Which methodologies of science are consistent with scientific realism? by Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick
Durham E-Theses
Which methodologies of science are consistent with
scientific realism?
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick
How to cite:
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick (2002) Which methodologies of science are consistent with scientific realism?,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3752/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
WHICH METHODOLOGIES OF SCIENCE ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH SCIENTIFIC REALISM? 
DARRELL PATRICK ROWBOTTOM 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MA IN PHILOSOPHY, 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
AUGUST 2002 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
2 5 MAR 2003 
ABSTRACT: WHICH METHODOLOGIES OF SCIENCE ARE CONSISTENT 
WITH SCIENTIFIC REALISM? 
DARRELL P A TRICK ROWBOTTOM 
MA IN PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM, 2002 
This thesis sets out to examine which methods it would be most consistent for 
a scientific realist to adopt when practising mature science, given his 
philosophical predilections. Moreover, it aims to establish the means by 
which the closely related question, "Is there any support for the philosophical 
stance known as scientific realism, given the methods that the modern 
scientist does, in fact, employ?", might be answered. 
In order to do this, it is first necessary to examine scientific realism in detail, 
and to compare it with competing philosophical positions on science; this is 
the role of chapter one. Scientific realism is seen to involve four distinct 
theses: metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, and teleological. The vital role 
which induction plays in justifying each of these theses is then illustrated, in 
part by elucidating the limitations of Popper's anti-inductivism, and of 
subsequent critical rationalist positions. 
Second, it is necessary to examine how the methods which one adopts when 
practising science might be affected by one's philosophical viewpoint. This is 
the task undertaken in chapter two, where the distinction between normative 
methods, in which all scientists must take part (in order to practice anything 
which might be justifiably thought of as a mature science), and auxiliary. 
methods, which are dependent upon the psychological state of the individual 
practitioner, is established, based on plausible demarcation guidelines 
between science and pseudo-science. It is clearly shown that different 
auxiliary methods are adopted by realist and anti-realist scientists: the 
construction of the quantum formalism in the 1920s, which is mentioned at 
several points throughout the thesis, is used as the primary example. 
The final chapter consists of the conclusions, which are as follows: (i) 
Scientific realists who are also practising scientists should be metaphysical 
realists of a Lowean variety, and employ metaphysical analysis in order to 
delimit ontological possibilities, before using experience (e.g. experiment) to 
choose between those possibilities; (ii) The question of whether there is 
support for scientific realism from the practice of modern scientists rests on 
whether there is really any legitimate distinction to be made between belief 
and acceptance; (iii) The semantic thesis of scientific realism is just as 
plausible as the metaphysical thesis of scientific realism, given that a 
practising scientist must behave as ifboth are true (viz. instrumentalism 
appears to be a highly dubious position). 
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1 
FORMULATING SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
What exactly is scientific realism? Naively stated, it is the view that the picture science gives 
us of the world is true, and that the entities postulated really exist ... But that statement is too 
naive; it attributes to the scientific realist the belief that today's scientific theories are 
(essentially) right. 
(van Fraassen [1976], p.250) 
This book is an attempt to defend scientific realism: the view that mature and genuinely 
successful scientific theories [many of today's] should be accepted as nearly true. 
(Psillos [1999], p.xiii) 
INTRODUCTION 
From a historical perspective, the doctrine of scientific realism is related to, 
although it should not be conflated with, the metaphysical realism to which 
many medieval philosophers subscribed. In common, both forms of realism 
make claims about the mind-independent existence of entities which are 
essentially unobservable; about 'suprasensible entities that lie beyond the reach 
of human perception.'1 However, whereas the entities of interest to the 
medieval realist were universals, viz. abstract entities such as 'redness', the 
contemporary (scientific) realist is, rather, concerned with the theoretical 
entities, such as the electron, that are employed in the theories of mature 
sciences.2 Although it may seem tempting to claim that there is a stronger 
analogy between metaphysical realism and scientific realism (or, indeed, 
between nominalism and instrumentalism), as Rescher does, I think that this 
is a misleading move.3 For it is neither logically inconsistent, nor ostensibly 
irrational, to be an anti-realist about abstracta, on the one hand, and a realist 
about theoretical entities as employed by science, on the other; the converse 
may also be true.4 
1 Rescher [1987], p.xi 
2 The mature sciences to which I refer are physics, chemistry, and biology. I will avoid 
making any claims about social sciences, psychology included, because I doubt that scientific 
realism is applicable to them. Certainly, to contend that it is would be to put forward an 
unnecessarily strong thesis, logically speaking, for the empirical successes of social sciences 
have not, in my opinion, been unequivocally demonstrated. 
3 For example, he claims that conceptualism- 'universals are ... mind-made all right, yet not 
arbitrarily, but under the guidance of certain natural predispositions of the mind'- is the 
analogue of approximationism- 'While the theoretical entities envisioned by natural science 
do not actually exist in the way current science claims them to be, science does (increasingly) 
have "the right general idea".' Rescher [1987], pp.xi-xii 
4 In the former case, one might argue that theoretical entities are Hot eliminable from 
predictively successful theoretical discourse, whereas many abstracta, such as universals, are. 
In the latter case, which is admittedly more problematic, one might suggest that the success of 
4 
In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, then, I shall present scientific 
realism as a stand-alone philosophical position. I will pay minimal heed to its 
precursors, insofar as they were precursors, and instead elucidate it as is. 
Since the purpose of this thesis is not to defend scientific realism, per se, but 
rather to examine which methodological views of science are compatible with 
it, this strategy seems the most direct. Before embarking upon it, however, I 
would draw the attention of the reader to one final caveat. 
This is, as suggested by the conflicting quotations which head this chapter, 
that scientific realism is ecumenical, and has therefore often been 
misunderstood, through no fault of their own, by its critics.s As Leplin puts 
it: 'Like the Equal Rights Movement, scientific realism is a majority position 
whose advocates are so divided as to appear a minority.'6 In light of this, I 
shall attempt to make my initial presentation of the position as logically weak 
as possible, so as to capture the common ground. In section 1.1, the 'hard-
core' of scientific realism will be expressed in terms of three distinct theses or 
components, the metaphysical, the semantic, and the epistemic, which form 
the basis of consent. Thereafter, in section 1.2, I will discuss an additional 
component, the aspirational thesis proposed by some, and explain why I 
believe its inclusion, at least as an axiom, to be ill-advised. Finally, in section 
1.3, I will provide an outline of the issues on which there is room for 
legitimate disagreement among scientific realists. Unavoidably, this 
discussion about the possible consequences of the 'hard-core' will be less of 
an exposition, and more of an exploration; hence the conclusions drawn 
therein should not be seen as representative of scientific realists in general. 
1.1 THE 'HARD CORE' OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
Simply put, the scientific realist views science as a search for truth: as a 
process of discovery and explanation. The instrumentalist, on the other hand, 
views theories as simple rules for calculation, which should be accepted only 
on the basis that they allow us to make phenomenological predictions. 
Whereas the instrumentalist would think it foolhardy to speculate on the 
nature of unobservable entities or mechanisms that underlie the act of 
prediction, the realist believes that science can and should, at least to a certain 
extent, identify and investigate these suprasensibles. Even at this early stage 
theoretical discourse in science is based directly upon the reality of llllll!bers and their 
relationships (a form of structural realism), rather than that of theoretical entities. Perhaps it 
might be claimed that talk of numbers that relate phenomena must be couched in talk of 
theoretical entities? 
5 What Feyerabend calls 'scientific realism', for example, bears little similarity to the 
contemporary (mainstream) position that is elucidated by those such as Devitt [1984] and 
Psillos [1999]. See Feyerabend [1981], chapters 1 and 2. 
6 Leplin [1984], p.1 
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of the presentation, this draws our attention to two important questions 
which are key to the overall theme of this thesis: (i) Can either belief-system, 
at least ostensibly, be adopted by real, successful, scientists?; (ii) If yes to (i), 
will scientists who adopt one system proceed differently than those who 
adopt the other? I will, therefore, make a brief stab at answering both these 
questions in the affirmative, before discussing scientific realism in any further 
depth.7 
Scientific Realism vs. lnstrumentalism - Two Illustrative Episodes 
Although it is prudent to avoid drawing general lessons from specific 
historical episodes, there is one particular area of physics which would seem 
to suggest that scientists can be either realists, or instrumentalists, and still 
succeed in some measure of predictive success. Specifically, I refer to 
quantum mechanics; one only needs to look to the declarations of the central 
figures in its development, during the late 1920s, in order to appreciate that 
they had very different ideas about the proper role of physical theories.s 
Bohr, for example, wrote: 
'There is no quantum world. There is only abstract quantum physical description. It is 
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we 
can say about nature.' 9 
'What we can say about nature', here, is presumably just what we can say 
predictively about macroscopic events, involving observables (or, to be more 
precise, sensibles). This reading is supported by Bohr's statement that: 
'The entire quantum formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions.' to 
Squarely opposed to what he saw as this 'shut up and calculate' approach to 
physics, however, was Einstein: 
'1930. Physics is the attempt at the conceptual construction of a model of the real world, as 
well as its lawful structure' 11 
7 Primarily, this is in order to explain why the issue treated by this thesis is interesting; how, 
that is, it relates to science as a real activity. 
8 The instrumentalists were the younger group of physicists: Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, and 
Pauli. The realists were the older group: Einstein, Schrodinger, and de Broglie. See Cushing 
[1994], chapter 7. 
9 Bohr, quoted in Squires [1994], pp.117-118 
10 Bohr, N. Dialectica 2, 312 (1948) 
11 Einstein, quoted in Fine [1996], p.97. With concession to Fine's argument, I do not want to 
contend that Einstein would have been fully committed to the position of scientific realism. I 
make only the weaker claim, that Einstein advocated a realist progrmmne of research, as a 
valuable, or perhaps even indispensable, heuristic for physics. 
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So, unnecessary technicalities aside, it seems eminently clear that these two 
physicists, as representative of their opposing schools of thought (see footnote 
8), approached the task of theory-construction from radically different 
viewpoints.12 Indeed, this is borne out by the fact that each school produced 
its own formalism. On behalf of the instrumentalist school, Heisenberg 
proffered his matrix-mechanics to the physics community. On behalf of the 
realist school, Schrodinger tendered his wave-mechanics. However, what is 
somewhat fascinating is that both these formalisms were subsequently shown 
to be empirically equivalent! To this very day, both formalisms are used 
interchangeably for certain calculations in non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics.13 So, in short, it would seem that the answer to both (i)-can 
either belief-system, at least ostensibly, be adopted by real, successful, 
scientists?- and (ii)- will scientists who adopt one system proceed differently 
than those who adopt the other?- is a resounding "yes". This said, though, 
one might claim that the answer to (ii) is not an important methodological 
concern, since the end results of both approaches, empirically speaking, were 
indistinguishable. To this empirical congruence, I will concede for the 
moment. Nevertheless, I shall offer one further example, building upon the 
previous discussion, in order to show that the results of the two approaches 
may differ in other important respects. 
At the Solvay Conference of 1927, after the empirical equivalence of the 
differing formalisms had been established, the two competing schools came 
together in order to discuss how best to interpret the mathematical backbone 
of quantum mechanics. The most prominent realist idea was the 'pilot-wave' 
interpretation put forward by de Broglie, but this was thought (erroneously) 
to be untenable, after a technical objection from Pauli.14 The instrumentalist 
school carried the day, and the 'Copenhagen Interpretation' was born. 
Indeed, it was not until twenty-five years later, when David Bohm realised 
that Pauli' s objection was spurious, that the pilot (or guiding) wave idea was 
re-examined. His two papers, published in 1952, showed how de Broglie' s 
basic idea could be employed, provided that non-locality was explicitly 
accepted in the process_15 
Now what we might ask, technicalities again avoided, is why Bohm went back 
to de Broglie' s old idea, when quantum mechanics had been such a great 
empirical success? The answer, in his own words, is simple: 
12 Zahar, though, is of the opinion that one would do better to examine what scientists 
actually do, rather than just what they say. I do so in this sub-section, but only to a very 
limited extent; deeper analysis will not be appropriate until later. See Zahar [1989], pp.3-4 
13 The Schrodinger wave equation is typically preferred in most cases, except when 
calculating spin-states. 
14 See Cushing [1994], pp.118-121 
1s Bohm, D. Physical Review 85, 166 (1952) & Ibid. 180 (1952) 
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'What I felt to be especially unsatisfactory was the fact that the quantum theory had no place 
in it for an adequate notion of an independent actuality ... the theory could not go beyond the 
phenomena or appearances.'I6 
Bohm was a realist, and this led him to adopt a different method to that which 
is prevalent in modern physics. Rather than purely engaging in experimental 
or theoretical work at the 'cutting-edge' of the discipline, he questioned a 
widely-accepted theory which had been (and still is) empirically adequate. 
As Kuhn put it: 
'given a theory which permits normal science ... scientists need not engage the puzzles it 
supplies ... they could instead seek potential weak spots ... Most of my present critics [Popper, 
Watkins, and other such 'rationalists'] believe they should do so. I disagree but exclusively on 
strategic grounds.' 17 [emphasis mine] 
Now what this seems to suggest is that there may be genuine links between 
realist thought and motivation, and the critical approach to science which is 
prescribed by Popper, among others. Nevertheless, to make the claim that 
there is anything more than a suggestion, here, is too quick. Why? Because 
Bohm' s theory makes no empirical predictions which differ from its 
(Copenhagen) predecessor. Whereas Popper's methodology is supposed to 
drive science forward, in terms of empirical success (inter alia), Bohm' s theory 
was, prima facie, predictively sterile. 
All that Bohm' s theory does do, it seems, is to express quantum mechanics in a 
fashion that is more ontologically consistent with, and explanatorily amenable 
to, theories in other domains of physics. In the words of Chang: 
'If we are concerned with the goal of understanding or explanation that teaches beyond the 
making and testing of predictions, it becomes crucial to eliminate conceptual contradictions. 
In the case of quantum physics the conceptual contradictions largely remained unresolved, 
and in this sense its success was not so great. The common opinion that quantum physics 
was a spectacular success results from the value system prevalent in contemporary science, 
which gives more weight to prediction than to understanding.' 18 
To the instrumentalist, then, the Bohmian theory might be seen as preferable 
on purely pragmatic grounds; it might be said to 'tell a more plausible story'.19 
But she might also claim that scientists should not be concerned with mere 
storytelling, because new empirical successes, which Bohm' s theory does not 
provide, are an important goal for science by any standards! Does the realist 
have a good counter? Can it be cogently argued that realist methods do lead 
16 Bohm [1987], p.33 
17 Kuhn [1970], p.246. 
18 Chang [1995], p.135 
19 There are other options. Instead, some anti-realists reject the importance of explanation 
completely (conventionalists such as Duhem); others say that two predictively equivalent 
theories are always explanatorily equivalent (i.e. in the 'covering-law' sense due to Dray, and 
subsequently adopted by Hempel in his deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical 
models of explanation.) These positions are discussed later in this section. 
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to more empirical success than instrumentalist ones? In order to answer such 
questions, we will first need to explore scientific realism in detail. 
Tlze Metaphysical Thesis 
Thesis M - There exists a world that is external to humans, which is 
populated by entities that have objective and mind-independent existence. 
Thesis M has two important dimensions. First, it says that there are entities 
which exist quite independently of what we humans believe, conceive of, or 
can even recognise; they are objective in the sense that they are not' constituted 
by our knowledge.'20 This is not to say that such entities are epistemically 
inaccessible; this thesis, taken alone, allows for objective entities which are 
either sensible or insensible, either identifiable or unidentifiable.21 In short, 
ontological and epistemological concerns, as they relate to the external entities 
posited by thesis M, are to be kept strictly separate.22 This dimension, 
henceforth referred to as dimension 0 (Objectivity), is thus explicitly opposed 
to modern verificationist accounts, specifically those of Dummett and 
Putnam, 'which reduce the content of the world to whatever gets licensed by 
a set of epistemic practices and conditions.'23 
Second, thesis M says that both the world which it posits, and the entities 
which inhabit it, are not constituted by the mental (as distinct from our 
knowledge). Against Leibniz, the world does not just consist of many minds. 
Against Berkeley, an entity (even a sensible one) does not consist of a bundle 
of 'ideas', viz. sense-data; esse is most certainly not percipi. One vulgar way of 
expressing this dimension, henceforth dimension I (Independence), would be 
to say that, were all minds to be suddenly extinguished, there would still be 
many entities left in existence. 
Of course, thesis M is seen by most, philosophers and laymen alike, as vapid, 
if not completely' obvious'. Rescher makes the case that such a world-view is 
a necessary presupposition for any form of experiential inquiry; it is a 
'postulation made on functional rather than evidential grounds.'24 It does seem 
plausible, as he claims, that one must accept thesis M in order to practice 
science in the first place; for science cannot, and does not, provide any 
unequivocal evidence for thesis M. Moreover, it seems equally plausible that, 
without accepting thesis M, there would be no reason why one should want 
to communicate with another. If I were crossing a road, and was almost 
2o Devitt [1984], p.15 
21 Indeed, it is permissible to accept thesis M and believe that both types of objective entities 
(accessible and inaccessible, epistemically speaking) inhabit the world. 
22 The link between the two is established, for the realist, in the subsequent theses. 
23 Psillos [1999], p.xix 
2~ Rescher [1987], p.l26 
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struck by a car (a near-collision, rather than a near-miss!), I might well ask 
bystanders to describe the car. Now if I had thought it blue, but I spoke to a 
large number of people who said that it was, instead, green, I would usually 
do well to believe them. But why would I want to, if I did not accept that 
there really was an external object (the car), about which some of my beliefs 
might be incorrect? As Rescher points out, to reject thesis M is to preclude 
inquiry-related discourse: 
'It is crucial to the communicative enterprise to take the egocentrism-avoiding stance that 
rejects all claims to a privileged status for our ow11 conception of things. In the interests of this 
stance we are prepared to "discount any misconceptions" (our own included) about things 
over a very wide range indeed ... [instead] we are committed to the stance that factual 
disagreements as to the character of things are communicatively irrelevant within very broad 
limits. The incorrectness of conceptions is venial.'25 
All this, unfortunately, is still not enough to convince the sceptic. For, even if 
one accepts that we must all behave as if a thesis is true, this is not to say that 
one should commit to the belief that it is true. It is quite ironic that Rescher 
makes this point most clearly when he is arguing for thesis M as a natural 
presupposition, by stating: 'The utility of the conception of reality is such that 
even if reality were not there, we would have to invent it.'26 This just begs the 
question, and the eager sceptic will simply ask, "Well, haven't we?" 
Unfortunately, as we shall see, providing a cogent answer to the negative is as 
problematic today as it was in the time of the Ancient Greeks. 
Rescher's strategy is to claim that the successes of our inquiry-related 
discourse provide a type of retro-justification for thesis M. He claims there 
are two 'loops' of retro-justification, the 'practical' and the 'theoretical', as 
depicted below: 27 
2s Ibid., p.135 
26 Ibid., p.140 
27 Figure from Rescher [1987], p.144 
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So the benefit of hindsight about our presuppositions supposedly 'confirms' 
them. On the one hand, they are 'confirmed' by the fact that their adoption 
has led to practical success, whereas on the other hand they are 'confirmed' 
by the role that they play in the explanation of inquiry. Rescher 
acknowledges the obvious circularity, and wants to have it that is not vicious: 
'The pragmatic turn does crucially important work here in putting at our disposal a style of 
justificatory argumentation that manages to be cyclical without vitiating circularity.'28 
However, I believe that his argument fails when inferential concerns are taken 
into account. First, let us note that Rescher fails to grasp the nettle of 
scepticism firmly, because a sceptic about thesis M is most certainly going to 
be a sceptic about induction. Let us imagine an individual struggling with a 
Cartesian demon. To him, it will seem that to believe in retro-justification is 
just to succumb to the illusion; the ephemeral' successes' resulting from his 
intuitive method of empirical inquiry are just the product of an evil monster, 
attempting to lure him into a false sense of security. Frankly, to suggest that 
this individual would adopt Rescher's complex philosophy, rather than limit 
himself to the Cogito, is just absurd. Once the Cogito is found, then acceptance 
of the way that things appear is pragmatically efficacious, but in no way 
necessitates attribution of beliefs about any putative 'veiled reality'. Since the 
pragmatic justification of induction still allows for scepticism, as its 
proponents candidly admit, Rescher could not adopt it and still claim his 
2s Ibid., p.142 
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argument was sceptic-proof.29 Moreover, to claim that nothing like induction 
is ever necessary is to renounce any claims about confirmation whatsoever 
(even about singular statements). In the words of Popper: 
'The best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to show its worth, and 
that it has been more successful than other hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be 
justified, verified, or even shown to be probable.' 30 
The sceptic would, then, need some way of determining that induction is 
justifiable a priori, in order to accept any further claims about a mind-
independent reality that might, for all he knows, not even exist. 
Unfortunately, even if we do try to attach an a priori justification of induction 
to explain the validity of retro-justification (following the principle of charity, 
we might assume that Rescher would have it so), we then run into another 
brick wall. Specifically, we encounter a hidden circularity, because it is quite 
clear that induction cannot be so justified without recourse to the validity of 
thesis M (in particular, dimension 0 thereof). Bonjour's conclusion, when 
considering how we can justify knowledge of the future, based on experience 
of the past, is that: 
'[an a priori] solution to the problem of induction depends on the tenability of a non-
Humean, metaphysically robust conception of objective regularity (or objective necessary 
connection).' 31 
Without a strong metaphysical underpinning for the argument, then, any 
attempt to avoid entertaining scepticism about thesis M (or indeed, about 
induction) is going to prove fruitless. We need to show that, metaphysically 
speaking, it is just impossible for thesis M not to obtain. It is important to 
recognise, as is suggested by the title of Bonjour' s book, that such a project is 
not feasible if we think of metaphysics in Kantian (or Neo-Kantian) terms, 
because its given role, in such a system, is too narrow: 
'space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely 
subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere 
appearances ... much may be said a priori that concerns their form, but nothing whatsoever 
about the things in themselves that may ground them.'32 
In fact, recent work on transcendental arguments has suggested that they can 
only provide theses with invulnerability from scepticism, viz. show that one 
should not be concerned about the challenge posed by the sceptic. According 
to Hookway: 
29 The proponents that I refer to are Reichenbach and Salmon. For an excellent outline of their 
position, see Bonjour [1998], pp.192-196 
30 As will be discussed in section 1.2, this is a serious problem for anti-inductivist 'realism' 
about science. Quotation from Popper [1980], p.315 
31 Bonjour [1998], pp.214-215 
32 Kant [1997], A49, p.188 
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'The 'logical possibility' which the modest argument fails to eliminate is dismissed as 
irrelevant once we take note of the uses to which the transcendental argument is put. Thus 
the argument is not irrelevant to the belief's being justified: but it does not originate that 
justification; it merely undermines a challenge to it.'33 [emphasis mine] 
Transcendental arguments are not sufficient to prove a thesis to be true (in the 
sense of correspondence), and we might, therefore, be left wondering, "What 
other options are left?" Gladly, I think that there is one possibility that 
remains, and it is 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' in Lowe' s sense: 
'it is possible to achieve reasonable answers to questions concerning the fundamental 
structure of reality -questions more fundamental than any that can be competently 
addressed by empirical science. But I do not claim that metaphysics 011 its own can, in general, 
tell us what tlzere is. Rather- to a first approximation- I hold that metaphysics by itself only 
tells us what there could be. But given that metaphysics has told us this, experience can then 
tell us which of various alternative metaphysical possibilities is plausibly true in actuality.'34 
If such a view of metaphysics can be defended, then the correct method of 
proving thesis M would be to demonstrate that any metaphysical system that 
attempts to exclude it is simply not sustainable.35 I shall not attempt to do so 
here, however, and for two distinct reasons. First, because this would involve 
setting out a list of criteria for distinguishing between metaphysical systems 
that allow for different possibilities - this is quite outside the scope of this 
section. Second, because such a quest would result in a lengthy thesis in its 
own right. 
All I want to suggest is that Lowe' s take on metaphysics promises a chance of 
cogently defending thesis M, whereas all other attempts to do so have failed. 
The importance of this, in context of this thesis as a whole, will become 
apparent in Section 3.2, where I will discuss the role that metaphysics could 
play in a realist methodology of science. For the moment, though, I would 
ask the reader to turn his attention back to the exposition of scientific realism. 
The Senzantic Thesis 
Thesis S- The terms in scientific theories, be they observational or 
theoretical, have putative reference. 
Thesis S says that the terms in a scientific theory refer to entities that are 
theory-independent. In particular, the emphasis is upon theoretical terms, 
such as gravitational force, rather than observational terms, such as the 
33 Hookway [1999], p.186 
34 Lowe [1998], p.9 
35 Illusb·ating that dimension 0 is ineliminable, even in the near-nihilist limit where one could 
posit that only the empty-set existed (in addition to human minds), is not too problematic. 
However, sustaining that dimension I is ineliminable would be far more difficult. 
13 
Young's modulus of an iron bar. When coupled with thesis M, and a 
correspondence-theory of truth, the conclusion drawn from thesis S is that a 
true theory will pick out mind-independent entities that exist. An extended 
example will help to clarify this point, by showing how putative properties 
and putative particulars are interrelated. Let us imagine that Maxwell' s 
equations, here simplified to apply to the case of electric and magnetic fields 
in a vacuum, are all true: 
(1) V· E=O (from Coulomb's Law) 
(2) V· B=O (from Gauss's Law) 
(3) V x B -JlDEodE/dt = 0 (from Ampere's modified Law36) 
(4) V X E + dB/dt = 0 (from Faraday's Law of Induction) 
So (and I emphasise, this is on the assumption that the laws are true) we have 
two real particulars, viz. electric field, E, and magnetic field, B. We also have 
two real properties of free space, viz. its permittivity, Eo, and its permeability, 
f..lo. Now, only elementary mathematics is necessary to elucidate their 
re la tionshi ps: 
We take the curl of (4), using the vector relationship, 
V x (V x A)= V(V ·A)- V2A 
and obtain, 
(5) V(V. E)+ V X dB/dt = \72£ 
Then, substituting (1) into (5), and reversing the operators on B (which are 
mathematically interchangeable), we arrive at, 
djdt (V x B)= V2E 
and may substitute from (3) to find that, 
(6) V2E = f..lo Eo d2E/ ae 
Indeed, analogously, by taking the curl of (3), using the same vector 
relationship as above, and substituting from (2) and (4), we find the 
symmetrical equation, 
36 The initial version of Ampere's law would have read V x B = 0 in this case, but Maxwell 
modified it to include a displacement current. Notice the symmetry between 3 & 4. 
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So we note that both the electric field and the magnetic field obey the classical 
wave equation, which is just: 
V'2A = (1/ c2) (J2A/ iJt2 where c is the speed of the wave 
Thus it becomes clear that forE and B to exist (alone) in a vacuum they must 
be bound together in the form of a self-propagating wave.37 This 
'electromagnetic wave' will be transverse, with E and B both perpendicular to 
the direction of propagation (as suggested by Fleming's left-hand-rule), and 
will travel with a definite speed of, 
c = 1 / -1 (f.lo Eo) 
Now what is interesting is that we have 'picked out' a new 'thing', a bundle of 
E and B, which deserves the status of a particular in its own right. Its E 
cannot exist without B, and vice versa: 
'Suppose the magnetic field were to disappear. There would be a changing magnetic field 
which would produce an electric field. If this electric field tries to go away, the changing 
electric field would create a magnetic field back again. So by a perpetual interplay - by the 
swishing back and forth from one field to the other - they must go on forever. .. They 
maintain themselves in a kind of dance - one making the other, the second making the first-
propagating onward through space.'38 
In less elegant terms, the electromagnetic wave is indi·uisible, so should be 
considered as a fundamental building block of the world, even though it is a 
composite of E and B. It is primitive in a sense that a water wave, or a wave on 
a string, is not. But what of its speed, c? Should this be considered as a 
primitive, viz. metaphysically basic, property of the e-m wave itself? Surely 
not, for it is the initial properties of free space itself (or in the more general 
case, the medium through which the e-m wave is moving) that define it_39 Let 
us remember that c is not a variable (as velocity for an object with mass is), it 
is rather a constant that relates the energy and momentum of a photon, as 
follows: 
Energy= pc (from the equation for total energy of an entity40) 
37 For derivation of plane-wave, see Feynman [1964], pp.18-4 to 18-8. 
38 Ibid., p.18-8 
39 A charge of circularity may be leveLled at my presentation, since I assumed that the 
permittivity and permeability of free space were real initially. With the benefit of hindsight, 
of course, we might want to say that c is pri111itive, whereas one of !J.o or Eo are not; either way, 
we still end up with only two primitive properties. (Note that Maxwell first worked with just 
c and Eo, interestingly enough.) 
~o Specifically, E2 = (p c)2 + m02c4. E =pc is the special case for a body with no rest mass. 
The other derivative equation is for a body with no momentum -the infamous mass-energy 
equivalence equation, E = m0 c2 
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The important lesson, here, is that some theoretical talk of properties may be 
reducible to talk of a snwller number of real primitive properties, but still adopted 
for convenience; thesis S allows for this. (Notice footnote 39, and see my later 
discussion in the next sub-section, 'The Epistemic Thesis'.) 
Adopting thesis S sets the scientific realist apart, first, from reductive 
empiricists. Talk of theoretical terms is not just taken to be disguised talk of 
observational terms, as one who adopted a verification criterion of meaning 
would want to have it.41 The work of the early Carnap is particularly 
important in this area, for his attempt to show that theoretical discourse could 
be rephrased in terms of purely observational discourse was a failure. I shall 
not cover his argument in detail, here, for it is already treated extensively 
elsewhere.42 It should suffice, instead, to note that Carnap finally conceded 
that theoretical terms were necessary for successful scientific theories: 
'1. Without using theoretical terms 'it is not possible to arrive ... at a powerful and 
efficacious system of laws' ... ' this is an empirical fact, not a logical necessity' ... 
2. Scientific theories do formulate comprehensive laws with the help of theoretical 
terms. 
Therefore, theoretical terms are indispensable.' 43 
However, this said, there is still another position that can be adopted to avoid 
endorsing thesis S; that of the instrumentalist. While it might well be the case 
that scientific theories, if viewed as genuinely assertive about the world, must 
be seen to make putative reference to theoretical (as well as observational) 
entities, the instrumentalist would just deny that theories do make such 
assertions. Instead, he would claim that the theories of science are just means 
by which we give structure to phenomena which might, otherwise, appear to 
be unrelated. They are merely constructs, designed for 'organising 
experience ... and for guiding further experimental investigation.'44 The 
instrumentalist essentially believes that observational terms are still 
epistemically privileged, even though he rejects the verification criterion of 
meaning. There are, broadly speaking, two 'churches' of instrumentalism; on 
the one hand, the conventionalist, and on the other, the eliminativist. 
The conventionalist, such as Duhem, would argue that science can proceed 
successfully irrespective of whether there is a reality underlying the 
phenomena, or whether scientists believe that there is. That is, albeit that 
theoretical discourse may be ineliminable from scientific theories. Simply 
41 If statements containing theoretical terms were unverifiable, then they would not be 
meaningful from a logical positivist perspective. 
42 Psillos [1999], pp.3-1 0 
43 Ibid., pp.l0-11, with some quotation from Carnap himself. 
44 Ibid., referring to Nagel's work in the 1950s, p.17 
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put, these are matters with which the scientist, and therefore science, need not 
be concerned: 
'The aim of tlzeonJ is to classifiJ experimental laws ... In classifijing a group of experimental laws, 
physical theonJ teaches liS absolutely nothing about the foundation for those laws and the nature of the 
phenomena they govem ... plzysical theories and metaphysical truths are independent of one another.'45 
The conventionalist may even, therefore, wholeheartedly endorse thesis M, 
but remain quite agnostic about whether theoretical terms in theories are 
really referential to entities that are inaccessible to the senses. Niels Bohr's 
position would be best characterised as being within the conventionalist 
'camp', since he believed in a deeper-structure to the world, but simply 
maintained that our intuitive (classical) conceptualisation thereof was too 
limited to make sense of it: 
'The quantum theory is characterized by the acknowledgement of a fundamental limitation of 
the classical ideas when applied to atomic phenomena. The situation thus created is of a 
peculiar nature, since our interpretation of the experimental material rests essentially on the 
classical concepts.' 46 
In particular, Bohr's doctrine of complementarity reflects this concern; in his 
eyes, one could speak of a quantum entity as 'wave' or as 'particle', but these 
two concepts were mutually exclusive.47 In a similar way, for any non-
commuting variables, viz. properties such as spin on the x and y axes of a 
silver atom, there may well be something real underneath our picture, but we 
cannot elucidate it because we are bound to use models that are derived from 
our macroscopic experience. 
At the root of the conventionalist position, that 'A physical theory is not an 
explanation'48 (Duhem), and that 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics 
is to find out how nature is'49 (Bohr), is a historical-epistemic argument. Since 
the history of science clearly shows that many explanations provided by 
previous theories were wrong, the conventionalist wants to maintain that the 
empirical progress of science is based only upon the fact that a successor 
theory carries over some of the structural aspects of its forerunners. In short, 
the conventionalist claims that it is developments in formalism ('the 
representative part' of theories), rather than interpretation ('the explanatory 
part' of theories), that really drive science ahead.50 This idea is at the core of 
the pessimistic meta-induction, a powerful argument against scientific realism, 
which attempts to sever the connection between empirical success and the 
45 Duhem [1996], pp.36-37 
46 Bohr, N. Address to the International Congress of Physics at Como, Italy, on 16111 
September 1927. 
47 See Fine [1996], on Bohr's belief in semantic disturbance due to measurement, pp.34-45 
48 Duhem [1954], p.19 
49 Bohr, quoted in Squires [1994], pp.l17-118 
so For the distinction between explanatory and representative parts, see Duhem [1954], pp.31-
39 
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truth-like representation of the world's deep-structure. How the realist 
attempts to establish and defend this connection is also vital for the epistemic 
thesis of scientific realism (thesis E), so discussion of this concern will 
therefore be postponed until the next sub-section. For the moment, let us turn 
our attention to the other 'church' of instrumentalism, namely eliminativism, 
and see how semantic realists argue against it. 
The early eliminativists, such as Mach, claimed that there is simply nothing 
other than experience to represent; thesis M, as it relates to suprasensibles, 
viz. theoretical entities, was considered to be incorrect. According to Mach, 
posited entities such as atoms are afforded properties which have no bearing 
upon the way that we would expect bodies to be, from our macroscopic 
experience: 'with properties that absolutely contradict the attributes hitherto 
observed in bodies'.SI Notice the similarity, here, with Bohr's aforementioned 
point. The difference is that, whereas Bohr might believe in things like atoms, 
which unfortunately have properties that we can never hope to identify (due 
to our inability to mentally 'step outside' our macroscopic prejudices), Mach 
thought that such entities could not exist, because real things are simply not 
of that sort. In short, for Mach, our macroscopic experiences are not just 
prejudices; they constitute privileged knowledge of the way that things must 
be. We should endeavour to speak of unobservable properties if, and only if, 
they are extrapolated from observable properties: 
'The properties of atoms are formed in a way discontinuous with the properties observed in 
the phenomena. In positing atoms, the principle of continuity is violated. For Mach this 
means that 'the mental artifice atom' is suspect: something, perhaps, to be used provisionally, 
but disposed of ultimately.'52 
Mach's view on atoms is generally thought to have been proven 
unsustainable, after Perrin, in his Les A tomes, showed how Avogadro's 
number (the number of atoms in one mole of a gas) could be determined, to a 
high degree of agreement, by no less than thirteen different experiments. As 
Psillos points out, the simple argument that 'we can count them, therefore tlzey 
exist' was enough to convert Poincare, who was previously one of Mach's 
more notable sympathisers, to atomism.s3 
However, although Mach's attempt to dismiss thesis M (with respect to 
unobservables) was unconvincing, it did pave the way for later developments 
in eliminativism. For, in recognition that it was problematic to advocate 
theoretical discourse as an economic necessity, while simultaneously 
maintaining that it did not imply the existence of unobservables, Craig 
51 Mach, quoted in Psillos [1999], p.20 
52 His 'principle of continuity' does important work in avoiding idealism of the Berkelian sort; 
Mach can endorse the idea of an unobservable vibration in a stiff rod, for example, since we 
can imagine such vibrations becoming incrementally smaller and reaching a stage at which 
they become insensible. Quotation from Psillos [1999], p.20 
53 Psillos [1999], p.22 
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adopted a different strategy. Specifically, he put forward a theorem which 
demonstrated that theoretical discourse can be completely eliminated from a 
scientific theory, T, not by reducing it to talk to observables (the failed 
Carnapian scheme), but rather by forming a new theory, Craig(T). Formal 
logic aside, Craig's theorem demonstrates that, for any theory T, employing 
both theoretical and observational terms, there exists a theory Craig(T) which 
uses only the observational terms in T, yet is functionally isomorphic with T.54 
Functionally isomorphic, that is, in the sense that all the deductive 
consequences ofT that can be expressed in observational language are also 
deductive consequences of Craig(T). This poses what Hempel called the 
'paradox of theorizing': 
'if the terms and principles of a theory serve their purpose, i.e., if they establish definite 
connections among observable phenomena, then they can be dispensed with since any chain 
of laws and interpretative statements establishing such a connection should then be 
replacable by a law which directly links observational antecedents to observational 
consequents.'55 
Then, by adding two uncontroversial statements- (i) If the terms and 
principles of a theory do not serve their purpose, then they can surely be 
dispensed with; (ii) For any theory, its terms and principles either serve their 
purpose or do not- Hempel concludes that the terms and principles of any 
theory must, therefore, be dispensable. Prima facie, this 'Theoretician's 
Dilemma', as Hempel christened it, seems fatal for thesis S: 'Craig's theorem 
guarantees that if we deem a class of terms 'unwanted', then it can be 
dispensed with.'56 
This said, though, the semantic realist would want to make the case that 
theories not only establish deductive connections, but also inductive ones. 
And theoretical terms are 'wanted' precisely because they are responsible for 
making the inductive connections between observable terms. Consider the 
following: 
i) A theoretical hypothesis, H, deductively entails a group of 
observational consequences, {01 ... On}. 
ii) Another theoretical hypothesis, J, deductively entails a different group 
of observational consequences, {P1 ... Pn}. 
iii) When Hand J are conjoined, a novel (testable) group of observational 
consequences, {Q1 ... Qn} is predicted. These predictions, after 
appropriate experimental investigation, are found to be correct. 
54 See Craig [1956]: There are problems for Craigian theories- for example, that the number 
of axioms in a Craigian system is infinite - that are not discussed here, because it is the logical 
validity (rather than practical applicability) of Craig's theorem that is relevant in this context. 
ss Hempel [1965], p.186 
56 Psillos [1999], p.25 
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Now what is important to note is that {OI ... On} and {PI ... Pn} alone cannot lead 
to a prediction of the novel observational consequences, {QI ... Qn}. Rather, it 
is necessary to inductively infer that both Hand J hold, because {OI ... On} and 
{PI ... Pn} both obtain (in their respective domains), before any attempt to 
conjoin could be considered worthwhile. H and J are, thus, quite 
indispensable in making a connection between {OI ... On} and {PI ... Pn}, on the 
one hand, and {QI ... Qn}, on the other. In this context, Craig(H) and Craig(J) 
are predictively sterile. It seems fitting to leave the final word on the 
Theoretician's Dilemma to Hempel: 
'if it is recognized that a satisfactory theory should provide possibilities also for inductive 
explanatory and predictive use and that it should achieve systematic economy and heuristic 
fertility [see footnote 54], then it is clear that theoretical formulations can not be replaced by 
expressions in terms of observables only; the theoretician's dilemma, with its conclusion to 
the contrary, is seen to rest on a false premise [that theories should only provide deductive 
connections between observables]'57 
The Epistemic Thesis 
Thesis E - Scientific theories, through their predictive empirical successes, 
can achieve degrees of confirmation. A well-confirmed theory, in a well-
established domain of mature science, is approximately true. 
Thesis E says that most of our current scientific theories, those that have 
shown themselves to be empirically successful in terms of accuracy and 
scope, are essentially right. Given theses M and S, thesis E thus means that, in 
the eyes of the scientific realist, the theoretical entities employed by the 
aforementioned theories are real, and actually do inhabit the (mind-
independent, objective) world. As an example, let us take the electron, which 
plays a central role in the predictive successes of nuclear physics (beta decay), 
statistical thermodynamics (Fermi-Dirac statistics), solid state physics 
(conductivity, heat capacity, optical behaviour), quantum chemistry (valency 
and periodicity), and even stellar astrophysics (degeneracy pressure). For the 
scientific realist, this means that the electron must be just as real as planets, 
stars, or even the keyboard on which I type. Moreover, it means that the 
properties of the electron which play a role in the formalisms of science, such 
as charge, mass, spin, and wavelength, must also be approximately correct. 
For, if 'spin' does not refer to something about the elech·on, or at least the 
electron-world system, then why would the use of such a property, say in 
accounting for the inert chemical nature of helium, lead to such great 
predictive power? 
Of course, the caveat mentioned towards the beginning of the previous sub-
section, that some talk of 'properties' may ultimately be found to be talk about 
57 Hempel [1965], p.222 
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other more fundamental (or primitive) properties, is one that the realist can 
happily accept. Indeed, although from a modern metaphysical perspective 
one might be inclined to think that the objects of everyday experience do not 
really possess a fundamental property of' colour' - one might think, instead, 
that colour is a relationship between light, the media through which it moves, 
and the faculty of human perception - there is an important sense in which 
colour is still a 'property' of an object. If I speak of two books in front of me, 
one red, and one blue, then with the necessary ceteris paribus clauses (e.g. both 
books have white light shining on them), I am still picking out an important 
difference between those two books. In a more practical context, were I to be 
offered a salad containing brown lettuce leaves, then I would not partake of it, 
because I would inductively infer something important about those lettuce 
leaves, specifically that they were rotten. And just as to talk of a lettuce leaf 
being 'brown' is to say something about that leaf, to talk of an electron having 
'+1/2 spin on the x-axis' is to say something (although we might not be sure 
precisely what that something is) about that electron. 
Central to the realist defence of thesis E is the notion that abduction (or 
inference to the best explanation) empowers one to choose which of a 
competing set of empirically equivalent theories is more likely to be true. For 
example, were I to wake up on Christmas Day and find that a package 
addressed to me had mysteriously appeared by my bedside, I might, in 
principle, posit a large number of theories to explain its appearance there. 
One such theory might be that Santa Claus came down the chimney during 
the night and deposited the package, whereas another might be that my 
loving parents put it there shortly after I went to sleep. And I would choose 
the latter, the realist would argue, just because it is the better of the two 
explanations for the phenomenon (better, in this case, on grounds of the 
theoretical virtues of simplicity and consistency).58 In short, when Watson 
sycophantically congratulated Holmes for making a "brilliant deduction", he 
should, instead, have said "brilliant abduction". Following the principle of 
charity, though, it only seems fair to abduce that Conan Doyle was aware of 
this fact, but did not wish to make it appear that Watson was congratulating 
Holmes on a successful criminal action! 
The main objections to thesis E have been made by those who accept theses M 
& S, but reject the notion that we can ever know of a theory that it is any more 
true than another. True, that is, in a correspondence sense; for those who 
reject thesis M, or indeed thesis S, are free to endorse thesis E in a rather 
trivial sense. As Hendry points out: 
ss It is simpler, in an Ockham's razor sense, because I am not positing an extra entity, in this 
case Santa Claus, without necessity. It is more consistent because it fits in with what I know 
about the world, experientially; it might also be a good inductive inference, if my parents told 
me that they left the present that 'mysteriously' appeared by my bedside on Christmas Day 
the year before. 
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'There is ... a sense in which the issue of whether theories can be confirmed as true arises in an 
interesting way only if a non-epistemic theory of truth is agreed upon ... Putnam's acceptance 
of the epistemic component [Thesis E] is rendered Pickwickian on this view by its 
identification of truth with rational acceptability in the ideal limit of enquiry.'S9 
There are three broad types of objection to thesis E (made by those who 
endorse a 'non-epistemic theory of truth'): the critical rationalist, the 
historical-epistemic, and the constructive empiricist. The most distinct and 
striking position is that of the critical rationalist. He, following Popper, 
would argue that thesis E is incorrect because induction is unjustifiable (or, 
perhaps, because there is not even such a thing as 'inductive inference'). Yet 
curiously, he would still want to claim that the aim of science is truth. Now 
this is an interesting type of 'realism', at least prima facie, and is certainly 
worthy of further investigation. Unfortunately, it is one that is, as I hope to 
demonstrate in the next section (1.2), internally inconsistent and rationally 
unsustainable.6° Here, I will only treat the other two types of objection, which 
both, in common, focus their attack on the realist's use of abduction. 
From the historicist (or historical-epistemic) perspective, which has already 
been touched upon during the previous discussion of conventionalism, any 
methodology of science should be judged on the basis of a specific meta-
methodological rule. Specifically, that "The better of two methodologies of 
science is that which shows the better fit with history."61 And the historicist, 
such as Laudan, would claim (along related lines) that 'epistemic realism [the 
result of thesis E, given M & S], at least in some of its extant forms, is neither 
supported by, nor has it made sense of, much of the available historical 
evidence.' 62 By citing several previous theories in science, Laudan points out 
that a theory can enjoy a degree of both predictive and explanatory success, 
even when one of its central theoretical terms can be seen, with the benefit of 
hindsight, to have referred to literally nothing. Indeed, a scientific realist 
(committed to the belief that the current theories of chemistry and physics are 
approximately true) can hardly claim that there really are such things as 
caloric, phlogiston, and the electromagnetic aether!63 To avoid becoming 
embroiled in a detailed account of Laudan' s argument, however, it is worth 
simply pointing to his central assumption that' a realist would never want to say 
that a theory was approximately true if its central terms failed to refer.'64 
59 Hendry [1995L p.58 
60 This said, an important lesson about the central role of induction, in any realist account of 
science, will be drawn from that discussion. 
61 For example, if a given methodology made a novel prediction about a specific historical 
episode in science (i.e. we searched through previously unexamined historical documents, 
such as the letters of scientists, and established its success), then that methodology, itself, 
would be seen to attain a degree of confirmation. 
62 Laudan [198Jt p.1114 
63 Laudan's other examples of non-referential terms include 'the crystalline spheres of ancient 
and medieval astronomy' and 'the vital force ... of physiology'. Laudan [198Jt p.1126 
64 Ibid., p.1126 
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However, as Psillos points out in his case study of the caloric theory of heat, 
sometimes the laws which form a theory can be totally independent of the 
assumptions made on the grounds of a supposedly' central' theoretical term.65 
Indeed, many scientists at the turn of the nineteenth century actually 
recognised that there just wasn't enough evidence available to choose 
between the caloric and dynamic theories of heat. Laplace and Lavoisier, for 
example, wrote: 
'The conservation of the free heat, in simple mixhues of bodies, is .. . independent of tlzose 
lzypotlzeses [caloric or dynamic theories of heat]: this is generally admitted by the physicists, 
and we shall adopt it in the following researches.'66 [emphasis mine] 
So, the realist would argue, the caloric theory of heat was approximately true, 
in the sense that it captured the conservation of energy principle, even though 
one of its central terms was non-referential. Moreover, in terms of my 
formulation of thesis E, the realist might deny that the caloric theory was ever 
'well-confirmed'; on the contrary, what was well-confirmed (as the scientists 
of the day recognised) was the shared ground between the dynamic and caloric 
theories. It should also be emphasised that it was never appropriate to use 
abduction to choose between the dynamic and caloric theories of heat, 
precisely because they were not empirically congruent (although it was clear 
that they dealt with different phenomena in the same domain).67 That is to 
say, further experimentation was considered to be the most appropriate 
means by which to proceed. 
On a higher level, I think that it is also fair to criticise the historicist approach 
by drawing attention to the questionable nature of its meta-methodology. In 
particular, I do not believe that there is just one 'methodology of science', one 
science-philosopher's stone, which can lay bare the inner workings of such an 
essentially human activity. Rather, I believe that science can be approached in 
many different ways, and that empirical success can be achieved, in varying 
degrees of efficacy, by adopting many different methods.68 Popper, for one, 
agreed with this point: 
"Normal' Science, in Kuhn's sense, exists ... it must be taken into account by historians of 
science. That it is a phenomenon which I dislike (because I regard it as a danger to science) 
while he apparently does not dislike it (because he regards it as 'normal') is another 
question ... a very important o11e.' 69 [emphasis mine] 
65 Psillos [1999], ch.6 
66 Laplace and Lavoisier, quoted in Psillos [1999], p.118 
67 E.g. The caloric theory predicted an increase in weight (due to more caloric) as a body was 
heated, whereas the dynamic theory did not. 
68 As suggested towards the beginning of this chapter, under the heading 'Realism vs. 
Instrumentalism - Two Historical Episodes', if this idea can not be defended then this Thesis is 
simply based upon a false premise. 
69 Popper [1970], p.52. Kuhn also appreciated that his disagreement with Popper was only 
made on 'strategic grounds' (see footnote 17), so it seems that I am in good company (both 
logicist and historicist) in my views about methodology. 
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Of course, it is quite possible that there is some sort of' core methodology', 
some bare set of methodological requirements that are necessary to do 
anything that would be recognisable as 'science', but this would be pretty thin 
(and, indeed, unlikely to be practically applicable, without auxilianJ methods). 
And it is only in establishing such a 'core methodology', I would argue, that 
the historicist's meta-methodology would prove useful. However, my views 
on methodology will be presented in the next chapter (2), so I shall not dwell 
upon this point here. 
As mentioned long ago, in a paragraph far, far away, the final objection to 
thesis E, critical rationalism aside (until1.2), is made by the constructive 
empiricist. 'Constructive', as van Fraassen explains when he mints the term, 
because such an empiricist believes that the proper aim of science should be 
to construct theories that are empirically adequate, rather than to discover 
truths about mechanisms that underlie the phenomena?0 Although it may 
seem curious, prima facie, van Fraassen' s position is very close to that of the 
scientific realist, for he not only accepts theses M and S, but also most of thesis 
E; he would just substitute 'empirically adequate' for 'approximately true'. In his 
words: 
'The distinction I have drawn between realism and anti-realism, in so far as it pertains to 
acceptance [of a theory], concerns only how much belief is involved therein.'71 
His suggestion is that it is only acceptance of a theory that is important, in the 
context of science as a practice, because it is only necessary for a scientist to 
accept a theory (as empirically adequate) in order to work with it. Now this is 
clearly true to a certain extent, certainly if a scientist is using a theory in one of 
the 'puzzle-solving' senses that constitute Kuhnian 'normal science', but the 
realist would argue that this can not be the whole story.72 In particular, if we 
take two theories in different domains that we only accept as empirically 
adequate, then why would we want to conjoin them? 
If' A is true' and 'B is true', then' (A & B) is true' is deductively entailed, but if 
'A is just empirically adequate', and 'B is just empirically adequate', then 
there are no obvious grounds for asserting that '(A & B) is empirically 
adequate'. In recognition of this point, van Fraassen makes the claim that 
nothing like conjunction occurs (or at least, occurs often); instead, he suggests 
that 'Putting two theories together ... [involves] correction.'73 But this is surely 
insufficient, the realist rejoins, because correction occurs prior to the process of 
conjunction. If (A & B) fails, one does not just correct it to form (A & B)*. 
Instead, one corrects A {orB} and forms A* {orB*}, before re-conjoining it with 
70 van Fraassen [1980], p.5 
71 Ibid., p.12 
72 See Kuhn [1996], chapter 3, and my later discussion in 2.2. 
73 van Fraassen [1980], p.84 
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B {or A}, and thus arriving at (A* & B) {or (A & B*)}.74 Besides, the realist 
adds, simple conjunction (without any theoretical correction) happens 
regularly in science. For example, in making a typical prediction about the 
elemental composition of a star, via spectroscopic analysis, we just slam 
together laws from quantum mechanics, optics, electromagnetism, and even 
electronics (which is employed in the construction of modern instruments). 
Note that such a prediction will always be of the form 'it is 99.9% likely that 
star X contains element Y', rather than 'star X definitely contains element Y', 
since experimental (not theoretical) errors must always be taken into account. 
Thus a failure to make a successful prediction in any one isolated case is never 
sufficient to suggest that any theoretical corrections are necessary, and does 
not pose a serious threat to the realist line on this issue. 
However, aside from offering a positive alternative to scientific realism, by 
the substitution of' empirical adequacy' for' approximate truth' in the 
statement of thesis E, van Fraassen also offers a criticism of abduction, with 
respect to theoretical entities. And it is this negative thesis, which turns on 
the old empiricist distinction between what is 'observable' and what is 
'unobservable', which proves to be more cogent than his positive one. In 
presenting this criticism, I shall not follow van Fraassen directly- primarily 
because he does mix his positive and negative theses, and I believe that there is 
no logical reason to do so75 - but shall, instead, suggest that there might be an 
internal inconsistency in the realist position?6 My argument, for what I shall 
subsequently refer to as the Abduction-Obsenmtion Tension (or AOT), is as 
follows: 
The scientific realist wants to sustain that: 
A) Suprasensibles may be quite unlike sensibles, in many respects. 
Else, the realist would have to concede that Mach's 'principle of continuity', 
mentioned in the discussion of thesis S, is essentially right. 
But also wants to sustain that: 
B) Abductive inferences allow one to select between empirically 
equivalent theories, on the basis of their relative verisimilitude (or 
nearness-to-the-truth). 
74 See Psillos [1999], p.206 (Referring to work by Hooker.) 
75 See van Fraassen [1980], p.21: 'the premiss that we all follow the rule of inference to the 
best explanation when it comes to mice and other mundane matters - that premiss is shown 
wanting. It is not warranted by the evidence, because that evidence is not telling for the 
premiss agai11st the alternative hypothesis I proposed, which is relevant in this context.' 
[emphasis mine] 
76 The spirit of this objection is very similar to van Fraassen's, although I believe that my 
presentation is novel. 
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Else, theory-choice is either radically underdetermined, or merely a pragmatic 
matter. 
But now we must ask whether the type of explanation that is normally 
expected of an abductive inference is not just one that is based upon 
experience; for example, in theorising that a Christmas present is from one's 
parents, rather than Santa Claus. In terms of the earlier discussion under the 
heading of' Scientific Realism vs. Instrumentalism', would a realist not just 
prefer Bohm' s interpretation over the Copenhagen one because it relates more 
to their preconceptions based on macroscopic experience? This points to an 
internal tension in the scientific realist's position: 
AOT - How can we judge how explanatorily successful a theory is (B), 
without succumbing to experiential predilections (forbidden by A)? 
The answer is by no means clear, and this clearly speaks in favour of van 
Fraassen's agnosticism about (not denial of) the existence of suprasensibles, at 
least as they are characterised by scientific theories. In his words: 
'if it matters more to us to have one sort of question answered than another, there is no reason 
to think that a theory which answers more of the first sort of questions is more likely to be 
true (even with the proviso 'everything else being equal'). It is merely a reason to prefer that 
theory in another respect.'77 
The only strategy available to the realist, in order to diffuse the AOT, seems to 
be to perform a historical analysis of science past, in an attempt to 
demonstrate that those theories which we (humans) consider to be more 
explanatorily successful have turned out to be the better ones in the long-term. 
At least, if such a link between explanatory power and long-term empirical 
success (in terms of successor theories) were to be established, then 
philosophers could agree that "If scientists behave as if the suprasensibles 
employed by their theories exist, then they will perform better science." That 
would be a good start?B 
Scientific Realism -A Brief Recapitulation 
Unfortunately, the arguments surrounding scientific realism are complex at 
each stage (or each thesis), and it is easy to lose sight of how it stands in 
relation to its competitors, instead becoming transfixed by one technicality or 
another. In light of this, I believe that a diagrammatic presentation might 
prove useful to the reader, and serve to add clarity to my previous prose: 
77 van Fraassen [1980], p.87 
78 Of course, local scepticism would still be possible, although it would be less plausible. Note 
also, in this context, that van Fraassen isn't a sceptic about thesis M- so why should he be 
one about thesis E, if the realists were successful in establishing an 'explanatory power-
empirical success' link? 
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Although fig. 2 is not designed to be comprehensive -for example, I might 
have included Poincare's fictionalism as a competitor to thesis S-I believe 
that it encapsulates the spirit of the debate between realists and anti-realists, 
with respect to science. Indeed, I think that looking at the structure of the 
debate in such a manner allows one to draw three interesting conclusions: 
1) Central to the scientific realist position is the notion that there is no valid 
epistemic distinction to be made between observables and unobservables. 
(Which is not to say that unobservables should be necessarily thought to 
have properties which are similar, in any respect, to those of observables.) 
2) Over time, the anti-realist positions have 'slipped', becoming ever closer to 
scientific realism. This is reflected by the fact that modern anti-realists are 
generally in the 'epistemic-historicist' (Laudan), 'critical rationalist' 
(Miller), or 'constructive empiricist' (van Fraassen) camps; there are hardly 
any reductive empiricists or instrumentalists left to speak o£.79 
3) The move of the later Putnam, towards an epistemic theory of truth, is in 
some senses a brilliant one. It allows him to evade a plethora of problems, 
and jump straight to the 'Holy Grail' of scientific realism, namely thesis E. 
However, although fig. 2 makes it clear why he should want to take such a 
line, the fact that it is so 'easy' should, I believe, make one a little 
suspicious. Such a I quick fix' seems very implausible, especially in view 
of his earlier work in mainstream scientific realism (the red line on fig. 2). I 
contend that in philosophy, as in life, it is often the most difficult trails that 
lead to the most interesting places. so 
Besides, in getting to thesis E via the 'easy route', Putnam loses sight of his 
initial reason for wanting to get there - to defend the intuitive belief that 
we can say much about the world that is independent of our place in it, 
and our sense-data. The pot at the end of the rainbow, the same one that 
he began to follow in his youth, just turns out to be filled with iron pyrite. 
(This is only because he has deviated from following the rainbow, and 
jumped to the place where he has guessed that it will end- if one follows 
it diligently, then one takes the risk that it might never end, although one 
always has the promise of gold if it does.) 
This concludes my discussion of the 'hard-core' of scientific realism, and I 
shall now proceed to defend my decision to avoid including an I Aspirational 
79 I might also mention other modern positions, such as structural realism (Worrall), and 
entity realism (Hacking), which are also based upon acceptance of thesis S. 
so I do not intend to imply that Putnam has just taken the easy route for the sake of it. I want 
to suggest, rather, that it has not yet been established whether the mainstream is tenable, and 
that his choice to avoid it seems a little too quick. 
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Thesis' therein, by examining the Neo-Popperian position known as 'critical 
rationalism'. 
1.2 THE POVERTY OF THE' ASPIRATIONAL THESIS'- AGAINST 
POPPER(S) AND CRITICIAL RATIONALISM 
'I am not going to read your diatribe!' Popper had shouted when he saw my comments on his 
diatribe against Bohr. (He calmed down when I told him that many people had complained 
about my aggressive style and had ascribed it to his influence. 'Is that so?' he said, smiling, 
and walked away.) 
(Feyerabend [1995], pp.145-146) 
In his PhD thesis, Hendry claims that scientific realism should also admit an 
'Aspirational Component', in order to state what counts as success in 
science.81 This thesis would look something like: 
Thesis A - The aim of science is truth. Science aims to discover the truth 
about objective and mind-independent reality, and explain (truthfully) how 
this bears upon the phenomena. 
Specifically, this is not to pass judgement about the motivation of individual 
scientists, but rather to state what the aim of the game itself (science) is-
'discovering the truth', in science, would thus be analogous to 'forcing one's 
opponent into checkmate', in chess. 
Now, while I do not disagree with Hendry that this' Aspirational Component' 
is an important part of scientific realism, I want to claim that it just follows 
from the three theses (M, S, and E) presented in the previous sub-section. That 
is to say, if one accepts M, Sand E, then one can hardly think that the aim of 
science is just empirical adequacy, irrespective of what scientists might think that 
its aim is. Certainly, if science has just happened to get closer to the truth over 
time, even though that wasn't the aim of the game (and part of the rules of the 
game), then thesis E might be true today, and false tomorrow! This is clearly 
not the sort of thing that a scientific realist would want to admit. 
However, in order to understand why Hendry wants to admit thesis A, we 
must look at 'realism about science' in a wider context. For he believes that it 
is necessary to distinguish between critical rationalists (putatively 'realists'), 
on the one hand, and constructive empiricists, on the other: 
81 Hendry [1995], p.58 
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'Popper adopts aspirational realism as a kind of categorical epistemological imperative that 
motivates the methods of science. For van Fraassen, the methods presumably determine the 
aims: we should trim the latter to suit what can be achieved with the former.'82 
On this issue, I am firmly on the side of van Fraassen, as Hendry characterises 
him; indeed, this is why I think that his position is internally consistent, 
whereas Popper's (and that of the subsequent critical rationalists) is not. The 
question that I will ask in this sub-section is, then, "Does it make any sense for 
a critical rationalist to claim to be a realist?" Or, perhaps more forcefully, "Is 
any sort of realism about science consistent with critical rationalism?" Before 
it becomes clear why I want to answer in the negative, it will first be 
necessary to examine both Popper's philosophy, and subsequent critical 
rationalist work, in further depth. 
The Logic of Scientific Discoven;- The 'Popular Popper' 
Popper's philosophy rests, first and foremost, on his thoughts about the 
problem of induction (specifically, the problem of justifi;ing induction, rather 
than classifi;ing which inferences are inductively valid): 
'the principle of induction must be a synthetic statement; that is, a statement whose negation 
is not self-contradictory but logically possible. So the question arises why such a principle 
should be accepted at all, and how we can justify its acceptance on rational grounds.'83 
Indeed, Popper thinks that the problem of induction is so serious that any 
account of science which mentions it must be quite wrong; that one cannot 
even learn from induction that one theory is more probable than another. So 
his 'logic of scientific discovery' is designed specifically to avoid induction, at 
all costs - it consists, instead, of' deductive testing of theories' .84 In a nutshell, 
this deductive method consists of the following: 
i) We put forward theories, and it just does not matter how we arrive at 
them: 'The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a 
man .. .is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.'85 
What does matter is that any theory should be internally consistent, and 
empirically testable-in-principle (even if it is not currently testable). 
That is to say, it should make predictions (singular statements) which 
can be verified or falsified. 
If a theory is not testable, then it is not n scientific theory; this is Popper's 
demarcation criterion: 
82 Ibid., p.58 
83 Popper (1980], pp.28-29 
84 Ibid., p.32 
8s Ibid., p.31 
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'I shall ... admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested 
by experience ... it must be possible for an empirical the on; to be refitted by experience.' 86 
ii) Necessarily, if a theory makes a false singular statement, then it is false 
(since the singular statements it makes are deductively entailed by it), 
and must be rejected. A new theory is clearly necessary to take its 
place. 
iii) In judging between two theories, we should never ask which is more 
likely to be true: 'I never assume that by force of 'verified' conclusions, 
theories can be established as 'true', or even as merely 'probable'.'87 
We say of one theory that has survived more tests (or more severe 
tests) than another that it is just better corroborated by experience. 
When choosing which of a set of new theories to adopt, we should 
prefer the one with the most empirical content, viz. which predicts the 
most, because it will be the most testable: 
'our methodological rule that those theories should be given preference which can be 
most severely tested ... [is] equivalent to a rule favouring theories with the highest 
possible empirical content.'88 
Essentially, then, what drives science ahead (for Popper) is a continual 
process of 'Conjecture and Refutation'- the faster we set up theories, knock 
them down, and set up new theories, the faster that science will progress. But 
now we might ask "progress in what way?" It is pretty obvious that the 
process Popper suggests might drive science ahead in terms of empirical 
adequacy - but how about in terms of truth-like representation of a mind-
independent, objective, world? 
If we can all agree that the set of possible theories is infinite, then identifying 
any finite number of theories as being 'false' rather than 'not proven false', 
over time, will bring us no closer to appreciating any truths about the world, 
no matter how basic. And Popper does not suggest in the original version of 
his 'Logic of Scientific Discovery', even once, that the theories of today are 
any more truth-like, or closer to the truth, or verisimilar (a term which he 
coined later, as will become clear), than their predecessors. 
The original'Logic of Scientific Discovery' is thus, taken alone, a consistent 
philosophical thesis about science, that makes no mention of realism as an 
aim of science whatsoever.89 It is later, when Popper tries to smuggle 
'realism' in through the back door, that the inconsistencies begin. Consider 
86 Popper [1980], p.40 
87 Ibid., p.33 
88 Ibid., p.121 
89 Popper does claim, therein, that the' quest for truth' is what motivates the scientist, and this 
is not incompatible with his position. See next footnote. 
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the following, fascinatingly awkward (if not downright contradictory), 
addition to the 1972 edition of the LScD: 
'The logical and methodological problem of induction is not insoluble, but my book offered a 
negative solution: (a) We can never rationally justifiJ a theory, that is to say, our belief in the 
truth of a theory, or in its being probably true. This negative solution is compatible with the 
following positive solution, contained in the rule of preferring theories which are better 
corroborated than others: (b) We can sometimes rationally justifi; tlze preference for a theory in the 
light of its corroboration, that is, of the present state of the critical discussion of the competing 
theories, which are critically discussed and compared from the point of view of assessing 
their nearness to the truth (verisimilitude). The current state of this discussion may, in 
principle, be reported in the form of their degrees of corroboration. The degree of 
corroboration is not, however, a measure of verisimilitude ... but only a report of what we 
have been able to ascertain up to a certain moment of time, about the comparative claims of 
the competing theories by judging the available reasons which have been proposed for and 
against their verisimilitude.'9o 
It is my hope that the reader is as thoroughly confused by this as I am, and as 
Lakatos, Newton-Smith and Salmon (inter alios) have been.91 How can we (b) 
even sometimes rationally justify our preferences for a theory, when (a) our 
preferences are no guide, whatsoever, to the truth-likeness of that theory? 
Surely, if I know and accept (a), then I would have to admit that I have 
absolutely no good reasons whatsoever for preferring any one theory, with 
respect to its verisimilitude, to any other.92 Judging the 'comparative claims 
of. .. competing theories' would just be a futile exercise- a foolish game- that 
would only be entered into by those ignorant of (a).93 Certainly, such an 
exercise should not have any place in the deductive methodology which 
Popper initially proposed; the time of the scientist would be better spent in 
trying to refute existing theories, or in proposing new ones with high 
testability. 
Moreover, as Salmon has pointed out, it is extremely important for any model 
of science to be able to explain how and why prediction occurs; yet more, to 
explain why (more often than not) science has had such great predictive 
successes.94 But how, Salmon asks, can Popper's philosophy of science 
achieve this? Certainly, it seems reasonable to say that the corroboration of a 
theory might motivate an individual to adopt it for practical (predictive) 
purposes- but that is quite beside the point. Salmon's question is along the 
lines of "How does the corroboration of a theory justifiJ our choice to employ 
90 Popper [1980), pp.281-282 
91 Lakatos [1969). Newton-Smith [1981), ch.3. Salmon [1988). 
92 As mentioned above, since there are an infinite set of theories available, there is no reason 
to believe even that a theory which has not yet been proven false is any more likely to be true 
than one that has. 
93 We wouldn't know what true theories, or even partially true theories, looked like- so we 
could only judge a theory against those theories that have been subsequently classified as 
false. And all are equally false, in our eyes ... 
94 Salmon [1981), p.434. A few notable examples (mine) are: The times of lunar and solar 
eclipses, the Poisson bright spot, and the bending of light around Sol. 
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it for practical (predictive) purposes, rather than merely theoretical ones?" 
And Salmon thinks that the only possible answer is an inductivist one: 
'When, for example, scientists assembled the first man-made atomic pile under the West 
Stands at the University of Chicago, they had to make a prediction as to whether the nuclear 
chain reaction they initiated could be controlled, or whether it would spread to surrounding 
materials and engulf the entire city- and perhaps the whole earth- in a nuclear holocaust. .. It 
may be possible to excise all inductive ingredients from science, but if the operation were 
successful, the patient (science), deprived of all predictive import, would die.' 95 
This point is very cogent, for one may know that a theory has predicted some 
things successfully in the past, viz. that it is well-corroborated, but to justify 
claims about the future, we must use induction. 
As we are beginning to see, the choice to renounce induction has some very 
serious consequences for any philosophy of science; indeed, there have been 
so many attacks on Popper's anti-inductivism that it is quite beyond my 
means to treat them all herein.96 Instead, let me just reiterate the important 
tension between any 'realism about science' and anti-inductivism, for this is 
my central concern in context of this Thesis. I believe that Newton-Smith said 
it best: 
'1 For Popper the goal of science is increasing verisimilitude. The principles of 
comparison involved are based on corroboration- the more corroborated theory is to 
be preferred. 
2 There is no way within the confines of the Popperian system to ground rationally the 
claim that corroboration is linked to verisimilitude. [or even prediction, which is 
Salmon's separate point] 
3 Popper's [only] way out involves abandoning what is unique about the system. [anti-
ind uctivism ]'97 
In other words, without a stronger epistemic component to his realism 
(something nearer to thesis E), Popper's talk of 'truth' is far too cheap. If we 
can not even see that one theory is more verisimilar than any other (even 
those which have been subsequently classified as false), then it seems there 
are no rational grounds for claiming that finding theories of increasing 
verisimilitude constitutes 'success in science' (thesis A). 
Unfortunately, this is far from being the end of this story, since the critical 
rationalist will claim that I have made a terrible mistake in all the foregoing 
arguments. More, that I have fundamentally misunderstood, if not deliberately 
misrepresented, Popper. 
95 Salmon [1981 ], p.443 
96 See Miller [1994], eh. 2. 
97 Newton-Smith [1981 ], p.70 
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Behind Closed Doors- The 'Socratic Popper' 
Although the emphasis in most of the literature on Popper is generally on 
falsification, those who knew the man in person often take a strikingly 
different view of his philosophy. For example, Bartley writes that 'the 
importance lent to the falsifiability criterion and the demarcation problem by 
Popper and others distorts his thought.'98 And Boland, who studied under 
Agassi (Popper's assistant at LSE, for a time), also favours the view that 
'falsifiability plays a very minor role.'99 Instead, Popper's 'disciples' place 
emphasis on the anti-justificationist nature of his philosophy; that is to say, on 
the putative fact that Popper wants to link rationality to criticism rather than 
justification.1°0 Indeed, Miller claims that, for Popper: 'what we call scientific 
knowledge simply is not knowledge in the philosophers' sense of being 
justified, or supported by good reasons.'lOl 
This is a genuinely revolutionary view, which rejects a core assumption of 
typical Anglo-American philosophy- namely that part of what makes a belief 
count as knowledge is that it is justified. As Boland frankly admits, it serves to 
place knowledge claims from areas that have traditionally been considered 
'pseudo-scientific', such as mysticism, on a firm par with those made by 
mature sciences.1o2 And while the cynic might want to suggest that Boland, as 
an economist, would support this view just because he is a 'pseudo-scientist', 
this hardly constitutes a reasoned riposte. Instead, I will use Popper's own 
words: 'In science (and only in science) can we say that we have made 
genuine progress: that we know more than we did before.'l03 Presumably, 
Popper meant that science is the only way to learn more about the actual (and 
I will add a caveat, that he might have meant knowing just some things which 
are definitely false), rather than the possible. 
But is it really plausible that Popper adopted one stance in his seminars, 
'behind closed doors', and another in his literature? For this is precisely what 
some would have us believe: 
'The all-consuming situation in the early 1960s was that while there was a rapidly growing 
interest in the philosophy and history of science, the name most often mentioned was not 
Popper's but that of Thomas Kuhn. Some of the disciples claim that Lakatos took advantage 
of the situation and, in effect, hijacked Popper's seminar. Supposedly, Lakatos convinced 
98 Bartley, quoted in Boland [1994], p.154 
99 Boland [1994], p.157 
100 I will avoid addressing merely verbal issues, since Miller admits that he is happy to be 
called an 'irrationalist', if the word 'rationalist' is just taken to mean 'one who acts on good 
reasons'. See next footnote. 
101 Miller [1994], p.53 
102 Boland [1994], pp.166 
103 Popper [1970], p.57 
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Popper that the desired recognition could be obtained by recasting Popper's views in a form 
closer to Kuhn's. Thus Lakatos and Popper made much more of the growth of knowledge 
implications of Popper's view and much, much less of the Socratic dialectical aspects which 
the disciples advocated.'1D4 
So the 'disciples' mentioned in the above passage seem to paint a picture of 
Popper as a rather weak and vain man, easily seduced by the promise of 
fame, and of Lakatos as the metaphorical serpent who corrupted his 
otherwise virtuous mentor. More, they seem to imply that Lakatos and 
Popper worked in close collusion, to present a united front against the 
dominancy of the Kuhnian, if one will excuse the pun, paradigm. But to both 
these suggestions, I say "Poppycock". Certainly, Popper would have been the 
first to deny such characterisations, as is abundantly evident from the 
following passage: 
'For many years he [Professor Lakatos] attended my lectures and seminars, at which criticism 
was invited as a matter of course; and I made myself regularly available for him to discuss - if 
he so wished- any problems or criticisms he might have ... The only occasion on which he took up 
my invitation to discuss with me his criticism of my position led to a conversation about corroboration 
and verisimilitude'I05 [emphasis mine] 
This said, however, I am not entirely unsympathetic to the idea that there is a 
side to Popper's philosophy, hidden deeper in his works, which is not often 
appreciated. For example, in stark contrast to the statement mentioned earlier 
(footnote 90), that' we can sometimes rationally justifiJ the preference for a theory', 
Popper wrote elsewhere, in the same year, that: 
'in spite of the 'rationality' of choosing the best-tested theory as a basis of action, this choice is 
not 'rational' in the sense that it is based upon good reasons for expecting that it will in practice 
be a successful choice: there can be 110 good reasons in this sense, and tlzis is precisely Hume's 
result.' 106 
That these two statements are in tension is an understatement, since the 
former would suggest that rational justification is 'worth something', whereas 
the latter would suggest that it is simply impossible, and that to seek it would 
be a fool's errand. Of course, it would be very easy to accuse Popper of yet 
more inconsistency, but that is really beside the point. Instead, I want to take 
the latter quotation above as evidence, albeit minimal, that there is some 
legitimacy in the 'Socratic' view of Popper. Indeed, perhaps it might even be 
fair to suggest that any apparent inconsistencies are just based on his use of 
established words, viz. 'rational' and 'justify', in non-standard senses. 
In the final analysis, I suppose it does not matter which of the two views, 
'Popular' or 'Socratic', is the right view, or indeed whether either is; it is more 
important, indeed, just to recognise that there are two views, and that both 
L04 Boland [1994], p.162-163 
tos Popper [1974], p.999 
to6 Popper [1972], p.21 
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should be taken into account when discussing Popper's philosophy. As 
Feyerabend put it, 'long live Popper--=, and happy fornication (NOT with him, 
God beware!)'107 Critical rationalism has moved on from its roots, and is 
deserving of consideration in its own right. 
Critical Rationalism: Restated and Assaulted 
For the critical rationalist, all human knowledge consists of hypotheses, or 
unsupported and unsupportable guesses.108 The process of inquiry, then, is to 
be thought of as twofold. First, it consists of subjecting accepted hypotheses to 
harsh criticism, in the hope of refuting them: 'it relies on expulsion 
procedures, rather than entrance examinations.'109 (Note, of course, that to 
accept a hypothesis we do not have to have good reasons for believing it.) 
Second, it consists of making educated guesses to replace those rejected. 
'Educated', that is, in the sense that not just any old hypothesis will do; those 
that are admissible are only those that can be refuted in principle (hopefully in 
practice) and have not been antecedently refuted. In the case of science, a 
hypothesis (or guess) can only be admitted if it is experimentally refutable; to 
this extent, at least, the proponents of the 'Socratic Popper' and the 'Popular 
Popper' agree. 
Now the obvious question, here, seems to be "How can we legitimately 
classify any given hypothesis as false, if we can have no good reasons at our 
disposal for believing that it is, in fact, false?" Indeed, in the case of science in 
particular, we might ask "How can we know that a given theory is false, 
without having good reasons for believing that certain observation statements 
are true?" If the critical rationalist confesses that we can have good reasons for 
believing in the truth of observation statements, while simultaneously 
contending that observation is theory-laden (which Popper certainly did), 
then he has dug himself a hole,llO For, as Crispin Wright points out: 
'Since such good reason [regarding observation statements] requires good reason to believe 
the background theories which, by hypothesis, condition our assent to those observation-
statements, and since the relevant notion of truth is - presumably - absolute, the Popperian 
realist is in a poor position to explain, what is crucial to his position, the possibility of 
reasonable confidence that a theory has been shown to be false.' 111 
107 Feyerabend, in a private letter to Lakatos dated 28 February 1970. See Motterlini [1999], 
p.193 
tos As Miller puts it: 'there are no such things as good reasons; that is, sufficient or even partly 
sufficient favourable (or positive) reasons for accepting a hypothesis rather than rejecting it, 
or for rejeceting it rathing than accepting it, or for implementing a policy, or for not doing so.' 
See Miller [1994], p.52 
109 Miller [1994], p.6 
uo For Popper on the theory-laden nature of observation, see Popper (1982], p.3 
111 Wright [1993], p.295 
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However, it is my understanding that a critical rationalist would reject the 
notion that we can even have 'reasonable confidence that a theory has been 
shown to be false'; certainly, he would reject the notion that we can ever be 
certain that a theory is false.112 Miller's argument, for example, seems to be 
that it is perfectly reasonable to classifiJ theories as false, without any reference 
to our beliefs whatsoever: 
'science is a collection of statements ... the business of science is the discovery, as far as is 
practicable, of the truth values (and perhaps of the relative degrees of approximation to the 
truth) of these statements. The whole business can be explained, quite satisfactorily, without 
any reference to certainty, probability, confirmation, support, reliability, confidence, 
justification, good reasons, or knowledge. Truth and falsehood suffice.'113 [emphasis mine] 
In fact, it seems that any talk of knowledge, in the context of the critical 
rationalist view of science, will just be rebutted by a statement like "All 
knowledge is just hypothetical." Thus, critical rationalists are what I would 
call hypothetical realists; that is to say they accept realism, without committing 
to any belief in it. In answer to the question "Why does your philosophy 
contain the hypothesis that Thesis M is correct?", the critical rationalist will 
'answer', "Why not?"114 More, the critical rationalist will confess that 
'falsificationism is unable to justify (in whole or in part) its role in the search 
for truth.'115 And when one asks "Well, why should I believe that it is 
fruitful?", one will (predictably) be answered by another "Why not?"116 
Of course, the critical rationalist is just inviting the questioner to play his 
game, and by offering criticism one does, presumably, concede that there is 
certainly some link between criticism and rationality. Nonetheless, I shall not 
let this deter me from offering several criticisms of critical rationalism. 
First, let me reiterate that Popper's philosophy was founded on his 'solution' 
to the problem of induction; that is, the problem of justifi;ing induction. Yet it 
has arrived at the conclusion, at least as developed by some of his successors, 
that there simply isn't (and never has been) a real problem of induction, just 
because justification isn't important. Given this, one might legitimately ask 
why the critical rationalist does not just accept induction, in the same way 
that he accepts thesis M (and thesis S), as a working hypothesis.117 Surely he 
would not want to contend that induction has been subjected to enough 
112 Except, perhaps, in the trivial case where a theory has internal logical inconsistencies. 
m Miller [1994], pp.ll-12 
114 Or, as Miller puts it, 'Science proposes order for the world, it does not presuppose it.' See 
discussions in Miller [1994], sections 2.1a and 2.2a. 
115 Ibid., p.48 
m See the above reference, where Miller makes it clear that he believes the onus is on the 
critics to explain why falsificationism is 'inadequate to its task'. 
m One answer might be that no-one has managed to properly classifi; what does, and does 
not, count as 'inductive logic'. However, this is insufficient, for I might ask "Why not accept 
that there are inductive inferences, as a working hypothesis, and join in the quest to classify 
them?" 
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criticism (and remember, the criticism that it is unjustifiable is not important) 
to render it falsified? If so, then I shall invite the next critical rationalist that I 
meet to hold his hand in a candle flame. And when he replies that he will not, 
just because he accepts a theory that doing so will cause him pain, my 
rejoinder will be "Should you not subject that theory to another test? Should 
you not be actively trying to refute that theory, at every given opportunity? 
After all, to assume that a theory is confirmed, just because it is corroborated, 
is the sort of sin committed by your arch-enemy, the vile inductivist!"118 
Second, I question why the critical rationalist should want to say that the' aim 
of science is truth' when this has no visible link to the deductive methodology 
which he proposes. Consider: 
i) We can never know that one theory is closer-to-the-truth than another, 
or even more 'likely to be true', in light of any evidence whatsoever.119 
Thus, we have absolutely no evidential grounds for judging whether 
the scientific theories of today are any more truth-like than those of 
Neolithic men (who were capable of building remarkably accurate 
solar calendars, inter alia, as Stonehenge demonstrates). Indeed, it is a 
distinct possibility that many past theories were more verisimilar than 
those of contemporary science. 
ii) We adopt a methodology (Conjecture and Refutation), and hypothesise 
that it is suited to the task of finding theories of increasing 
verisimilitude. 
iii) We could never empirically falsify that hypothesis, from i. 
So the critical rationalist claim that 'the aim of science is truth' (under their 
normative methodology) is not only hypothetical, but also highly dubious. 
As a reductio ad absurdum of this position, we need only note that the critical 
rationalist might as well say that 'the aim of all human activity is truth', that 
is, if there is no discernible link, no matter how partial, between method and 
aim.12o To put it another way, why claim that science is any more likely to yield 
theories of increasing verisimilitude than nose-picking? 
Of course, the critical rationalist will want to say that his methodology is akin 
to shooting an arrow at a target (the truth) which is concealed by a heavy fog, 
but such an analogy is disingenuous because the nature of the target is 
unknown and unknowable. Thus, it would be no less rational to cast a fishing 
11s This goes back to Salmon's criticism - that we cannot explain the predictive successes of 
theories without appealing to induction. 
119 Of course, the critical rationalist does allow that we can prefer one theory over another, if it 
is more corroborated. 
12o And I reiterate that the aim of science, here, is what cou11ts as success in scie11ce, not what 
motivates scientists, individually or en masse. 
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line into the fog than it would be to throw out a cigarette butt, or even to 
shout loudly while hopping on one foot! In other words, the natural 
methodological complement to the critical rationalist's epistemic stance is just 
Feyerabendian pluralism; that is, if he still wants to claim that truth (as 
correspondence to the actual metaphysical world) is the aim of science. 
Alternatively, if his aims are trimmed to what can be demonstrably achieved by 
his methods, then 'success in science' for the critical rationalist should lie in 
achieving either empirical adequacy (truth as correspondence to the 
phenomenal world), or human consensus (in the ideal limit of enquiry).121 
Therefore, the only rational paths for one who sticks to the critical rationalist 
methodology are anti-realism or empiricism. The notion of correspondence 
truth as the aim of science (but not as an aspiration) must be completely 
rejected. Watkins forcefully drives home this point: 
'I. .. accept that the idea of truth is a regulative ideal for science: truth is what science aspires 
after. But to aspire after X is not equal to aiming at X. A schoolboy who dreams of being a 
military hero does not yet have military aims. If one is to aim at X, and pursue one's aim 
rationally, one needs to be able to monitor the success or failure of one's attempts to achieve 
X. Are Popperians entitled to claim that one could do so if X were simply tnttlz? Here is a 
simplified version of what, for us, would be a paradigm of scientific progress. Within some 
problem-situation a powerful new theory T1 is advanced. It is tested and for a time it only 
wins corroborations. But then a more corroborable theory Tz is advanced. Crucial 
experiments between it and T1 are performed, and they go in favour of T2. The splendid T1 
has fallen in battle. Later, the pattern is repeated, with T2 being refuted and superseded by 
the more corroborable T3. Was science fulfilling the aim of truth in this admirable 
progression? Not with T 1, which turned out to be false, nor with T 2 which suffered the same 
fate. Perhaps this aim was fulfilled with T3? Well, we may learn that it was not but we'll 
never learn that it was.' 122 
Third, and finally, I would point out that just because one rejects 
justificationism, one need not hypothesise that conjecture and refutation is the 
best way to proceed in inquiry-related discourse.123 And I would ask the 
critical rationalist how one can refute his epistemology, when criticism of it is 
parasitic on that very epistemology. Is 'to be a critical rationalist' not, 
ironically, 'to be a dogmatist about epistemological concerns'? And does 
critical rationalism not meet its doom in the fact that it is deductively 
irrefutable, and thus inadmissible as a valid hypothetical epistemology 
according to its very own rules?124 
To sum up, here is a philosophy that says there is such a thing as truth, 
although that truth is evidence-transcendent (insofar as we could never 
121 Another option is for the Critical Rationalist to say that the aim of science is possible truth; 
this is Watkins' approach. I would characterise this approach as being: "Science aims at the 
recognition of falsehoods." Watkins [1997]. 
122 Watkins [1997], paragraph 13. 
123 Arguably, foundherentism (Haack) and contextualism (Annis) both avoid the pitfalls of 
'justificationism' as Popper would have understood it. 
124 Analogously, of course, verificationism pronounced itself to be 'meaningless'. 
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recognise it, were we to have it), and that truth-hunting is a worthy exercise, 
even though we can never know when a hunt has been successful. Moreover, 
it fails to explain why science is a worthwhile activity, say in comparison to 
chasing shadows, simply because we can not even know if our method of 
truth-hunting is really suited to the task of finding the experientially 
inaccessible truths! At least shadows can be seen, if never caught. 
1.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE 'HARD-CORE' 
By taking a holistic view of the hard-core of scientific realism, in contrast to its 
competitors - especially critical rationalism - several points emerge: 
i) Scientific realism is a justificationist programme; scientific realists seek 
to justify their beliefs, in each of their theses (M, S & E), in the face of 
many different forms of local scepticism. Overall, though, scientific 
realists also employ a positive argument, put forward by Hilary 
Putnam, according to which scientific realism 'is the only philosophy 
that does not make the success of science a miracle.'125 
This 'No Miracle Argument', as it is typically known, is intended to be 
a peculiar form of abductive argument; the explanandum is the 
contingent fact that science works, and the explanans is the three theses 
in the core of scientific realism. Unfortunately, however, the anti-
realist will level the criticism that this form of argument just 
presupposes something which is already at question in thesis E, 
namely the validity (or even existence) of abductive inferences, 
period.126 So the 'No Miracle Argument' is really a meta-abduction, and 
the accusation is that it is viciously circular. 
The realist rejoinder is based, first, upon a distinction between premise-
circularity and rule-circularity. An argument which is circular in the 
former sense is one that is designed to prove the truth of a proposition, 
P, but also presupposes the truth of Pin its premises; this is obviously 
vicious. But an argument which is circular in the latter sense is quite 
different, at least prima facie, since it takes a set of propositions P1, ... ,Pn, 
employs a rule of inference, I, and then reaches a conclusion Q. 
However, Q has a special property, specifically that it serves to 
support, or confirm, the rule of inference, !.127 
12s Putnam [1975], p.73 
126 See my Abduction-Observatioll Te11sioll (AOT), mentioned towards the end of section 1.1, in 
the discussion of Thesis E. 
127 The distinction between premise-circularity and rule-circularity was first made by 
Braithwaite, in his defence of induction. See Psillos [1999], pp.82-83 
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Since the 'No Miracle Argument' is an example of rule-circularity, the 
realist can shift the focus of this debate to epistemology, and argue for 
an externalist account of justification.128 As Psillos puts it: 
'extemalist accounts sever the alleged link between being justified in using a reliable 
rule of inference and knowing, or having reasons to believe, that this rule is 
reliable ... all we should require of a rule-circular argument is that the rule of inference 
employed be reliable; no more and no less than in any ordinary (first-order) 
argument.' 129 
So the purpose of the 'No Miracle Argument' is not necessarily to give 
a reason for believing in the validity of abduction; it is just to show 
that, if such inferences are reliable (overall), which we have no prior 
reason to doubt (or to believe), then scientific realism has support which 
its competitors do not. More, even if this meta-abduction is taken as a 
defence of abduction, the realist might pose a dilemma for the 
internalist: 
'When it comes to the defence of our basic modes of reasoning, both ampliative and 
deductive, it seems that we either have no reasonable defence to offer or else the 
attempted defence will be rule-circular.' 130 
For, as Carnap has pointed out, deduction is just as circular as 
induction; one can not convince a sceptic about deduction that it is a 
valid form of inference without using deduction (or induction, which 
the sceptic about deduction might equally be sceptical about).l31 
ii) Induction is the foundation-stone of scientific realism (because it is a 
justificationist programme). In the first instance, one notices how 
induction is related to thesis M; that an endorsement of thesis M serves 
to partially justify the use of induction, whereas the evidence that we 
can successfully employ inductive arguments serves to partially justify 
thesis M.132 In the second instance, one notices how the proposition 
that theories make inductive links as well as deductive ones is vital in 
justifying thesis S; that is, in avoiding Hempel' s 'Theoretician's 
Dilemma'. And in the final instance, one sees that some form of 
inductive logic is necessary if the scientific realist is to support the 
claim, in thesis E, that theories can achieve degrees of confirmation. 
Moreover, there are other arguments employed by scientific realists, 
not treated in depth in the foregoing discussion, which rely on 
12s Note, of course, that several of my previous criticisms- e.g. on Rescher's attempted 
justification of thesis M - have been made from an intenzalist perspective. Here, I am just 
outlining a typical scientific realist argument, without necessarily committing to it. 
129 Psillos [1999], p.84 
13o Ibid., p.86 
m Carnap [1968],p.265-267 
132 This was what led to circularity in Rescher' s retro-justification argument. 
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induction. For example, abduction is seen by some as just a peculiar 
form of induction; that is, even though this might make my Abduction-
Observation Tension a much more serious problem_l33 
iii) Scientific realists need not believe that science will eventually converge 
upon the 'final' truth. Rather, they can accept that the aim of science is 
just to generate theories of increasing verisimilitude, or with a higher 
degree of approximation to the truth. Thesis A should be understood 
in those terms. 
iv) A scientific realist who was also a practising scientist would have more 
reason to place stock in successful theories of the past. And it is 
certainly reasonable to suppose, although I shall not attempt to fully 
justify this until later, that such individuals would adopt different 
theory-construction strategies to those of anti-realist scientists. If 
empirical success and truth-likeness are linked in some way, then any 
practically successful theory must be seen to have something 'truth-
like' somewhere within it. 
Negatively, of course, this might suggest that realists could be more 
dogmatic than anti-realists, in certain circumstances. Certainly, that is 
one way (though not necessarily the right one) to think of Einstein's 
objections to the Copenhagen Interpretation. 
This concludes my presentation of scientific realism, and I shall now move on, 
as suggested by point (iv), to discuss methodology in greater detail. 
133 If induction is based on experience (this seems undeniable), and abductive inferences are 
just a sub-set of inductive inferences, then it follows that abduction is based on experience. 
Hence the idea that we succumb to experiential predilections, in judging the relative 
explanatory value of competing theories, seems to be undeniable. 
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2 
ON METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
As was mentioned towards the beginning of the previous chapter - under the 
heading' Scientific Realism vs. Instrumentalism: Two Illustrative Episodes', in 
section 1.1 -I want to claim that scientists can be either (scientific) realists, or 
anti-realists, and still enjoy a measure of empirical success in science. And 
empirical success, as I characterise it, just consists of the successful application 
of theory in practice: of using theories in either predictive roles, viz. as a guide 
to practical action, or in non-antic explanatory roles, viz. to explain 
relationships between phenomena in terms of Hempel' s 'covering law' 
model,134 Arguably, it is these 'benefits' that most nearly mark mature 
sciences as somehow 'different' from other academic disciplines, certainly in 
the view of the wider (non-academic) community. The predictive benefits of 
science, as a driving force for technological innovations such as the computer 
on which I type, and the internal combustion engine that drives my car, are 
certainly the most obvious.135 But the weak explanatory benefit, that allows 
one to answer the question "Why do objects fall to the ground?" simply by 
saying "Because of gravity" also seems to offer comfort to many. And rightly 
so, for to say that an individual died because he was a smoker is to make a 
synthetic statement, and to offer some form of explanation, albeit not 
comprehensive, for his death.J36 
In the context of this chapter, what demarcates science from non-science (or 
pseudoscience) is of vital importance, since any plausible methodology of 
science might rely precisely on that difference (or those differences). Hence 
this will be my first area of discussion, in section 2.1, and I shall advocate 
demarcation guidelines, rather than rules (or laws), based on the theoretical 
virtues that Kuhn puts forward in his 'Essential Tension'. 
134 I want to leave the question of whether the realist and anti-realist enjoy the same degree of 
lzeuristic success, in generating new theories or experiments, open. 
135 'Beneficial' might be understood, more properly, to mean 'useful'. For example, the 
creation of the atom bomb was clearly useful, with respect to the goals of the US government 
during WWII, although one might legitimately question whether its creation was of lasting 
benefit to mankind. 
136 As this example should make clear, the predictive and the non-antic explanatory roles are 
interrelated. If I believe that individuals have died (early) just because they were smokers, 
then I would believe the prediction that "Smokers are at more risk of dying young, ceteris 
paribus, than non-smokers." Perhaps the relationship is best illustrated by the counterfactual 
"If he had not smoked, then he would have lived longer." which is obviously predictive, 
though is clearly just another way of saying "He died (earlier than he might have) because he 
was a smoker." 
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This completed, I shall move on - in section 2.2 - to present my view of 
scientific methodology as a two-tiered enterprise, involving normative methods, 
in which all scientists take part, and auxilian; methods, which are flexible 
additions to the aforementioned. And my claim will be that it is the normative 
methods which are primarily responsible for empirical success (as characterised 
above), although it is possible, in principle, that certain auxiliary methods could 
contribute to greater efficacy, in a heuristic sense.137 This will be seen to be 
significant because it will be argued that realists often adopt a different set of 
auxiliary methods to their anti-realist counterparts. 
Finally, in section 2.3, I will offer a brief recapitulation. Particular emphasis 
will be placed on the relationship between the two foregoing sections; that is, 
how my views on methodology (and especially auxiliary methods) follow from 
my views on demarcation. 
2.1 THE DEMARCATION OF SCIENCE FROM NON-SCIENCE 
While the notion of empirical success is clearly far too crude, taken alone, to 
constitute a valid demarcation criterion for (mature) science and non-science, 
I would argue that it captures the spirit of the difference. As Ruse puts it, 'In 
looking for defining features, the most obvious place to start is with science's 
most striking aspect- it is an empirical science about the real world of 
sensation.'138 Of course, this needs to be bolstered by considerations such as 
reliabilih;. That is, to make it clear that it is more reasonable for one to have 
confidence in Newtonian mechanics, as they relate to bridge building, than it 
is for one to have confidence in the 'laws' of Western Astrology, as they relate 
to our personal behaviour. Typically, this has been addressed by different 
philosophers of science in terms of two interrelated features of properly 
scientific theories (or domains): testabilihj/tentativihj and predictive novelhj. The 
first feature, testabilihj or tentativihj, results from the fact that a scientific 
theory is designed to account for certain experimental observations of 
relationships between phenomena. Thus, a scientist opens himself up to the 
possibility of encountering evidence which demands alteration to existing 
theory (or at least the auxiliary hypotheses used in its testing): 
'Ultimately, a scientist must be prepared to reject his theory ... Nothing in the real world 
would make the Kantian change his mind, and the Catholic is equally dogmatic, despite any 
empirical evidence about the stability of bread and wine. Such evidence is simply considered 
irrelevant.' 139 
137 Heuristic, that is, both in terms of designing new theories, and designing new experiments. 
138 Ruse [1982), p.39 
139 Ibid., pp.40-41 Of course, saying 'Nothing in the real world would make the Kantian 
change his mind' is a little imprecise, since he might change his views based on conversations 
with other human beings (who, even for Kant, really exist). 
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The second feature, predictive novelty, is based on the historical evidence that 
scientific theories successfully predict phenomena that would have been 
considered highly implausible beforehand. The history of physics, alone, is 
replete with examples: the prediction of barrier-penetration by quantum 
theory; the prediction of light bending around the sun, by general relativity; 
the prediction of time dilation by special relativity; the prediction of the 
Poisson bright-spot by the wave theory of light; the accurate prediction of the 
return of Halley' s comet, by Newtonian celestial mechanics; and even the 
prediction of the sonic boom, by statistical mechanics. In comparison, 
Lakatos points to the manifest failures of Marxism, as illustrative of 
pseudosciences: 
'It predicted the absolute impoverishment of the working class. It predicted that the first 
socialist revolution would take place in the industrially most developed society. It predicted 
that socialist societies would be free of revolutions. It predicted that there will be no conflict 
of interests between socialist countries. Thus the early predictions of Marxism were bold a11d 
stwmiug but they failed.' 140 [emphasis mine] 
Of course, the requirement of predictive noveltt; is complementary to the 
requirement of testabilityjtentativitt;. For Lakatos would want, correctly, to 
point out that sustaining one's 'pet theory' in light of any evidence whatsoever, 
simply by tacking on ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses, is unscientific. But bearing 
in mind that a scientist could, in principle, hold that only his auxiliary 
hypotheses were tentative- and that is the thrust of the Duhem thesis- the 
requirement that a properly scientific discipline should predict new 
phenomena, or previously unnoticed relationships between those already 
known, does not seem unreasonable. In Kuhnian terms, we might say that 
science must consist of fruitful theories.141 
Nonetheless, there are still obvious exceptions which we would want to call 
scientific. Boyle's law, for example, deals explicitly with an ideal case which 
never, in reality, happens, and does not seem to predict anything other than a 
simple relationship between a pre-determined set of macroscopically 
measurable (and observable) variables. It is, thus, neither particularly 
tentative, nor predictively novel. And there are other examples: the law of 
reflection - that the angle of incidence of a ray that strikes a reflective surface 
(taken from a line orthogonal to that surface) is equal to its angle of reflection; 
the Zeroth law of thermodynamics- that if a body A is in thermal equilibrium 
with a body B, and body Bin thermal equilibrium with a body C, then body A 
is in thermal equilibrium with body C; and Newton's first law of motion-
that any body which is not at rest, or at constant velocity (not speed), has a 
resultant force acting upon it. 
This seems to suggest that, rather than adopt a piecemeal strategy in order to 
state whether any given law is scientific or non-scientific, one would do better 
140 Lakatos [1977], p.25 
w This virtue is discussed further, toward the end of the next sub-section. 
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to consider only theoretical frameworks. That is to say, in terms of the last 
example, one should attempt to explain only why Newtonian mechanics, viz. 
the sum of Newton's three laws of motion, his law of gravitation, and all the 
metaphysical assumptions used in their application, is scientific. For a whole, in 
virtue of the relations which its parts enter into, is in a sense greater than just 
the sum of its parts. 
If one bears this in mind, it also becomes clear that any 'hard and fast' 
demarcation criteria are going to be doomed to dismal failure, precisely 
because many theoretical frameworks that are good guides to practical action 
contain metaphysical assumptions that are neither trivially dispensable, nor 
always readily identifiable. In the context of Newtonian mechanics (the 
framework), action-at-a-distance (metaphysical assumption, without which, 
the laws couldn't justifiably be thought of as spatia-temporally invariant) is 
an excellent case in point. 
What we should look for, then, are demarcation guidelines (or rules-of-thumb) 
- a set of factors which we can apply in order to roughly weigh the relative 
status of a given theoretical framework, domain within a discipline, or even 
discipline itself, in comparison to competing systems. 
Theoretical Virtues as Demarcation Guidelines 
In his 'Essential Tension', Kuhn suggests five qualities, or virtues, that might 
be characteristic of good scientific theories: accuracy, consistency, scope, 
simplicity and fruitfulness. 142 But even though his emphasis is on the fact that 
these theoretical virtues are shared epistemic values by which scientists 
choose between theories put forward within pre-existent domains of science- for 
example, Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics vs. the Many Worlds 
one - I think that they might also be useful in the context of demarcation. 
That is to say, I want to claim that these virtues might just be characteristic of 
scientific theoretical frameworks, period. Kuhn also suggests this, although it 
has sometimes been overlooked: 
'If the list of relevant values is kept short (I have mentioned five, not all independent) and if 
their specification is left vague, then such values as accuracy, scope and fruitfulness are 
permanent attributes of science.' 143 [emphasis mine] 
It is extremely important, however, to understand that I will not make any 
claims about realism vs. anti-realism in the subsequent discussion of these 
virtues.144 For they can be accepted by realists, on the grounds that they 
constitute abductive principles which allow us to 'sniff out' the more truth-
142 Kuhn [1977], p.321 
143 Ibid., p.335 
144 To do so would, after all, be unpleasantly circular in the context of this thesis as a whole. 
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like of two competing theories, and also by anti-realists, on the grounds that 
they merely represent our pragmatic preferences. My discussion will centre on 
the empirical and historical facts about what we would want, intuitively, to 
call" science". Indeed, since it is obvious that the issue of demarcation has 
significance in moral and legal respects, e.g. in the case of McLean v. Arkansas, 
this is imperative.J45 
Accuracy - A scientific theoretical framework will usually account for the 
available evidence in its domain, and do so with reasonable precision, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
First, in the properly Kuhnian sense, a theoretical framework is accurate if its 
deducible consequences are in agreement with existing observations and/ or 
experiments. And in this sense, it is easy to get a quick grasp of what might 
demarcate science from non-science. On the one hand, we have the 
Newtonian framework, which accounts with reasonable success for the period 
of a simple pendulum, as a function of its length. On the other hand, we have 
the obvious failure of astrological frameworks, or some religious doctrines, to 
account for the available evidence. For example, take the column in 
yesterday's newspaper which told me that I would meet a new love interest; 
this turned out to be false, just because I didn't leave my house, and in fact 
did not see another human all day!146 (This, without even pointing to the 
obvious fact that other Pisceans, say, were in a coma.) 
Indeed, in the case of creation 'science', the claim is often that no empirical 
evidence whatsoever is relevant to the doctrine: 
' ... it is ... quite impossible to determine anything about Creation through a study of present 
processes, because present processes are not created in character [of past processes] ... we are 
completely limited to what God has seen fit to tell us, and this information is in His written 
Word. This is our textbook on the science of Creation!'147 
So creation' science', or rather creation non-science, involves the construction of 
theories that are not empirical, in virtue of the fact that they can not be 
confirmed, or refuted, experientially. Rather than investigate the phenomena, 
one is encouraged to read a book, and place unswerving faith in its contents, 
irrespective of all else! The existence of fossils is simply irrelevant, 
presumably because "God works in mysterious ways." Of course, this is not 
to say that the theories of creationists are necessarily wrong, though a scientist 
would be entitled to claim that they have an extremely low probability of 
145 See Ruse[1982a], Laudan [1982], and Ruse [1982b]. 
146 Of course, this might be seen as only 'one church' of astrology, and there are many 
astrologers who would frown upon the writers of such newspaper columns. But all I am 
really saying is that the writers of those columns are not practising science! 
147 Henry Morris, quoted by Ruse [1982b], p.57 
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being true, on the assumption that there are spatia-temporally invariant laws 
of nature.148 
However, there is also a second sense in which accuracy might be thought of, 
and this is perhaps better characterised in terms of precision. Consider the 
following successful prediction, offered by the Newtonian framework, 
A) {Made in 1705, by Edmund Halley}- The comets seen in A.D. 684, 
1066 ... 1531, 1607, 1682 were all one and the same object, which is in an 
elliptical orbit about the sun, with a period of approximately 75.5 
years. It will return in 1759, 1835,1910, (late) 1985, etc. 
in contrast to the following prediction, offered by the astrological framework, 
B) {Sidney Omarr, Horoscope for 12th April2001, in the Chicago Sun-
Times}-
'PISCES (Feb. 19-March 20): An important person takes note of your talent, product. 
Push hard to maintain your creative control. Rewrite material, major opportunity 
exists. Scorpio plays top role.'l49 
Now as is eminently clear, B is very vague in comparison to A, and with good 
reason- namely, to increase its likelihood of applicability to any given 
Piscean reader. In my case, the 'product' might be this thesis, the 'important 
person' might be my supervisor, and Omarr's advice would be to rewrite this 
section, because there might be a 'major opportunity' (for a paper, perhaps?) 
in here somewhere. Of course, horoscope entries never read as follows: 
"PISCES (Feb. 19-March 20): At 9:33:23 AM, May 5, 2001, you will experience 
a sharp pain in your chest. Do not bother to take an aspirin; the pain will 
subside 22 seconds later." 
So my claim is that the difference between A & B might be characterised in 
terms of precision (or, inversely, vagueness). For, whereas A predicts a set of 
specific and time-indexed events, B might be seen to have predicted any 
number of events, over an indeterminate period of time, on the basis of 
recalcitrant experience. If A had failed, then it would have been obvious, and 
it would certainly have caused some adjustments to the overall Newtonian 
framework (not necessarily the laws therein). However, it isn't even clear that 
B can be seen to fail; for example, its author might even make the practically 
untestable assertion that his prediction was only right for the majority of 
Pisceans.1so 
148 It is this assumption that the creationists challenge. 
149 See Internet URL: http:/ j www.suntimes.com/ index/ omarr.html 
Jso Note that I am avoiding the Duhem problem, here, by discussing theoretical frameworks 
rather than individual laws. 
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Consistency- A scientific theoretical framework will be internally 
consistent, in logical terms. In addition it will usually be externally 
consistent, with other scientific theoretical frameworks. 
Clearly, as a stand-alone demarcation principle, consistency would only be 
useful in its internal respect, and prima facie its external aspect may seem to be 
somewhat parasitic on the other demarcation principles that I shall cover 
here. This should not be problematic, however, because the principles are 
only guidelines, and because they are not supposed to be useful for 
demarcation purposes when applied in isolation from each other. 
Nonetheless, it is very important to understand that two theoretical 
frameworks which are externally consistent, each with the other, do not have 
to be in strong agreement on a metaphysical level (although their 
fundamental metaphysical assumptions are almost always similar, if not 
identical). Consistency is more important, rather, in terms of either 
conjunction or correspondence. 
In terms of conjunction, which has already been mentioned in the earlier 
discussions of the theoretician's dilemma and constructive empiricism 
(section 1.1), scientific frameworks can often be combined (or conjoined) in 
order to predict/ explain (in Hempel' s sense) phenomena that lie in the 
overlap between their two respective domains. For example, in order to 
calculate the average velocity of molecules in a gas at known temperature, 
volume, and pressure, one might calculate their translational energy from 
statistical mechanics (working out how much of their total kinetic energy was 
in fact stored in other degrees of freedom, viz. vibrational or rotational), and 
then apply classical mechanics. Mature science is 'special' in this respect since 
areas such as biophysics, biochemistry, and physical chemistry, are feasible. 
In non-science, religions such as Christianity and Buddhism are manifestly 
incompatible, as are the predictions issued by Numerology, as compared to 
those from Western Astrology. For example, I was born on 5 March 1975, 
hence my life path number is 3 {5+3+1 +9+7+5=30, 3+0=3}, and my Sun sign is 
Pisces. According to the same source, namely Michael McLain, in terms of 
numerology, 
'Here we are apt to find ... bright, effervescent, sparkling people with very optimistic 
attitudes ... The approach to life tends to be exceedingly positive ... and your disposition is 
almost surely sunny and open-hearted.'l51 
Yet in terms of astrology (and it is worth nothing that 'my' sun is slap-bang in 
the middle of the Pisces house), 
151 Michael McLain, internet URL: http:/ jwww.astrology-numerology.comjnum-
lifepath.html 
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'You're a moody and introspective person, and it's hard for others to understand you. It may 
be hard for you to understand yourself sometimes. Your temperament varies from being 
optimistic to being acutely pessimistic.'l52 
In terms of correspondence, a scientific theoretical framework will generally 
explain how its predecessor(s) are empirically adequate, under the correct 
circumstances. Hence, the special relativistic framework reduces to the 
Newtonian one in the correct parameter limit, viz. when velocities much 
lower than the speed of light are at play, and Y""l. So 'consistency' in this 
respect is not so much about demonstrating overall agreement, so much as 
explaining points of disagreement; for absolute inertial mass in Newton's 
second law, one might substitute 'relativistic mass'.153 In the case of 
astrology, however, the discovery of the outer planets (Uranus, Neptune and 
Pluto) was brushed off as unimportant to personal qualities, in virtue of the 
fact that the period of these planets would mean that a lot of very similar 
people should be walking around. (The period of Pluto, though erratic, is 
around 250 years.) Instead, when an outer planet changes sign it is supposed 
to represent a societal change; a very convenient story, viz. ad lzoc addition to 
the theory, indeed_154 
Scope - A scientific theoretical framework will often have implications that 
were not used in its construction. Sometimes, these will not even have 
been envisaged before it began to be employed.JSS 
Although Newton's system of mechanics was created in order to account for 
the motion of celestial bodies, it coincidentally served to explain other 
phenomena such as the tides, and projectile motion, on Earth. That is to say, 
it synthesised Galileo's terrestrial mechanics and Kepler' s celestial kinematics. 
Likewise, when Maxwell devised his system of electromagnetism, by positing 
symmetry between curl of electric field and curl of magnetic field, the notion 
152 Michael McLain, internet URL: http:/ /www.astrology-numerology.com/insigns-sun.html 
As an aside, I might also add that astrology is not even internally consistent, since predictions 
based on sun sign are often at odds with those made by the position of the moon, or the 
planets, in one's astrological chart. The professional asb·ologer thus spends much of his time 
attempting to resolve contradictions (a radically subjective exercise), in order to give a holistic 
view of an astrological chart. 
153 Whether or not, I hasten to add, one wants to see those two terms as taking on new 
reference or meaning (as Kuhn or Feyerabend might claim). 
154 In addition, note that astronomy has proven capable of predicting the existence of new 
planets, whereas astrology has not. Presumably, the astrologist of the past did not notice 
anything 'wrong' with his theory -just because no serious attempt was made to test it. 
155 In my opinion, Kuhnian 'scope' is very similar to what philosophers of science now call 
'use-novelty'. This reading is supported by the following quotation: '[a theory] should have 
broad scope: in particular, a theory's consequences should extend beyond the particular 
observations, laws, or subtheories it was initially designed to explain.' Kuhn [1977], p.322 
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of electromagnetic waves moving without a medium would have been 
thought absurd. 
Nonetheless, when Einstein dropped the bomb of special relativity on the 
physics community (and when the results of the Michelson-Morley 
experiment became widely known), Maxwellian e-m proved to fit neatly into 
the new mechanics. (See the earlier derivation in section 1.1, under 'The 
Semantic Thesis'.) Here, then, it is worthwhile to note the relationship 
between scope and conjunction (as an aspect of external consistency). For 
when special relativity arrived on the scene, Maxwellian electrodynamics 
proved- miraculously, as some realists would accuse their opponents of 
saying- to be quite compatible. Yet, as alluded to earlier, the discovery of 
Pluto, and its inclusion in astrology, did not serve to make astrology any more 
compatible with numerology, or religious doctrine, or any of the other non-
sciences. That is, even though it might be argued that astrology demonstrated 
explanatonJ scope, since it was found that it could supposedly account for 
more societal changes than its creators had originally envisaged. 
This seems to suggest that empirical scope, in science, is quite different from a 
looser notion of 'explanatory scope', and that a theory in non-science may 
have a great deal of the latter, while having none of the former. Henceforth, 
then, I shall write only of empirical scope in the demarcation context. 
Simplicity - A scientific theoretical framework will not usually posit any 
entities which are not strictly necessary in order to account (in predictive 
terms) for the phenomena in its domain. 
In its most commonly accepted philosophical sense, the simpler of two 
theories would postulate the existence of fewer entities, while maintaining the 
same descriptive power as its competitor. This idea, first put forward by 
William of Ockham, is a key argument in favour of nominalism, when 
compared to metaphysical realism. In the arena of science, however, the 
situation is less clear; as Laudan argues: 'Notoriously, one man's simplicity is 
another's complexity'.156 
Nonetheless, there is a very clear sense in which a scientist would not want to 
state that quarks have another thirteen flavours, which have no predictive 
consequences, in addition to isotopic spin, strangeness, charm, beauty, and 
truth.157 And by contrast, the introduction of' demons in hell' in a theological 
context seems to have little predictive interest- in life, at least. Certainly, it is 
possible that there are 'demons in hell', but one might legitimately point out 
that such a claim can not be presently judged in comparison to the one that 
'there are pink elephants, and fluffy bunnies, in hell.' Lucifer might even be 
156 Laudan [1990], p.339 
!57 Isotopic spin can be viewed as a flavour for up and down quarks. 
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an animal lover, especially in the case of serpent-kind!158 (After all, Adolf 
Hitler was a vegetarian.) 
This said, though, considerations of simplicity often seem to give way to those 
of explanatory value, even in science. For example, some physicists might be 
seen as preferring Bohm' s interpretation of quantum mechanics for its 
superior explanatory value, even though it introduces a' quantum potential' 
which is not found in the Copenhagen interpretation. However, I think that 
such a view is fundamentally misguided, just because introducing a 'quantum 
potential' does away with the need for wave-function collapse (a process 
posited by the Copenhagen interpretation); hence the proper way to view 
these competitors is as equally simple, at the very least.159 In either case, 
anyway, the underlying mathematical structure of quantum mechanics 
remains the same; Bohm just chose to express the wavefunction in polar, 
rather than rectangular, form_l60 
Naturally, individual scientists can and do have religious and spiritual beliefs, 
and undoubtedly some of these might be adapted to play a role in explaining 
scientific results. However, I think it highly implausible that a science journal 
would publish a paper which suggested that particles are more good (in a 
moral sense) than waves, or that pulsars are angels, unless either of these 
statements were inextricably bound-up with a theory that had new predictive 
consequences (visible-in-principle to the community, which consists of living 
scientists, that is).161 
Fruitfulness - A scientific theoretical framework will often draw attention 
to new phenomena, and reveal links, previously hidden, between 
phenomena that are already known. 
In the first sense- drawing attention to new phenomena, or what I shall call 
sensible disclosure- the virtue of fruitfulness is tightly bound up with the idea 
of predictive novelty (due to Lakatos), which was discussed toward the 
beginning of this section. In addition to the examples given there (of barrier 
penetration, etc.), one might add red-shift, as predicted by general relativity. 
When we compare astronomy to astrology, we notice that it was the former 
158 I refer to the hypothetical serpent in the hypothetical Garden of Eden, of course. 
159Jt might be argued, further, that Bohm's interpretation is actually simpler than the 
Copenhagen one, because it avoids complementarity, but I shall not make that case here. 
160 From Euler's formula, ei9 =cos El+ isin El, it is clear that any complex number (and hence 
function) can be expressed in either rectangular or polar forms, z = x + iy [rectangular form]= 
r(cos El+ isin El) = rei9 [polar form]. 
161 More properly, such metaphysical claims would only need to appear to be inextricably 
bound-up with the predictive power of theory. That is, in light of the current status of the 
debate in the community. 
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which has proven more fruitful, because it has disclosed Neptune (a sensible 
thing).162 
In the second sense - revealing previously unknown links between known 
phenomena, or what I shall call relationship disclosure- the Newtonian 
framework is an excellent case in point. This accounted for Kepler' s laws 
governing celestial motion, the swing of the simple pendulum, the path 
followed by terrestrial projectiles, and even the movement of the tides, all in 
terms of one common type of force. Of course, it is noticeable that there is a 
link between this aspect of fruitfulness and scope, for a theory with maximal 
scope (e.g. a theory-of-everything) would necessarily also disclose a new 
relationship (if only in a bare mathematical sense, which would require 
subsequent interpretation) between all known phenomena. 
Theoretical Virtues in Application 
Although it will not be possible for me to apply these virtues to various 
disciplines in depth, I envisage that doing so would pick out, broadly 
speaking, four different groups of enterprises: 
i) Mature Sciences 
ii) Partial Sciences 
iii) Potential Sciences 
iv) Non-Sciences 
First, the mature sciences, including chemistry and physics, have a long 
history of predictive success, with impressive precision - they have 
demonstrated good accuracy. They have productive research areas that are 
interdisciplinary, such as physical chemistry, and their theories can often be 
conjoined successfully (e.g. The Periodic Table and Quantum Mechanics)-
they are externally consistent, each with the other. They have compact yet 
powerful theoretical frameworks, which demonstrate a wide range of 
applications- viz. have good scope and simplicity. And finally, they draw our 
attention to that which we might never have noticed, without their influence-
they are fruitful. 
Second, the partial sciences, such as psychology and economics, have 
certainly had some predictive successes, but only in certain domains- they 
162 Sometimes, sensible and reproducible constant conjunctions of evwts are disclosed; this is a 
good way to think of the quantum tunnelling example. (Remember, here I want to avoid 
belief-talk about theoretical entities, to keep my demarcation discussion neutral on the 
question of realism.) 
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have limited accuracy. And conjoining theories across disciplines might often 
lead to the compounding of errors, rather than any useful insight (e.g. in 
combining psychology with macro-economics, to construct a micro-economic 
theory)- they have limited external consistency. They do, in some cases, 
have excellent scope (in theory of perception, for example), but this is often 
parasitic on mature sciences (e.g. biology, chemistry and physics, which 
provide background theories on photoreceptors, light, the ear, sound, etc.) 
Their theoretical frameworks are usually simple, but only because their 
accuracy is limited. And they can be fruitful in terms of both sensible 
disclosure and relationship disclosure, but again only in a few domains (e.g. 
experimental psychology).163 
Third, the potential sciences, such as astrology, are notoriously inaccurate; 
enough so, indeed, to rule them out as 'partial sciences' at this very first 
hurdle. Yet at their core, there are hypotheses which are, in principle, open to 
empirical investigation; in astrology, one such hypothesis might be that there 
is a relationship between the career of an individual and his astrological 
house. Of course, given modern technology, it becomes quite feasible to 
investigate such a claim, and although it might turn out that there is some 
'truth' in it, we will certainly find that the relationship is not the same as that 
which the astrologers had guessed at beforehand.164 Astrology is not 
scientific, then, just because of the way that it is currently practised; yet its 
practitioners might aspire to more, by adopting a different methodology. 
Fourth, and finally, the non-sciences, most notably 'creation-science' and 
Kantianism, are dogmatic doctrine, just because they have no empirical 
content whatever. No matter what happens, the creation-scientist can always 
turn around and say "Yes, I know it appears that I'm wrong, but I'm not. God 
is just testing us." Likewise, the Kantian can point out that the core of his 
transcendental theory cannot be refuted by any experience, because it already 
presupposes a certain relationship between the perceiver and the perceived! 
Now all this points to the important break between science and non-science 
happening somewhere within those areas which I have classified as 'partial 
sciences', and I think there is every reason to believe that it is a purely 
methodological one. For, as I have argued, even astrology might aspire to a 
scientific status, were the correct method of inquiry to be adopted. 
l63 Compare Jungian dream analysis, which is highly speculative, with the work of von 
Helmholtz, Necker, and Ames (of Ames room fame). See Gillies [1993], pp.140-146 
tM When Gauquelin compiled the careers and birth times of twenty-five thousand 
Frenchmen, he found that there was no relationship between house and career- but he did 
find some relationships between the position of certain planets and career. See Thagard 
[1978], p.30 
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2.2 SCIENCE AS A TWO-TIERED ENTERPRISE: NORMATIVE METHODS 
AND AUXILIARY METHODS 
"Only when they must choose between competing theories do scientists behave like 
philosophers." 
(Kuhn [1965], p.7) 
In considering scientific methodology, the philosopher is faced with two 
important tasks. On the one hand, she must account for the fact that science is 
a unique activity, which produces results that are quite unlike those in any 
other area of human endeavour. The nature of these results, which bring us 
so much predictive and technological power, suggests that there is a logic of 
scientific discovery. Yet on the other hand, she must recognise that science is 
practised by a wide range of individuals, with differing goals and personal 
approaches to their work. This suggests that the psychology of scientific 
research might also be a relevant consideration. 
Now when we turn our thoughts, cursorily, to science, we tend to think of the 
'greats': Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Dalton, Maxwell and Einstein. That is, we 
are drawn to the glamour, the putative I genius', of those that have not only 
overthrown a certain way of seeing the world, but also replaced it with a new, 
and certainly more productive, world-view.165 When we think of the 
I discovery' of the nucleus in the atom we think of Rutherford, the great 
theoretician. But how often do we pause to consider the work of his students, 
Geiger and Marsden, who actually performed the experiments with alpha-
particles and gold foil? Are our untamed thoughts not just as distorted as 
those who think of the battles in North Africa, during W.W.II, as a contest 
between just two men, Rommel and Montgomery? And is it not only at our 
peril that we should forget the tens of thousands of men on the ground, 
without which, no battles would ever have been fought? In essence, this is 
the criticism that Kuhn levels at Popper: 
'Sir Karl has characterized the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its 
occasional revolutionary parts. His emphasis is natural and common: the exploits of a 
Copernicus or Einstein make better reading that those of a Brahe or Lorentz ... [but] it is for 
the normal, not the extraordinary practice of science that professionals are trained ... If a 
demarcation criterion exists (we must not, I think, seek a sharp or decisive one), it may lie in 
just that part of science which Sir Karl ignores.' 166 
Indeed, I do not remember ever sitting a physics course entitled "209: How to 
Question the Status Quo", or "310: Breaking the Boundaries of Modern 
Physics: How to Bring about a Scientific Revolution", and I think that this is 
rather unsurprising. Can we imagine a modern scientist who, having failed to 
build a rocket which succeeds in achieving escape velocity, would begin to 
165 Ironically, the same is true in philosophy, and the revolutionary nature of Kuhn's work, in 
itself, serves to partially explain its widespread popularity. 
166 Kuhn [1965], p.6 
55 
question the validity of the principle of conservation of energy? I would say 
not. For, on the contrary, the vast majority of scientists- those responsible for 
constructing ever faster computer processors, designing ever more efficient 
data-storage media, and testing ever faster aircraft- need to assume that the 
theories which they are given, those of modern science, are sufficient to solve 
the puzzles that they are faced with. And only if those theories begin to fail in 
a wide variety of applications, only if the scientific community is faced with a 
critical-mass of anomalous results, does it become necessary to re-examine 
those theories which are generally accepted, and have proven to be extremely 
useful in the past. That, Kuhn claims, is when normal science ends, and 
extraordinan; science begins:' A failure that had previously been personal may 
then come to seem the failure of a theory under test.'167 
However, in interpreting the previous quotation, I believe it is of vital 
importance to understand that 'come to seem' should read as 'come to seem, 
in the eyes of the wider communih/. And I join those, such as Watkins, who 
recognise that although something like disciplinary matrices do exist, they 
simply do not have the sort of monopoly that Kuhn insists they do. If they 
did have, then Bohm' s work in the early fifties would have to be considered 
unscientific (as would the work of Everett on relative-states, Wigner on 
subjectivism, etc.) since it could hardly be said that the formalism of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics had then encountered serious problems in 
application. So I wish to claim that scientists can be a little more individual 
than Kuhn gives them credit for, insofar as the community of scientists will 
always contain those who try to attack the status quo (the ruling disciplinary 
matrices), when their personal philosophical predilections are at odds with 
doctrine. As Watkins writes: 
'It seems that a dominant theory may come to be replaced, not because of growing empirical 
pressure (of which there may be little), but because a new and incompatible theory (inspired 
perhaps by a different metaphysical outlook) has been freely elaborated: a scientific crisis 
may have theoretical rather than empirical causes ... there is more free thinking in science 
than Kuhn supposes.' 168 
This said, I do not want to concede that normal science, as Kuhn explains it in 
methodological terms, does not happen, and is not of vital importance for 
science. It is certainly curious of Popper to admit that "Normal' Science, in 
Kuhn' s sense, exists'169, but claim that it is 'a danger to science and, indeed, to 
our civilisation.'17o, while simultaneously maintaining that 'scientific method 
does not exist'.171 Unless, that is, Popper's objection is purely on moral 
grounds, viz. that it is wrong for large groups who are in agreement to stifle 
those who disagree, which do not concern me here. Kuhn was not, I think, 
167 Ibid., p.7 
168 Watkins [1965], p.31 
169 Popper [1970], p.52 
170 Ibid., p.53 
m Popper [1983], p.S 
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merely trying to prescribe behaviour for scientists; his intent was to look, 
rather, at what methods the scientific community prescribes to its students, 
and its members.172 These are the normative methods of which I wish to write, 
and they are normative not in the sense that I think they are the best way to 
practice science, but in the sense that the community actively encourages its 
members to use them. This is because tlzey yield great practical benefits, and we 
have the technological evidence, the evidence of our senses, to back up such a 
claim.l73 
Besides, in the final analysis, it seems quite obvious that any scientist who 
wishes to criticise a theory which is widely accepted by his community must 
also understand what it is to do 'normal science' very well, and for two 
distinct reasons: 
a) Else, he never would have made it into a position where his peers 
would put any trust in his words. (He would just be thought of as a 
crank.) Indeed, he would not even understand the special theory-
infected language that the scientific community employs. 
b) In criticising any given theory, it will still be necessary to accept 
doctrine in other domains of the science. For example, when Bohr 
constructed his model of the atom, he did not suddenly 'throw away' 
the idea of electrons, or claim that the charge on such theoretical 
entities (or constructs) was radically different from the approximations 
made beforehand. And when Einstein put forward his special 
relativity, he did not throw out Maxwellian electromagnetism along 
with Newton's laws of motion. Indeed, if anything, Maxwell's 
framework was later viewed as lending support to the theory of special 
relativity. 
Normative Methods and Normal Science - Logic of Discovery 
In answering the question "What does normal science consist of, 
methodologically?", Kuhn draws a rather sharp distinction between two areas 
of endeavour, 'theoretical activity ... and fact gathering.'174 However, since I 
think it best to make his claims consistent with the idea that observation is 
theory-laden, I shall deviate from his presentation, instead accepting that 
'facts and theories ... are never as neatly separated as everyone makes them 
m According to Kuhn, 'the descriptive and the normative are inextricably mixed'. See Kuhn 
[1970], p.233 + 237. 
m Note that it is enough, for this argument to go through, that science constructs theories of 
increasing nearness to empirical adequacy. 
174 Kuhn [1996], p.31 
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out to be.'175 I shall treat three areas of activity, not necessarily unrelated, that 
constitute the work of the normal scientist,l76 
The first, which I would call classification and prediction, involves determining 
numerical information that will be useful for prediction, according to the 
ruling paradigm, and then slotting this information back into its theoretical 
framework. For example, discovering the Young's modulus, coefficient of 
thermal expansion, and yield strain of a new metal (classification) would be 
beneficial to an engineer; armed with facts such as these, he could assess 
which applications the material was suitable for (prediction). This said, 
however, there are certain facts gathered within this domain which do not 
appear, prima facie, to have any practical value. For example, Kuhn cites data 
within astronomy, namely stellar position and magnitude, which appear to 
have been gathered for purely academic interest.l77 Still, I would argue that 
such knowledge has been used for predictive purposes on many occasions; 
consider navigation at sea by the use of a sextant and an astronomical chart, 
or the use of Hubble' s notoriously imprecise 'law' in order to predict the 
velocities of receding galaxies. 
Second, there is what I call experiment-tlzeon; comparison and application 
extension. On the factual side of this domain of normal-scientific 
investigation, there is the search for new evidence which can further bolster 
the paradigm; new apparatus, or a novel experimental set-up, is devised in 
order to demonstrate the agreement of theory with nature itself. In 
reciprocation to the theory, these experimental comparisons then draw 
attention to the approximations that had to be made in order to' demonstrate' 
the aforementioned agreement. An excellent example is Newton's attempt to 
derive the equations governing the motion of a pendulum from his law of 
gravitation. As Kuhn correctly points out, Newton needed to assume a point 
mass for the pendulum-bob, as well as disregarding the effect of air 
resistance. 178 Moreover, from a modern perspective, it is noticeable that he 
assumed a small angle of swing in order to simplify his proo£.179 If one were 
to be truly pedantic, then one could also draw attention to several other 
factors neglected: the properties of the rod bearing the bob, the non-
uniformity of the gravitational field, and the friction at the bearing. Such 
glaring omissions drive theoreticians to devise more elegant and powerful 
proofs, viz. theories which incorporate more factors, to extend the 
175 Since I think there is no harm in making this concession to the Popperian camp (and other 
anti-realist positions, such as van Fraassen's, which involve theory-ladenness), it seems best 
to make it. Quotation from Feyerabend [1993], p.51 
176 Note that throughout the following discussion, I will only use the word 'paradigm' in the 
'disciplinary matrix' sense, viz. as referent to 'a Constellation of Group Commitments'. See 
Kuhn [1996], pp.181-187 
m Kuhn [1996], p.25 
178 Ibid., p.31. 
179 Sin 8 ""8, when 8 is small. This approximation allows one to treat the motion of the 
pendulum as being 'simple harmonic'. 
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applicability of the paradigm. As Duhem put it, sixty years before Kuhn, 'The 
degree of approximation of a law, though sufficient today, will become 
insufficient in the future'.18° In the case of pendulum motion, we now have 
theories to describe both damped and forced oscillations; we can also consider 
the properties of the rod, and even explain oscillations involving large angles 
of swing. It is important to note that these sophisticated theories, in line with 
their predecessors, do not question the validity of the Newtonian paradigm.1s1 
The third and final domain, to use Kuhn's terminology directly, is that of 
articulation. On the quantitative side, this involves the use of experiment to 
determine physical constants such as Planck' s constant or the permeability of 
free space; other experiments may also be performed with the aim of 
discovering quantitative relationships such as the Ideal Gas law, or Faraday's 
law of induction.182 On the qualitative side, there are experiments designed to 
examine aspects of the paradigm which are unexplored, or somewhat 
ambiguous. It is eminently reasonable to believe that, in both cases, such 
activity would not come about without theories, based on a widely accepted 
paradigm, to guide the experimenter; in fact, Kuhn boldly states: 'More than 
any other sort of normal research, the problems of paradigm articulation are 
simultaneously theoretical and experimental'. 183 To add cogency to this 
argument about articulation, let us consider a 'normal science' account of the 
discovery of non-locality, which builds upon my earlier discussion of 
quantum theory towards the beginning of the first chapter: 
Given formalisms with clear predictive successes, theoreticians such as Bohr, 
Heisenberg, and Born, set about interpreting them.184 And in response to 
some of the counter-intuitive results of the paradigm, which in this case I 
would describe as 'quantisation', they advocated a standpoint that was 
agnostic about (or perhaps even dismissive of) claims of the value of certain 
non-commuting variables, such as spin, before they were measured. Yet 
nonetheless, other theoreticians continued to question implicit problems (or 
puzzles), and a case in point is non-locality. Bell's theorem, following in the 
footsteps of the famous EPR paper185, and V on Neumann's flawed locality 
theorem, predicted the data which would be obtained if quantum entities 
were local. Subsequently, Aspect, and more recently Kwiat et al., performed 
ISO Duhem [1954], p.178. 
181 I disregard relativistic considerations, here, since they are irrelevant in principle. Many of 
the developments to which I refer happened before 1905, and there is no reason to believe they 
would not have continued as they have, even if special (and general) relativity had not yet 
been proposed. 
182 As Williams points out: 'there could be no better demonstration of 'normal science' than 
the experimental researches in electricity of Michael Faraday'. Williams [1965], p.50. 
183 Kuhn [1996], p.33. 
184 Specifically, I refer to the Schrodinger equation, Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, and 
Dirac's q-number/c-number theory. 
185 Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen. 'Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be 
considered complete?', in Physical Review 47 777. 
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experiments which demonstrated that Bell's inequality was violated; 'spooky 
action-at-a-distance' is, by most, now regarded as a genuine consequence of 
the quantum formalism, even though the Copenhagen Interpretation did not 
explicitly deal with it,186 Thus, Kuhn could say that the paradigm of 
'quantisation' (or the 'disciplinary matrix of quantum mechanics') was 
articulated. When he says that articulation 'can [only] resemble exploration', 
however, his anti-realist colours begin to show, and I want to leave the 
question of whether it is really exploration up-in-the-air.187 What is clear is 
that it is progressive in a predictive sense, which is- as I have already argued 
earlier in this chapter- not only what makes it scientific, but also what makes 
it worthwhile in the eyes of the scientific community. 
Overall, then, what strikes one about these normative methods is that they are, 
on the whole, pretty boring. The progress is painfully slow, the work is often 
repetitive, and the discovery of anomalous results that are generally agreed 
upon (as being the flaws of theories, rather than inept scientists) might take 
many years. (The Mpemba effect is an excellent case in point.188) But 
ultimately, the phenomena win out even though experiment and theory are 
symbiotic, and any given theory might eventually need to be jettisoned; this is 
when the critical comparison between new competing theories, extraordinan; 
science, comes into play. Of course, none of this will stop certain individuals 
(and these will not be the majority) from bucking the trend, and actively 
attacking certain disciplinary matrices (in certain domains of science), while 
committing to belief in (or at least full acceptance of) others.189 And I would 
suggest that this is as it should be; in the words of Kuhn, 'Revolutions through 
criticism demand normal science no less than revolutions through crisis.'190 
I will now move on to discuss auxilian; methods, which play a major role in 
extraordinary science, viz. in theory-choice and theory-construction 
(heuristically). It will also be argued that they have a limited role in normal 
science- insofar as they might sometimes affect the specific techniques that a 
scientist might apply in order to solve any given puzzle. It is pleasing to find 
that this follows on from where Kuhn leads, when he writes that: 
J8o For the Kwiat experiment, see Internet URL- http:// p23.lanl.gov / agw /2crystal.pdf 
187 Kuhn [1996], p.29. 
188 Mpemba was a Tanzanian student who, in 1969, was responsible for the physics 
community's 're-discovery' of the fact that hot water can sometimes freeze faster than cold 
water (at the same pressure). Initially, he was ridiculed by his teacher, as no doubt he would 
have been by most physicists of the time, even though Aristotle, Bacon, and Descartes had all 
previously mentioned this curious phenomenon. Moreover, as Jeng points out: 'the effect 
was known by laypersons around the world long before 1969.' See 'Can Hot Water Freeze 
Faster than Cold Water?', by M.Jeng, at Internet URL-
http:// www.weburbia.com/ physics/ hot_ water.html 
189 This is necessary in order to make an admissible attack, as explained under point b) at the 
end of the preceding sub-section. 
190 Kuhn [1970], p.233 
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'There can be no set of rules adequate to dictate desired individual behaviour in the concrete 
cases that scientists will meet in the course of their careers ... Shared ideals affect behaviour 
without making those that hold them ideal...it may be vitally important that different 
individuals decide in different ways. How else could the group as a whole hedge its bets?' 
[emphasis in the original)191 
Auxiliary Methods and the Individual Scientist - Psychology of Research 
In Normal Science 
When the young normal scientist has finished his schooling, he will be 
equipped with a good knowledge both of contemporary theories, and of the 
mathematical techniques necessary in order to solve puzzles that involve the 
use of those theories.192 And if he wishes to become a professional scientist, 
then his first move will be to decide which specific domain of his science it is 
that most appeals to him. Of course, his philosophical predilections will 
influence this choice, practical considerations notwithstanding - the choice of 
which type of puzzles he wants to tackle. 
Prinw facie, it might not seem that this is an important methodological issue. For 
while the realist might want to work in quantum gravity because what it 
currently suggests to him about 'the real world' is just too incredible to 
swallow, the anti-realist might want to work in the very same domain just 
because its current formalism seems to be unnecessarily complex.193 But it 
might still be argued that there are certain circumstances, albeit rare ones, in 
which an individual (or small group) might see a certain area of their 
discipline as posing worthwhile puzzles, while the majority might not. For 
example, the anti-realist might consider that a predictively successful 
formalism, with observational consequences that are sufficient for all present 
practical purposes, needs no further qualitative articulation- instead he might 
begin to work on its quantitative articulation. On the other hand, the realist 
might want to see how the formalism could be better understood in terms of 
correspondence to the world. And this, one might claim, is how it was made 
explicit that the non-relativistic formalism of quantum mechanics is, strictly 
speaking, compatible with both indeterministic and deterministic views 
thereo£.194 
However, I think that this line of argument is misleading, for it confuses the 
puzzles set by normal science, those generated by acceptance of (or belief in) 
191 Ibid., pp.238-241 
l92 This is where shared examples (or exemplars) play an important role in the disciplinary 
matrix. See Kuhn [1993], p.187-191 
193 Or that the explanations it offers are not of sufficient practical value. 
194 Popper's view is an example of the former, whereas Bohm's is an example of the latter. As 
Cushing puts it: 'In the end, we may be left with an essential underdetermination in our most 
fundamental physical theory and this issues in an observational equivalence between 
indeterminism and determinism in our world.' See Cushing [1994], p.214 
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established theories, with what the individual may perceive as problenzs with 
those theories. That is to say, I do not think that what Bohm did in the early 
1950s can be properly understood as articulation of quantum mechanics within 
the realms of normal science. Rather, it points to a belief on his part that the 
period of extraordinary science which generated the Copenhagen Interpretation 
had ended too soon. Thus, he put himself into the mind-set of the 
extraordinan; scientist, with the goal of generating a theory that might have 
been accepted by the community in place of the Copenhagen one, had it been 
placed on the table in the late 1920s. And any auxilian; methods he employed, 
in constructing his theory of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, were only 
due to his deliberate choice to act as an extraordinary, rather than normal, 
scientist. Historically, this argument is supported by the fact that Bohm 
started out by writing a book, Quantum Theory, which was designed to 
elucidate Bohr's views on quantum mechanics, and only began to question his 
approach after meeting with Einstein. As Bohm put it: 'This encounter with 
Einstein had a strong effect on the direction of my research, because I then 
became seriously interested in whether a deterministic extension of the 
quantum theory could be found.' 195 Further, it is clear that Bohm spent 
considerable time investigating the arguments that took place during the 
period of crisis in the late twenties, for he went on to write: 
'it occurred to me that if de Broglie' s ideas had won the day at the Solvay Congress of 1927, 
they might have become the accepted interpretation; then, if someone had come along to 
propose the current interpretation, one could equally well have said that since, after all, it 
gave no new experimental results, there would be no point in considering it seriously. In 
other words, I felt that the adoption of tllC current interpretation was a somewhat fortuitous affair, 
since it was affected ... by tlze generally positivist empiricist attitude that pervaded plzysics at tlze 
time.'196 [emphasis mine] 
Thus, I want to claim that auxilian; methods are not relevant to the choice of 
which puzzles an individual will tackle, but they are relevant if an individual 
begins to perceive that there are problems with an established theoretical 
framework (not just in the way that it has been applied). In the latter case, 
such an individual would effectively be deciding to act as ifhe were in a 
period of extrnordinan; science, which will be treated in the next sub-section. 
This said, however, there may still be another fashion in which auxilian; 
methods might creep into normal science; in the means by wlziclz a given 
individual chooses to tackle a recognised puzzle. 
In chess, for example, strategic considerations dictate that control of the centre 
of the board is an important goal - and the puzzle "How do I gain control of 
the centre?" is one that a good chess player will try to solve in the first phase 
of every game (the opening). Some prefer making a quick grab for it, and if 
195 Bohm [1987], p.35 
196 In addition, he also mentions that he spent time considering Pauli's original objection to de 
Broglie's guiding-wave idea; Pauli sent this to him. Ibid., p.39 
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both players opt for such tactics then an opening such as the Queen's gambit, 
Ruy Lopez, or Centre Counter is likely to occur.197 But others prefer to allow 
their opponent to occupy the centre, in the hope that he will over-extend and 
allow a swift counter-attack; this is the Black player's intent in more passive 
systems such as the Modern and Pirc defences.l98 Of course, at our present 
level of knowledge about chess, it is not immediately clear which approach 
(say for Black) is better, although there is almost certainly a truth of the matter 
which will be discovered when we have a computer of sufficient power to 
analyse all possible games. And might this not suggest that there could be 
certain puzzles in normal science to which the realist is better suited than his 
anti-realist counterpart (and vice versa)? 
Given the puzzle "What is the charge on an electron?", it is hard to see why 
an anti-realist would have performed the Millikan oil-drop experiment, since 
it is conceived in terms of capturing a real discrete 'thing' (rather than a 
theoretical construct), and examining it. Conversely, given the puzzle "What 
are the relative rates of electromagnetic and weak interaction particle 
processes?", it is difficult to see why an ardent realist would posit theoretical 
entities such as virtual particles, when 'it is meaningless to argue whether or 
not they are there ... As any attempt to observe them changes the outcome of 
the process.'199 In short, there are many ways to break an egg, and this is the 
very essence of auxiliary methods.2oo 
Tn Extraordinan; Science 
When a critical mass of anomalies confronts a theory, or when an individual 
embarks upon a personal critical crusade against a generally accepted theory 
(e.g. Bohm, against orthodox quantum mechanics), normal science (for the 
community or individual, variously) ends. Theory-construction, and theory-
choice (between competing theories that are constructed), viz. those activities 
which constitute extraordinan; science, begin in earnest. And auxilian; metlzods 
will, inevitably, begin to be employed by the scientist. 
In both theory-choice and theory-construction, and it is clear that these two 
are intertwined, I would follow Zahar in saying that 'ontologtj may be taken to 
Jza·ue prescriptive import.'201 But in the context of realism vs. anti-realism, it is 
197 Queen's Gambit: 1. d4, d5; 2. c4 Ruy Lopez: 1. e4, e5; 2. Nf3, Nc6; 3. Bb5 
Centre Counter: 1. e4, d5 
198 Pirc Defence: 1. e4, d6; 2. d4, Nf6 Modern Defence: 1. e4, g6; 2. d4, Bg7 
l99 Internet URL- http:// www2.slac.stanford.edu/ vvc/ theory/ virtual.html 
2oo I do not want to preclude the possibility that different methods might, ultimately, lead to 
highly similar (or even identical) results. However, it might take a long time for such 
'levelling out' to occur, even assuming that it can and does. 
201 They are intertwined because an individual who prefers theories with certain qualities will 
attempt to ensure that any new theory which he constructs also possesses those same 
qualities. Quotation from Zahar [1989], p.22 
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more important to recognise that it is whether one works to an ontology, or 
not, which is the issue at hand. For a hard-headed anti-realist, who rejected 
the need for ontic explanation in science, would have no reason to care what 
his theory might suggest to a realist. Instead, his only concern would be to 
save the phenomena in the 'neatest' fashion possible. For one such as 
Duhem, for example: 
'A physical theory ... is a system of mathematical propositions deduced from a small number of 
principles, which aim to represmt as simply and completely as possible a set of experimentallaws.' 202 
It is important to remember that Duhem was not just adopting a peculiar 
form of empiricist metaphysics; he was not claiming that there is nothing 
beyond our perception to speak of. Instead, he just believed that science 
could progress without appeal to ontology - that the scientist would do best 
to adopt an agnostic stance about the suprasensible, and to avoid entertaining 
any speculative metaphysical thoughts_203 Of course, this is perfectly 
compatible with the choice to construct (and prefer) theories which satisfy the 
demarcation guidelines led out in section 2.1 of this chapter; for, as I argued 
there, they might be preferred on purely pragmatic grounds. 
The realist, on the other hand, would likely think that what a theory says or 
implies on the metaphysical level is a vital consideration.204 And just as 
Einstein was driven to reject the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics because it was observer-dependent, indeterministic, and 
apparently non-local (theory-choice), de Broglie and Bohm were motivated to 
construct competing theories which obeyed as many of those constraints as 
possible (theory-construction). Thus, while the demarcation guidelines (2.1) 
might be thought of as relevant considerations for both the realist and the 
anti-realist extraordinan; scientist, the realist considers something extra -
specifically, the metaphysical content of a theory. In the eyes of the realist, this 
need not be what demarcates science from non-science, but it might well be 
that which demarcates good science from bad science. 
In short, when the realist constructs a new theory, he wants it to suggest that 
the theories which it supersedes were approximately true (in correspondence to 
the actual metaphysical world)- that his new theory has added resolution to 
a basic, but essentially correct, ontological picture. When the anti-realist 
constructs a new theory, he only wants it to demonstrate that the theories 
which it replaces were approximately ernpirically adequate - ontological 
continuity be damned, for it is only saving the phenomena which counts. 
202 Ouhem (1954], p.19 
203 See the discussion of conventionalism in Chapter 1, section 1.1. 
204 This is because he links the explanatory parts of theories with their empirical success- the 
conventionalist, structural realist, or constructive empiricist, would sever that link 
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Throughout the foregoing discussion, I have left the specific details about 
auxilinnJ methods essentially vague, and this was quite intentional. For they 
are legion, and rooting out all their intricacies would require in-depth 
analyses of many historical episodes.zos Yet I still wish to offer a few 
examples of the heuristic tools that a theoretician might employ in theory-
construction, and how these might differ, in both application and importance, 
for the realist and anti-realist: 
i) The Correspondence Principle. This principle, which has already been 
alluded to in my earlier discussion of the theoretical virtue of external 
consistency (2.1), says that a new theory should reduce to its 
predecessor (in the same domain of science) under the correct 
conditions. To reiterate my earlier example, the deducible 
consequences of special relativity reduce to those of classical 
(Newtonian) mechanics, as v / c ~ 0. As Zahar correctly points out: 
'this is also how Newtonian gravitation, though strictly incompatible 
with Kepler' s laws, is nonetheless based on them.'206 
However, another of Zahar' s examples, that of h ~ 0 in quantum 
mechanics leading to its correspondence with classical mechanics (this 
is how Bohr followed the correspondence principle) is much more 
interesting, because this is something that realists have disputed. And 
I believe that the further examination of this dispute, which follows, 
will reveal how realists might apply the Correspondence Principle 
differently to their anti-realist counterparts.207 
Now in comparing v / c with h, the first difference is that the former 
quantity is dimensionless, whereas the latter does have dimensions, 
specifically Js or kgm2s-1. So when we consider Planck's law,£= hv, if 
h were literally to hit zero, then there would be no relationship 
between the energy of a photon and its frequency (or wavelength, from 
£=he/A) whatsoever. Analogously, if we imagine G (the gravitational 
constant) reaching zero, then there would be no relationship, period, 
between the gravitational field emitted by a body and its mass. 
The second difference is that h is a constant, rather than a variable 
(such as v), so it is difficult to see, from a realist perspective, how it 
could tend towards anything other than its actual value, in this actual 
world. Analogously, it would seem very strange to speak of 1t (a 
dimensionless example) as tending to anything other than that which it 
is. Certainly, one does not spend one's time attempting to draw circles 
205 Analyses of the sort performed by Zahar, in his 'Einstein's Revolution'. 
206 Zahar [1989], p. 19 
zo7 I will remain neutral on the question of whether there is a rigl1t way to employ it, viz. a 
way that is best for science. I do, however, contend that both anti-realists and realists can use 
something like it, in order to construct more virtuous (consistent) theories. 
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with a circumference that is not equal to nd, since it is impossible by 
definition. And while much experimental effort has been devoted to 
finding ever more accurate values for G, none has ever been directed 
toward trying to somehow 'change it'. 208 
In light of these comparisons, the obvious move for one with realist 
sympathies is to accuse Bohr of making a rather foolish error, in both 
mathematical and indeed empirical terms. But while I think that the 
foregoing mathematical argument is quite legitimate, insofar as v / c 
tending to zero in special relativity is not analogous to h tending to 
zero in quantum mechanics, I think it fair to suppose that Bohr was 
aiming for a different, empirical, notion of correspondence.209 That is 
to say, I think that Bohr wanted to offer an answer to the question, 
"Why didn't we realise earlier that classical mechanics is, and was, 
empirically inadequate?", rather than questions such as, "How do we 
show that classical mechanics, properly construed, is a special case of 
quantum mechanics? That classical mechanics is approximately true in 
the correct parameter limits?" 
So with his loose talk of Planck' s constant tending to zero, I contend 
that Bohr was attempting to express a proposition such as "If we don't 
factor h into our equations, viz. if we assume that the values of 
dynamic variables are continuous rather than discrete, then we arrive 
at classical mechanics. And if h had been many orders of magnitude 
higher in the actual world, then we could have easily recognised that 
the velocity of a tennis ball, say, is quantised." Of course, the scientific 
realist will find such an account lacking in one important respect, 
specifically that it does not justify the claim that classical mechanics 
was approximately true (Thesis E), but the constructive empiricist or 
conventionalist will find it quite pragmatically satisfying. Certainly, it 
will suffice as a means of explaining to physics undergraduates that 
relationships between phenomena are often more subtle than one 
would appreciate in everyday life, and will justify the claim that 
classical mechanics was approximately enzpirically adequate. 
Yet Bohm, who was searching for some means of showing that classical 
mechanics is just an approximation to a more verisimilar theory, 
namely quantum mechanics (in a certain experimental domain), 
needed to adopt a different heuristic strategy. He sought, instead, to 
find a variable which could be thought of as literally reaching zero, and 
2os This is not to say that it will not spontaneously change, say at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow. But if it 
did, at least by any significant fractional margin, it would be immediately noticeable - the 
Earth's orbit about the Sun would change, as would the weight of a kilogram mass on Earth, 
etc. 
209 After all, it would be curious to accuse Bohr of being a poor mathematician, given his 
success in theory-construction. 
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genuinely yielding a classical result, from a realist perspective. He 
achieved this by forging the equation dp/ dt =- V(V + Q) in his 
mechanics, which reduces to the expected classical result of dp/ dt =-
VV, as Q -t 0. 210 Moreover, it is worth noting that the explicit non-
locality in Bohm' s theory also 'disappears' as the quantum potential 
tends to zero, which is a result that Bohr never managed to effectively 
explain in an equivalent (but anti-realist) fashion. 211 
ii) Interpretation of Mathematical Entities. As was suggested by the first part 
of my discussion of The Semantic Thesis (section 1.1), choosing which 
mathematical features of a theory should be taken to have real physical 
significance- and which parts of a theoretical framework should be 
taken literally- is a task which the semantic realist will take seriously. 
For example, consider the following two theories, which we would 
both recognise (from a modern perspective) as representing the same 
law, namely Coulomb's law of electrostatics: 
(Eq. 1) 
(Eq. 2) 
(where F is the magnitude of the force between two charged entities, qn 
is the charge on entity n, and r is the distance between the two entities.) 
Now, the first thing to note is that the two equations above are 
completely empirically equivalent; one could determine an extremely 
good value fork (Coulomb's constant) by experiment, irrespective of 
any belief in equation two. 21 2 Second, it is important to note that 
equation one is more structurally simple; I would have less to put into 
my calculator in order to use it.213 
However, I want to contend that the realist would find equation two to 
be far preferable to equation one, since it is more amenable to the 
ontological interpretation that he would attach to other domains of 
210 Where V is the classical potential, and Q is the quantum potential. 
m However, he might well have said, following on from my interpretation of his statement 
about Planck's constant, "If we don't factor h into our equations, then there could be no 
superposition of states in the dynamic properties of an entity. Hence probability would not 
enter the theory, and non-locality would not be a feature thereof." 
212 I want to claim there is a possible world in which we could just have discovered the 
relationship depicted by equation one, and not made the jump to equation two; this shouldn't 
seem too unreasonable, as an indication that the two can be viewed as different laws. It is too 
quick, with hindsight, for us to say "Oh, it's just the same law written differently". 
213 ln addition, in the Ockham's razor sense of simplicity, why should we want to introduce 
rr? Where's the circle? Surely it's not strictly necessary, from a wholeheartedly 
instrumentalist perspective? 
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physics. 214 On the one hand, the mention of 4Jtr2, viz. the area of a 
sphere, is significant because it promotes the picture of an isotropic 
field that is 'emitted' from each entity (or of a prior non-divergent 
substance, disturbed by the presence of each entity). As the area of the 
sphere increases, so the field strength will decrease; thus, there is an 
analogue in the relationship between the intensity of light or sound 
from a fixed-power point source, and the distance that one is from that 
source. On the other hand, the use of Eo binds equation two together 
with Gauss' law (or Maxwell's first law), thus strengthening the idea 
that free space has a real property, called its permittivity. This, rather 
than us having two isolated constants (k & Eo) which just help us to 
predict the relationships between phenomena in different situations.215 
As against this approach, an instrumentalist's primary aim will be to 
tease out the mathematical relationships between sensible things in 
whatever fashion possible; he need not consider himself bound, in theory-
construction, by any non-empirical considerations of what has gone 
before. And I contend that it is only after such a working mathematical 
relationship has been found- say between elements and the spectra 
which they emit- that he would be interested in couching it in terms 
amenable to those used in other domains of physics. He may even 
resent having to do this, although it is likely that such 'translation' is 
indispensable, in communicating a new idea to a community which is 
steeped in considerable tradition (viz. partial to an old disciplinary 
matrix, which will need to be replaced or altered). Certainly Bohr 
appeared to show some irritation at this process, as was suggested in 
Chapter One.216 It seems likely that other non-semantic-realists, such 
as Duhem, Poincare, and Mach, would have too. 
iii) Visual vs. Abstract Modelling. In constructing a new theory, the realist 
will often try to think of the way that things are in the hidden or 
unobservable realm, in spatia-temporal terms. Or he might even ask 
what the geometry of space and the nature of time would really have 
to be like, in order for the phenomena to be as they are.217 Of course, 
this latter type of thought was responsible, in part, for both of the 
greatest revolutions in mechanics. As Zahar writes: 
214 Here, the realist is examining the relative external consistency of the two theories in an 
ontological, rather than pragmatic or empirical, sense. 
215 Admittedly, some anti-realists could also prefer equation two in a pragmatic respect, just 
because it is more structurally consistent with other laws in the same domain of physics. But 
they need not. 
216 See quotation referenced in footnote 10, in 1.1, flzstrumentalism vs. Scientific Realism -Two 
Illustrative Episodes. 
217 Of course, this is what the Greek from which the word is derived, meaning 'land-
measuring' or 'Earth-measuring', also suggests. 
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'In Einstein's words, geometry constituted one of the oldest physical theories ... In the 
preface to his Pri11cipia, Newton treats geometry as a branch of mechanics, i.e. as a 
branch of physics.'218 
Anti-realists, however, have traditionally thought of our geometry as 
more of a construct, necessary only to make sense of the world in 
anthropocentric terms; there are echoes of such an approach in Kant' s 
views on space-time, and Hume's views on causality.219 As was 
mentioned in section 1.1, Bohr thought that our 'classical concepts' are 
limited in applicability, but that we are nevertheless stuck with 
them.220 And Poincare, in a similar vein, thought that there were no 
empirical grounds whatsoever for expressing a physical theory (such 
as special relativity) in terms of non-Euclidean, rather than Euclidean, 
geometry: 
'experience plays an indispensable role in the genesis of geometry; but it would be an 
error thence to conclude that geometry is, even in part, an experimental science ... It is 
meant by natural selection that our mind has adapted itself to the conditions of the 
external world, that it has adopted the geometry most adva11tageous to the species: or 
in other words the most convenient ... geometry is not true, it is advantageous.'22I 
Given this, and there are some links here to the interpretation of 
mathematical entities as mentioned above, I want to contend that a 
realist in the process of theory-construction is more liable to adopt a 
visual modelling strategy, while the anti-realist may be more amenable 
to an abstract modelling strategy. For, whereas Schrodinger attempted 
to explain quantum phenomena in terms of wave-like motion 
(something with which we have visual familiarity, from watching the 
ripples on a pond or the vibrations of the string on an instrument), 
Heisenberg preferred a more abstract, and purely algebraic, approach. 
According to van Fraassen: 
'To be good, it is not necessary for a model to have all its elements correspond to 
elements of reality. What is needed instead is that the model should fit the 
phenomena it was introduced to model.'222 
And following his own advice, he proceeds to introduce a modal 
interpretation of quantum mechanics which, in rigorous exposition, 
demands page after page of abstract quantum logic.223 In van 
Fraassen' s model, we find nothing quite as visually striking as the 
21s Zahar [1989], p.34 
219 See Kant [1987], A49, p.188 and Hume [1748], section VII, parts 1 and 2. 
220 See also the discussion of Bohr's views about sema11tic disturba11ce in Fine [1996], pp.34-35 
221 Poincare [1913], pp.79-80 & p.91 
222 van Fraassen [1991 ], p.16 Admittedly he adds the caveat that we also want our theories to 
be informative, in a pragmatic vein, but other empiricists need not accept the force of that 
claim. 
223 See van Fraassen [1991], pp.306-327 
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Bohmian depiction of the paths followed by particles in the two-slit 
diffraction experiment, due to his' quantum potential' .224 
I confess that it does seem rather curious for empiricists, given their 
emphasis on sense-data, not to want to fashion models that are more 
amenable to the inputs which we have on an everyday basis (and are 
couched in those spatial terms). But nonetheless they seem to prefer-
perhaps ironically- to trust to obscure logical arguments.225 
Conversely, the realist wants to try to describe a model which we can 
envisage, and posit entities or processes that we could imagine 
touching, seeing, and feeling, were our sensory range to be extended. 
Of course, there may also be other differences in the auxilian; methods 
employed by the individual which are not divisible along purely realist vs. 
anti-realist lines; for example, gender, culture or race may be other relevant 
considerations. Nonetheless, the notion that personal philosophical 
predilections do have an important (if not always decisive) impact on theory-
construction and theory-choice does seem very sound. I have just tried to 
argue that these predilections actually lie along a realist-antirealist axis, if only 
in one dimension. 
All that remains is to show how theory-choice and theory-construction are 
deeply bound, and to bring out how my views on demarcation closely relate 
to my views on methodology. I will also take the opportunity to provide a 
brief summary of this chapter, in order to cement my position in the mind of 
the reader. 
2.3 A SUMMARY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORETICAL 
VIRTUES AS DEMARCATION GUIDELINES, AND SCIENCE AS A 'TWO-
TIERED' METHODOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE 
"If I have a theory of how and why science works, it must necessarily have implications for 
the way in which scientists should behave if their enterprise is to flourish." 
(Thomas Kuhn [1970], p.237) 
With regard to demarcating between science and non-science, my antecedent 
argument was founded on the intuitive notion that it is empirical success, viz. 
the successful application of theory in practice (in predictive and non-ontic 
224 Vigier [1987], pp.176-177 
ns Which is to say, they are considerably keener on the application of pure reaso11, rather than 
extrapolation from the observable, than their empiricist colours might suggest. (This is at 
some, non-fatal, tension with their claim that we should consider our beliefs-in-sensible-
things to be more epistemically secure than our metaphysical beliefs.) 
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explanatory roles), which is the salient feature of science. Add to this that 
science has a degree of testabilih;/tentati'uity, and that it makes novel predictions 
which often prove to be reliable, and the spirit of the difference between 
science and non-science is captured. 
Moving on to flesh out this difference, I then argued from a descriptive stand-
point that theoretical frameworks (or domains consisting of multiple 
theoretical frameworks) in science are more virtuous, in terms of accuracy, 
scope, consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness, than those in non-science. And 
that, moreover, we might judge the status of a discipline by considering the 
overall virtuosity of the domains of which it consists. In other words, it is a 
visible feature of scientific disciplines that they contain a lot of virtuous 
domains, because those domains are composed of virtuous theoretical 
frameworks.226 
Now, and I have not made this point explicitly before, theoretical frameworks 
in mature sciences become highly virtuous - in part - because the 
practitioners of those disciplines actively work to make them so. At least, they 
do in this day and age- although it is possible that the first successful 
theoretical frameworks (in terms of empirical success) just happened to partake 
of these virtues, and thus groups set out to create more theoretical 
frameworks with the same properties.227 This is what the normative methods 
(handed down from generation to generation) which comprise normal science 
are all about. A theoretical framework is placed on the table (most do not care 
how it arrived there), and normal scientists work to make it more virtuous, for 
example by experiment-theon; comparison and articulation. In order to do this, 
they need to 'buy into' the theoretical framework in some way, whether that 
is characterised in terms of belief (as Kuhn would have had it), or acceptance 
(as van Fraassen might, instead, suggest). The community agrees on a set of 
legitimate puzzles posed by the theoretical framework, and sets out to solve 
them. But there is a feedback loop, and in solving puzzles, new ways to 
bolster the virtues of the theoretical framework (or to disclose the full extent 
of its virtues, in the case of scope and fruitfulness) are found. 
Of course, the auxilian; methods employed in theory-choice and theory-
construction (by the theoretician) are also designed to fashion new theoretical 
frameworks with both maximal virtue (in terms of accuracy and consistency) 
and maximal potential virtue (in terms of scope and fruitfulness). But the 
community does not prescribe these methods, they are not 'handed-down' in 
the same way that the normative ones are, precisely because few scientists 
226 Tile virtues lie in tlze theoretical jrame1.vorks, but we can talk of a domain as being 'virtuous' if 
it contains virtuous theoretical frameworks. And we can talk of a discipline being 'virtuous' 
if it contains many 'virtuous' domains. 
227 That is to say, they may have posited a link between these properties and the practical 
value of the theoretical frameworks which possess them. For example, Brahe's obsession 
with accuracy does not seem to have been mirrored in any earlier work in astronomy. 
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ever engage in revolutionary thought, viz. put themselves into the frame of 
mind of the extraordinary scientist. There are no textbooks on how to forge 
new theories, though I would join Zahar in suggesting that there probably 
should be, and thus the bold theoretician is not only left to his own devices, but 
also afforded a great deal of creative freedom. This, then, leads to the 
important difference between the heuristic devices employed by the realist 
and the anti-realist. For while both will want to maximise the virtuosity (and 
potential virtuosity) of their creation, the former will want to ensure it has 
ontological continuity with the frameworks which it succeeds. Additionally, it 
is also possible that the realist might accord the individual virtues different 
weights than his anti-realist counterpart; for example, he might think that 
consistency is more important than simplicity, when forced into a situation 
where he must favour one over the other. 
In addition, as I have also mentioned, auxilianJ methods can creep into normal 
science in the means by which a puzzle is solved. And my suggestion would be 
that it is actually good for science that there are realist scientists as well as anti-
realist scientists, at least on this level. It is solving a puzzle that is important 
for pragmatic purposes, after all, and there is no harm in having multiple 
lines of attack (adopted by different individuals and groups) until it is solved. 
Overall, then, I have tried to present science as an enterprise with a great deal 
of tradition, which relies on a prescribed methodology (and concordant logic) 
of discovery. However, I have also made the case that the free-thinking of the 
individual is vital for the enterprise to continue. There must be those with 
critical minds, driven by personal philosophical predilections, who attempt to 
forge new and better theoretical frameworks which are cast in the image (in 
terms of virtues) of those that they replace. If a catchphrase is wanted, then 
"Science isn't an art, but it needs some scientists who are also artists." 
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3 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC REALIST 
INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one, it was concluded that scientific realism, qua philosophical 
position, is a justificationist programme, which is heavily reliant upon the 
premise that valid inductive arguments not only exist, but are also sometimes 
recognisable.228 Induction plays a vital role in: justifying (at least dimension 
0 of) thesis M; rejecting the 'Theoretician's Dilemma' as a decisive argument 
against thesis S; explaining how theories might achieve degrees of objective 
confirmation, in the argument for thesis E; and in making the case that 
abductive arguments can also be valid (at least, for those who see them as a 
sub-set of inductive arguments). 
Then, in chapter two, it was concluded that the scientific realist, if also a 
practising scientist, will behave differently to his anti-realist counterparts 
when engaged in theory-choice and theory-construction (these being 
intertwined).229 Specifically, he will take the view that the empirical successes 
of current theories are based, in part, on their truth-like elements; elements 
which he would hope to tease out, and retain, were he to set about generating 
new (successor) theories. So the realist will reject the Popperian suggestion 
that 'how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man ... is irrelevant to the 
logical analysis of scientific knowledge', instead believing that science 
progresses because the successful elements of old theories are incorporated 
into their successors.23D That is to say, because good theory-construction relies 
upon making sound inductive inferences about which ontological elements of 
theory-past were approximately true.231 As I will argue in section 3.1, then, 
ns The means by which we purportedly distinguish between valid and invalid inductive 
arguments could be genetic, from a naturalist perspective. One might argue that our ability 
to recognise the superiority of "The sun will rise tomorrow" over "I will be alive tomorrow" 
(even if only in probabilistic terms- validity of an inductive argument need not be dependent 
upon its truth or falsehood) is necessary to guide practical action. Then, given that our 
practical action succeeds in allowing us to thrive, that this ability leads to empirically 
adequate results. Finally, that the results are empirically adequate just because the ability 
allows us to establish probabilities that are objectively, rather than just subjectively, good 
approximations to the truth. (Here, I allude to some sort of logical interpretation of 
probability, following Keynes or Carnap.) 
229 It was also argued that scientific realists might adopt different puzzle-solving strategies, on 
occasion; this may also be relevant, because their puzzle-solving experimental design strategy 
might be linked to ontological considerations. 
230 Popper [1980], p.31 
231 Naturally, some anti-realists might also think that induction is important in the choice of 
theory-construction strategy, though 11ot with respect to examining the ontologies of previous 
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the scientific realist is committed to the idea that induction is an indispensable 
part of the logic of scientific discovery, in not only a justificatory, but also a 
practical methodological, respect. 
It follows, of course, that the scientific realist who also happens to be a 
practising scientist should take a keen interest in both metaphysics and the 
history of science, at least if he wants to construct new theories with greater 
verisimilitude than their predecessors. For how else could he hope to 
rationally ascertain the ontological threads which have run through 
successive theoretical frameworks in the past? And by what other means 
could he hope to determine which ontological alleys have proven to be blind, 
and which might yet lead to new ground? It is obviously insufficient merely 
to take scientific doctrine now, and believe in it wholesale, because it is clear 
that ontological discontinuities Jzave occurred (e.g. action-at-a-distance in 
Newtonian mechanics, to action-by-contact in modern field theories), and are 
likely to occur again unless a special (and new) interpretative strategy is 
adopted. Thus, as I shall argue in section 3.2, the realist should think like a 
Lowean metaphysician, with an eye to what could, and what could not, be 
compatible with the phenomena.232 That is to say, he must take 
underdetermination seriously, if he is to account for the ontological mistakes 
of the past, to minimise those of the future, and to identify what can be 
justifiably said about the actual metaphysical world, given the current state of 
inquiry. Besides, it is only if one appreciates the limit of one's current 
scientific knowledge- and avoids getting caught up in the speculative 
excesses which often become, erroneously, bound up with it- that one can 
devise new experiments designed to extend it. 
Together, sections 3.1 and 3.2 should therefore provide a clear answer to the 
question "Which methodologies of science are compatible with scientific 
realism?" in the first of two distinct emphases thereof. Specifically, with 
regard to how a scientific realist should practice science, irrespective of 
whether his philosophical position is ultimately correct or not. Or, to 
rephrase the question, "How would it be most rational for an individual who 
committed to belief in scientific realism to practice science?"233 
But there is a second, more suggestive, way of emphasising the question: 
"How would scientists have to practice science, descriptively speaking, in 
order for the philosophical position of scientific realism to be most justifiable 
view of science?" And it seems natural, after having found an answer to this 
question, to want to ask, "Are there any good arguments for or against 
(empirically progressive) theoretical frameworks. For example, the empiricist might suggest 
that one should inductively infer which mathematical techniques are best suited to saving the 
phenomena in a particular domain. 
232 This takes up the suggestion made towards the end of my discussion of thesis M, in section 
1.1. 
233 This is the question that I primarily set out to answer. 
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scientific realism, from the methodological status quo?" In the final section of 
this thesis (3.3), I will therefore point out what my prior conclusions might 
suggest, with respect to this closely related issue. 
3.1 THE ROLE OF INDUCTION IN THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY 
As has already been mentioned, Popper proposed his logic of scientific 
discovery on the central assumption that 'the logic of knowledge ... consists 
solely in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to 
which every new idea must be submitted if it is to be seriously entertained' .234 
His prescription, as Miller explains it, is that the theoretician should: 
'propose conjectures, which might be true, and incorporate them into science, without regard 
for whether there is anything that could be called evidence in their favour, without regard for 
whether there is any reason to think that they are true.'235 
However, as I have previously argued, it seems very clear that many great 
scientific revolutions have been brought about by men who employed, in 
contradistinction to Popper's advice, (various forms of) the correspondence 
principle.236 In formulating his celestial mechanics, Newton looked to 
Kepler' s laws. Later, in constructing his transformations, Lorentz looked to 
Newton's laws. Of course, the Popperian might argue, nonetheless, that 
theoreticians would do better to avoid such inductive moves, but it remains 
for him to show they could ever be ironed out in practice. For, as Zahar 
argues: 
'there exist general inductive reasons why continuity must govern the transition from one 
theory to the next. When scientists speak of past empirical successes, they have in mind 
virtual as well as actually observed facts ... They set out to account, not only for known isolated 
observations, but also for allegedly observed regularities. Such regularities are regarded as 
being approximately captured by existing laws ... It therefore seems as if the correspondence 
principle is with us to stay, if only as a desideratum.'237 
While Zahar might be sceptical about the heuristic value of such moves, 
though, the scientific realist is liable to want to cultivate them, as the seed of 
an argument for his position. This argument would go something like this: 
a Scientific 'knowledge' has been, and continues to be, our most reliable, 
viz. most epistemically secure, 'knowledge'. 
234 Popper [1980], p.31 
235 Miller [1994], p.9 
236 See the sub-section 'In Normal Science' in section 2.2. 
237 Zahar [1989], p.21 
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Inductive inferences are indispensable in theory-construction. Theory-
construction is necessary for progressive science. Therefore, inductive 
inferences are necessary for progressive science. 
Thus, it is a distinct possibility, though by no means a demonstrable certainty, 
that the inductive inferences employed in theory-construction are causally 
responsible, if only in part, for the veracity of a. And Popper, for one, would 
likely admit that a is true.238 
This said, it is not my foremost intention to further criticise Popper's position 
here, even though elements of the foregoing argument might have been 
applicable to the discussion of critical rationalism in chapter one. Rather, I 
just want to suggest that - from the scientific realist's perspective - an 
important part of the process which Popper describes, specifically the 
deductive testing of theories, might plausibly be thought to work alongside the 
inductive means by which theories are formulated. Against Popper, the 
scientific realist would not necessarily think it worthwhile to test a theory 
which had been 'made up' without reliance on prior science, even if it had 
carefully laid-out obsenJational consequences. For Popper, attempting to 
determine whether any of the singular statements derivable from a new 
theory prove to be false (or whether there is any evidence which corroborates 
it) might well be seen as the best way to proceed, subsequent to the induction 
of said theory.239 But I would eschew any suggestion that this is a radically 
new way of thinking, because Francis Bacon recognised, over three hundred 
and fifty years ago, that: 
'it was a good answer that was made by the one who, when they showed him hanging in a 
temple a picture of those who had paid their vows as having escaped shipwreck, and would 
have him say whether he did not now acknowledge the power of the gods,- 'Yes', he asked 
again, 'but where are the pictures of those who were drowned after their vows?' ... in tJze 
establishment of any tme axiom, it is the negative instance which has the greater force .. .'240 [emphasis 
mine] 
Interestingly, Bacon also sheds further light on this issue, because he 
distinguishes between induction, viz. procession from true observation 
statements to the formulation of a theory, and super-induction, which 
involves, in his words, '[the] engrafting of new things upon old.'241 And to 
formulate a new theory in science, based on science past, might be to 'super-
induce' it, under his terminology. Admittedly, he was not eager to endorse 
238 In his own words: 'In science (and only in science) can we say that we have made genuine 
progress: that we know more than we did before.' Popper [1970], p.57 
239 Of course what Popper calls 'corroboration' would be taken by the scientific realist as 
confirmation not only of the new theory, but also of the body of science which preceded it, and 
made its construction possible. Also, it is worth noting that theories alone do not issue 
singular statements; at least, not without the addition of auxiliary hypotheses. (Hence, my 
earlier distinction between theoretical frameworks and theories.) 
240 Bacon [1620], p.308 
241 Ibid., p.306 
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such a process, but I would claim that this was likely because super-induction 
in his time too often involved theories which had not been properly induced, 
initially: in particular, those in Aristotle's 'Physics'. As Lloyd puts it: 
' ... if there is a lesson to be learned from his [Aristotle's] work in dynamics for his method and 
approach to scientific problems as a whole, it is not, as has sometimes been maintained, that 
he blandly ignored facts in constructing his theories on a priori principles, but rather that his 
theories are hasty generalisations based on admittedly rather superficial observations.' 242 
However, the scientific realist might claim that if one starts with a set of 
properly induced theories, such as those founded during the Revolution 
which Bacon brought about, then to super-induce when they are seen to be 
empirically inadequate (or of insufficient virtuosity) is more efficacious than 
the alternatives. If the initial theories were properly induced, then there are 
many observation statements (specific measurements, now lost, perhaps) 
'accounted for' by them. To throw away this previous work (which might 
now remain only in the theory), and to start again from first principles (i.e. 
first-level induction), might be thought foolhardy. Naturally, there is a 
caveat: that a new super-induced theory must be subjected to rigorous 
empirical examination, and not just taken for granted. This is where the core 
sentiment in Popper's philosophy can be seen, clearly, to be a wise one.243 
Moreover, as Popper himself confesses, 'scientific method presupposes the 
immutability of natural processes, or the 'principle of the uniformity of 
nature'.244 And the scientific realist might argue that such a presupposition 
actually licenses use of inductive inferences in certain circumstances.24S For 
example, carbon-dating can only be thought to be a justifiable process if 
inductive inferences about the past are reliable: one measures the half-life of an 
element (or compound), and induces that it was the same before radiation 
was even known about, or before homo-sapiens even walked the Earth!246 In 
short, the asymmetry between past and future which is suggested by 
Goodman's paradox is not as significant as it may appear to be, prima facie. 
After all, contemporary science tells us that to say "The sun will always rise" 
242 Lloyd [1968], p.180 
243 Although I would deny that it is necessary for the examination to be performed with the 
specific aim of falsifying the theory (which is not logically possible, as Duhem showed, 
anyway). Instead, it is sufficient to compare it with experience, in the sense of experiment-
theon; comparison (as a part of normal science). This way, theoretical frameworks can be 
falsified. 
244 Popper [1980], p.252 
245 In recognition of this point, which many perceive as a weakness in Popper's position, 
Miller instead claims that: 'Scientific hypotheses propose order for the world; they do not 
presuppose it.' See Miller [1994], p.27 
246 This should not be a permissible conjecture for Popper, because it is obviously untestable 
without a time-machine; there is simply no available evidence to corroborate it. Besides, if it 
just 'irrefutable conjecture', with no good reasons to believe, how can the scientist 
legitimately disagree with the historian who conjectures, instead, that the half-life of carbon 
radically changed at an arbitrary point t, before humans walked the Earth? Answer: he can't. 
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is just as foolish as to say "The sun has always risen", irrespective of the fact 
that no human being has ever lived - as far as we are aware, given the limited 
observation reports which we possess - through a day in which the sun did 
not rise. 
If a non-pragmatic argument is wanted, then the scientific realist might also 
say that we would neither exist, nor continue to exist as we are, if there were no 
regularities in nature. (That is, given that Thesis M is accepted, and that we 
are a part of nature.) From a Darwinian perspective, we would not have 
developed into intelligent beings were there no patterns to be found in nature; 
instead, random action would be the most 'rational', or suitable, mechanism 
for survival. From a Creationist perspective, intelligent design of a system 
implies that certain laws will obtain in it (else, why design?). 247 Thus, given 
our existence, induction is both justifiable and vital, if we are to understand 
our lot, or even to practically function. If induction were to suddenly become 
useless, then the regularities which it tapped into would also cease to exist; 
thus we would quickly recognise the manifest chaos around us, even if our 
minds were to continue to function in any fashion which we could presently 
comprehend.248 (Arguably, it is more likely that they would cease to function 
properly were there no laws to constrain them, such as those of rationality, 
even were we monads.) Given that we don't recognise this, and that our 
minds do function, here and now, we should keep on using induction. 
In science, the scientific realist will say, we should always try to put forward 
theories which are the most intersubjectively probable, given our current state 
of knowledge. And because nature is uniform in many respects, that which is 
intersubjectively probable will correlate with (though not precisely 
correspond to) that which is objectively probable. Ultimately, the evidence can 
and will decide, and mistakes need to be made if we are to progress; but it is 
better to make measured and educated guesses, in constructing new theories, 
than it is just to guess. Why? Because measured and educated guesses, viz. 
super-induced theories, will effectively take into account previous 
experimental evidence (that found by other humans, before our ephemeral 
stint on the stage) which might otherwise be lost or forgotten. 249 
Yet although this seems like a fair line of argument, part of which might be 
subscribed to by those who reject the 'approximately true' component of 
thesis E (i.e. just endorsing the notion that induction is vital in theory-
construction, if only for non-ontological reasons), two tasks still remain for 
247 Some of these laws might be spatia-temporally variant, but then there might be higher 
order laws that describe the spatia-temporal variance of those beneath them. (These would 
be a temporal; thereby the pitfall of an infinite regress of variant laws can be avoided.) 
248 Note, here, the vital role that presupposition of natural regularities plays in avoiding 
vitiating circularity. 
249 Needless to say, one also needs to bear in mind the means by which such evidence was 
likely gathered; for example, there are significant differences between the naked eye 
Astronomical observations of the early Greeks, and those of Tycho Brahe at Uranisborg. 
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the scientific realist. First, he has to explain to what extent we can (and 
usually do) determine what a theoretical framework says, in ontological 
terms; that is, he must flesh out the notion of' approximately true'. Second, he 
needs to propose specific tools in order to make good ontological judgements, 
with respect to theory-choice and theory-construction. I will now examine 
how he might achieve these tasks. 
3.2 THE ROLE OF METAPHYSICS IN THEORY-CHOICE AND THEORY-
CONSTRUCTION 
'Scientists inevitably make metaphysical assumptions, whether explicitly or implicitly, in 
proposing and testing their theories- assumptions which go beyond anything that science 
alone can legitimate. These assumptions need to be examined critically, whether by scientists 
themselves or philosophers ... Empirical science at most tells us what is the case, not what 
must or may be (but happens not to be) the case. Metaphysics deals in possibilities. And only if 
we can delimit the scope of the possible can we hope to determine empirically what is actual.' 
(Jonathan Lowe [1998], p.S) 
The scientific realist believes that, in order for a given theoretical framework 
to be highly empirically successful (in predictive and descriptive terms, we 
could take several examples from modern physics), it must have some truth-
like ontological content,250 Indeed, that the more successful a theoretical 
framework is on a phenomenallevet and the more virtuous it is, the more 
truth-like ontological elements it will have.2s1 And given that science 
continues to produce theoretical frameworks which treat established domains 
of phenomena with increasing degrees of accuracy - a claim that few 
philosophers, if any, would want to dispute- there must be some ontological 
continuity between scientific revolutions. 
However, the scientific realist need not claim that the truth-like ontological 
content of any given theoretical framework, even in modern science, is just 
ostensible. Instead, it seems more prudent for him to recognise that there will 
always be many and varied ontologies which are compatible with the 
empirical consequences of any given theoretical framework. 
Underdetermination is not just a wild anti-realist fantasy; this is a lesson, 
surely, which the ongoing debate about the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics should have taught us. On the most banal of levels, I would argue 
that the testable empirical consequences of any contemporary physical or 
chemical theoretical framework are perfectly compatible with either atheism 
25° As mentioned towards the end of section 2.2, it is reasonable to deny that bare 
mathematical relationships can be applied to any phenomenal situation without some sort of 
correspondence rules, and without interpretation of mathematical entities. Thus, 
metaphysical considerations will always enter into theoretical frameworks. 
251 As argued in section 2.1, the scientific realist views the five theoretical virtues as indicators 
of explanatonJ power. And the realist believes that there is a link between the explanatory 
power of a theory and its truth-likeness, viz. that abduction is a valid form of inference. 
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or theism. And to the extent that our current theoretical frameworks in 
science go, questions about the possible existence of a God (or even a 
pantheon of deities) should remain a properly metaphysical concern. As 
Cushing cogently argues, the same is the case, at least for now, as regards 
determinism versus indeterminism.2s2 (It should be added that such a 
recognition need not, and does not, imply that underdetermination is nearly 
as serious a problem as some, such as Quine, have made it out to be.253) 
To say that the theoretical frameworks of mature science are approximately true 
allows for a wide-range of epistemic positions, ranging from the nai've to the 
cautious. Of the term 'electron', the nai've realist might say, "It successfully 
refers to a wave-particle which is ontologically primitive; it is a building block 
of material objects in the actual suprasensible world." However, the cautious 
realist would say, "It successfully refers to something about the actual 
suprasensible world. But the effects which we use 'electron' to account for 
might be explained in a more truth-like fashion by reference to relationships 
between us and other, as yet unimagined or unidentified- perhaps even 
unidentifiable (though not unimaginable)- entities. That is to say, there are 
many legitimate metaphysical possibilities, with respect to 'electrons', which are 
compatible with the predictions issued by the use of the concept.'2S4 Of 
course, some realists might say that to adopt the latter (cautious) position is to 
take the proverbial punch, viz. intuitive appeal, out of the position of 
scientific realism. But I shall argue that such a concession not only preserves 
the notion that the aim of science is truth (Thesis A), but also provides an 
excellent defence against the 'anti-Thesis E' arguments of sophisticated anti-
realists, such as van Fraassen and Laudan. 
On 'Approximate Tntth' 
First, let us note that scientific realism appeals, pre-philosophically, because 
we want to hold that the science of today tells us more about the actual 
suprasensible world than the science of yesterday; that it involves discoven;, 
rather than pure invention. And to hold this, we need only justifiJ the claim that 
as science progresses, its theoretical frameworks become more verisimilar. We need 
not show that modern theory is at any 'threshold distance' from the 
unvarnished truth about the actual metaphysical world; it is enough that 
successive theoretical frameworks in science do constitute better 
approximations to the truth. For if they do, of a fashion, then we might expect 
2s2 See the conclusion in Cushing [1994], sections 11.2.2. through 11.4. 
253 He writes: 'Total science, mathematical and natural and human ... is underdetermined by 
experience. The edge of the system must be kept squared by experience, but tlze rest, with all 
its elaborate myths alldjictiolls, has as its objective the simplicity of laws.' [emphasis mine] See the 
infamous Quine [1951], p.298. The tenability of such a claim is brought into serious doubt in 
Laudan [1990]. 
254 See my discussion about how talk about some entities may in fact be talk about more 
fundamental entities, under 'The Epistemic Thesis', section 1.1. 
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them to preclude adoption of ever-more false models of the actual world. 
Moreover, this is sufficient to justify thesis A - that 'The aim of science is 
truth ... ' -because it is rational to aim at something which we might never in 
practice achieve, in the recognition that we can make incremental steps 
towards it.255 (It should not go unnoticed, and might even strike the reader as 
ironic, how close this position is to that of Popper's, but with the inclusion of 
induction.) 
Second, we might note that just because a given theoretical framework is 
more empirically successful than another in the same domain, it does not 
necessarily follow that its truth-like ontological content, even if greater than 
that of its competitor, will be readily apparent. On the contrary, it may be the 
case that the proper ontological content of a theoretical framework, although 
determinable, is not usually correctly determined by the scientific community. 
Why should this be so? Because scientists do not generally have any training 
in metaphysics, and because many would eschew such training, even were 
they to be offered it. In short, there is no obvious reason why the aim of the 
majority of current scientists is to pursue the legitimate aim of science; indeed, 
even if many of them are oblivious to that aim, they may still unwittingly 
further it. 
Simply put, then, the scientific realist might suggest that to call something 
'approximately true' is just to say 'it is the best approximation to the truth 
which we currently have'. And that it is justifiable to say that special 
relativity is more truth-like than Newtonian mechanics, but not on any 
numerical scale which is epistemically accessible.256 For whereas no scientific 
realist has been capable of producing a plausible formula by which one might 
make claims such as 'Newtonian mechanics is 76% verisimilar, whereas 
special relativity is 80% verisimilar', or even 'Special relativity is 4% more 
verisimilar than Newonian mechanics', it does not seem entirely ridiculous to 
claim that special relativity is simply closer to the truth than its predecessor, 
based on its relative virtuosihJ (which constitutes its explanatory power). 
What else could 'approximately true' really mean? 'More than 50% verisimilar', 
perhaps? If that is the realist thought, then his position seems fatally flawed 
for an obvious reason: in order to know that a given theoretical framework is 
any given' distance' from the truth, one must presumably know what the 
truth is! 
In addition, the scientific realist might also suggest that there is 'hidden 
ontology' inherent in successful theoretical frameworks which needs to be 
teased out, and separated from the 'ways of thinking about things' which get 
255 The same is true for those who strive to be morally 'good'. 
256 The notion that there really is some sort of numerical scale, underlying what we can judge 
from the observable, is not precluded. 
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bound up with it for pragmatic purposes.257 Typically, there is also a hearty 
dose of pretentious pseudo-metaphysical speculation - for example, that 
modern science proves that God does not exist - which will also need to be 
isolated, quashed, and rejected. 
To make this line plausible, it only remains for the scientific realist to justify, 
first, the central claim, 'that as science progresses, its theoretical frameworks become 
more verisimilar'. Second, he must show how the 'proper ontological content 
of a theoretical framework' can and should be determined. In order to 
achieve both these tasks, I will show how Lowe' s model of metaphysics, 
which has already been touched upon earlier in this thesis, might be 
employed.2ss Only then will it become clear what sort of defence the realist 
position outlined above can provide against the negative thesis of 
constructive empiricism (van Fraassen) and the pessimistic meta-induction 
(Laudan). 
Lowean Metaphysics - Elucidating the Possible 
As suggested by the quotation which heads this section, Lowe claims that the 
proper role of metaphysics is to examine the possible, rather than the actual; 
he also claims that this is the only sense in which metaphysics is possible, if 
the pun will be excused.259 But the Lowean metaphysician should not be 
interested so much in that which is possible de dicta, but rather that which is 
possible de re. Specifically: 
'Metaphysical possibility is ... the possibility of a state of affairs (one which is represe11table, no 
doubt by a proposition) ... The notion of a state of affairs, of course, is itself a metaphysical 
notion, just one of a large family of such notions ... These notions are not purely 'logical' 
notions: they are ontological. They concern being a11d its modes ... '260 
In order to clarify this point, we might distinguish between three types of 
possibility (and therefore, necessity and impossibility): strict logical, narrow 
logical, and ontologicaf.261 That which is necessary in a strict logical sense is 
true on the basis of the laws of logic alone; 'It is not the case that I am married 
257 Sometimes, it may be more pragmatically efficacious for a community to communicate 
(and think) in terms of ontological models which are obviously false. However, this will 
make it difficult for many members of said community to disentangle interpretation from 
formalism. 
2ss See 'The Metaphysical Thesis', in section 1.1. 
259 See Lowe [1998], p.8. He later retracts this point (which, after all, seems to have been made 
precisely to deliver the pun), noting- correctly - that establishing that which is 
metaphysically impossible and that which is metaphysically necessanJ is also possible. 
26o Ibid., pp.9-10 
261 Lowe uses the term 'broad logical', but I prefer 'ontological' because, as he points out, 
'[there is] a danger that this tradition [that of using the term 'broad logical'] may lead 
incautious philosophers to overlook the ... division between logic and metaphysics'. Ibid., 
p.14 
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and that I am not married' is an example, because it is an instance of the law 
of non-contradiction. That which is necessary in a narrow logical sense is true 
on the basis of the laws of logic in addition to the definitions of non-logical 
terms; 'It is not the case that I am married and that I am a bachelor' is an 
example. That which is necessary in an ontological sense, however, is that 
which is true in every possible world; a fine example is 'Dolphins are 
mammals' .262 Note that while it is necessary for a statement to be both strictly 
logically possible, and narrowly logically possible, in order for it to be 
ontologically possible (or necessary), it is by no means sufficient. 
So the role of the metaphysician, according to Lowe, should be to determine: 
i) That which is ontologically possible, viz. those states of affairs that 
may or may not obtain in the actual world. 
ii) That which is ontologically necessary, viz. those states of affairs that 
necessarily obtain in the actual world. 
iii) That which is ontologically impossible, viz. those states of affairs that 
necessarily do not obtain in the actual world. 
With this a priori work done, it then makes little sense to mount any sort of 
empirical investigation into the necessary or the impossible; the role of 
experience, for Lowe, is just to select the actual from the possible, when the 
possible has been delimited.263 In science, there is no point in investigating 
whether' All triangles have three angles' (a narrow logical necessity) or 'Some 
events are substances' (an ontological impossibility) are true in the actual 
world, whereas it is worthwhile to determine whether' All swans are white'. 
This is because, even were 'All swans are white' to be true in the actual world, 
it would only be so contingently. 
To this, the objection might be raised that there are some metaphysical 
necessities which cannot be determined simply by a priori considerations, for 
example: 'Dolphins are mammals'; 'Hydrogen is an element'; and 'Earth is a 
planet'. But Lowe does not want to deny this. He wants to have it, rather, 
that the a priori delimitation of that which is possible (which he still holds is 
necessary before experience can be applied to determine that which is actual) 
should be performed in terms of categories, rather than natural kinds. And 
whereas the latter are obviously not knowable a priori, he claims that the 
262 As Lowe points out, this claim might be more properly rewritten as 'For any x, if x is a 
dolphin, then x is a mammal'; this avoids the objection that 'Dolphins are mammals' is 
plainly false in those worlds in which there are no dolphins. (His example is 'Water is H20'.) 
Ibid., p.15 
263 In many cases, of course, experience will only be sufficient to reduce the number of 
'possibly actual' theoretical frameworks, explanations, or models. 'Possibly actual', that is, in 
an epistemic sense. 
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former are.264 Thus, one might say it is a priori ontologically necessary that 
'Events are not substances', 'Concreta are not abstracta', 'Organisms are not 
artefacts', and 'Nothing is both black and white all over'.26S (To clarify, we 
can know that there are such things as natural kinds, but not what sorts of 
natural kinds there are in any given world; for example, some ontologically 
possible worlds do contain mammals, and others do not. When we 
empirically establish that there is a natural kind such as 'mammal', and that 
dolphins instantiate this universal, it follows that 'Dolphins are mammals' is 
true in every possible world in which dolphins exist,266) 
By the actualist account, championed by Plantinga, states of affairs can exist 
even though they might not obtain.267 They also enter into relationships with 
one another; that is to say, one state of affairs can be said to include, or 
preclude, others.268 Under this framework, a possible world is said to be' a 
maximally comprehensive possible state of affairs' .269 'Maximally comprehensive' 
because it either includes or precludes each individual state of affairs, 
'possible' because it cannot include contradictions such as 'Triangles have 
only one side'.27o The term 'actual world' need not, then, be taken to be 
indexical, that is as picking out one particular spatia-temporally bounded 
entity (this universe).271 Instead, it may be taken to refer to the maximally 
comprehensive possible state of affairs which actually obtains; it enjoys 
ontological priority precisely because it does obtain. That is to say, possible 
worlds can be seen as abstract entities which necessarily exist (though only 
one of them obtains), not to be confused with the physical universe or any of 
the objects in it, which are contingent, viz. only exist because a particular 
possible world obtains.272 
264 Ibid., p.16 
265 See ibid., Fig.1, p.181. (Note, however, that there is some overlap as regards some of the 
categories on the diagram- for example, Lowe thinks that all universals are abstract. This 
seems right, because greenness, for example, is not a spatio-temporal thing.) 
266 This is an Aristotelian idea. In his Posterior Analytics, he writes:' ... demonstration depends 
on universals and induction on particulars, and it is impossible to consider universals except 
through induction ... and it is impossible to get an induction without perception - for of 
particulars there is a perception; for it is not possible to get understanding of them; for it can 
be got neither from universals without induction nor through induction without perception.' 
Aristotle 81b. See Barnes [1984), p.132 
267 This is similar to Plato's abstract entity account, where properties may exist but not be 
exemplified. 
268 For example, my writing this paper on my computer, as a state of affairs, includes the state 
of affairs that I possess a computer and precludes the state of affairs that I write this paper by 
hand. 
269 Loux [1998], p. 192. 
270 Logical possibility is a minimum requirement for ontological possibility, as previously 
mentioned. 
271 I refer, here, to Lewis' reductionist account of real possible worlds. 
272 Though it is important to note that this claim does not rely on states of affairs (or possible 
worlds) being ontologically prior to concrete substances. If concrete substances are prior, 
then they will determine the set of possible worlds that necessarily exist. 
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Should this picture of metaphysics be appealing to the scientific realist? I 
would argue so, because he is wont to believe that there are natural kinds, and 
that these are not a mere linguistic 'convention' (or invention), viz. a purely 
anthropocentric means of classification. That is to say, science for the 
scientific realist is a process of discovert;; the distinction between plants and 
animals, for example, is one found in nature, rather than one which we have 
imposed upon nature. And Lowe's point, eloquently made below, is just that 
such a position is unjustifiable if he who holds it does not also hold that 
metaphysics is a legitimate, nay vital, enterprise: 
'Only in the light of metaphysics can we vindicate a judgement that a caterpillar survives its 
transformation into a butterfly whereas a pig does not survive its transformation into the 
flesh of the python which devours it, or the judgement that water survives its transformation 
into ice whereas paper does not survive its transformation into ash [when combusted]. 
Neither macroscopically observable phenomena, nor scientific information concerning the 
'internal constitutions' of things, can resolve such issues for us in the absence of metaphysical 
guidance.' 273 
But what role can Lowean metaphysics play in the scientific realist's claim 
that science can and does produce theoretical frameworks of increasing 
verisimilitude? The argument goes as follows: 
i) It is a feature of theoretical frameworks in mature science that they are 
fruitful. That is to say, they are responsible for sensible disclosure and 
relationship disclosure.274 With each new generation of theoretical 
frameworks, new phenomena and new relationships between 
phenomena are disclosed. 
ii) There are entities and mechanisms (viz. laws of nature) in the actual 
metaphysical world which are causally responsible for that which we 
perceive. (It should be remembered that we, qua organisms, are 
ourselves a part of said world.) For example, to call one book 'red' and 
another book 'blue' is to point to a feature of the actual metaphysical 
world, even if'colour' is not a primitive universal.275 In short, there is a 
true antic explanation for all that we perceive. 
iii) Any true antic account of the actual metaphysical world must account 
for all the phenomena, and all the relationships between the 
phenomena.276 
iv) Thus, as that which is disclosed increases- and it is a feature of science 
(from i) that it increases this body of knowledge- the set of worlds that 
273 Lowe distinguishes between phase change and substantial change. Ibid.,.p.179 
274 This was argued in section 2.1 of this thesis; for the discussion of fruitfulness specifically, 
see the sub-section entitled 'Theoretical Virtues as Demarcation Guidelines'. 
275 Refer back to the discussion of this point at the beginnings of both the 'Thesis E' and 'Thesis 
5' sub-sections, in section 1.1. Naturally, this point is founded on the acceptance of Thesis M. 
276 It may be that some relationships are merely coincidental; still, it must allmo for them. 
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constitute the possibly actual (that is, in an epistemic sense) will shrink. 
In short, science serves to narrow down the admissible set of models of 
the actual world, even when underdetermination is taken seriously; 
science advances by ruling out possible worlds as candidates for the actual 
world. 
However, it must be made clear that the set of possible worlds which 
constitute the' epistemically possibly actual' (EP A) will always be 
infinite, even though infinities of possible worlds will sometimes be 
ruled out of this very set. This may seem confusing, so in order to 
elucidate this idea, let us imagine that the actual world can be 
represented by a positive integer, n, and that the set of ontologically 
possible (OP) worlds is represented by the set of all positive integers. 
Now we can imagine starting off, pre-science, with a set of EP A 
worlds which is just the same as the set of OP worlds, determined by 
category analysis, namely: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, ... ad infinitum 
And from this, experience will serve to remove certain sets of 
'numbers' (possible worlds), both finite and infinite. In the former 
case, we might learn that n>6, removing only five possibilities (namely 
1~n~6), or simply that nt:l034. In the latter case, we might learn that n 
is not even (ruling out the series n=2, 4, 6, ... ), or that n is not a prime 
(ruling out n=2, 3, 5, 7, 11 ... ). Thus, the set of EP A worlds will become 
an ever smaller sub-set of the set of OP worlds as science progresses, 
even though the number of EP A worlds will remain infinite. 
Now it might be claimed, from point iv), that if the set of EPA worlds remains 
infinite, then it can hardly be maintained that 'the aim of science is truth'; that 
it would be better to say 'the aim of science is to eliminate error'. I do not 
believe this follows, however, because it is possible in principle to reach a stage 
at which all EPA worlds involve certain states-of-affairs; for example, that 
mass exists. 277 And science clearly makes incremental steps towards that 
stage: toward the limit of our possible knowledge about the actual, or 'as 
much of the truth as we could ever determine'. Thesis A survives. 
The defence against van Fraassen' s local scepticism, then, is seen to rest on a 
central metaphysical, rather than epistemic, premise. If van Fraassen wants to 
have it that a scientific theory can be true or false, literally construed (viz. 
endorse thesis S), then there is clearly a sense in which he must admit that 
there are true antic explanations, or accounts, of the suprasensible; 
explanations such as "It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
277 In other words, we cannot find the whole truth about the world, but we can establish some 
facts, even about unobservables. 
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phenomenon x to occur that theoretical entity y exists." That is, irrespective 
of whether we can identify which explanation just happens to be true in any 
given case.278 
Of course, this need not prevent van Fraassen holding that there is a 
pragmatic dimension to explanation; that the type of the explanations which 
we happen to prefer are not necessarily truth-like ones, and that a false 
explanation may sometimes be functionally equivalent to a true one. Indeed, 
sometimes a false explanation might even prove to be more efficacious, in the 
short term. But then, the Lowean metaphysician might counter, it is simply 
not the role of the metaphysician to prefer one metaphysical system over another; his 
role is merely to outline the possibilities. It may be possible for van Fraassen 
to rejoin by saying something like "There may be unthinkable possibilities", 
but any attempted justification of such a claim would, ironically, require 
recourse to metaphysics. He would need to claim that it is metaphysically 
possible for there to be unthinkable metaphysical possibilities - and reflection on 
the nature of such a claim makes it clear that it is just nonsensical.279 
And what of the scientist involved in theory-construction? He would do well 
to heed Feynman' s words, and be mindful of the different possibilities: 
' ... we must keep all the theories in our heads, and every theoretical physicist who is any 
good knows six or seven different theoretical representations [read: ontology-laden 
theoretical frameworks] for exactly the same physics [read: means to derive the same 
observational results] :2so 
Against Laudan' s pessimistic meta-induction, the defence accorded to the 
scientific realist by adoption of the foregoing metaphysical position is 
considerably different. It relies, first, on the frank admission that scientists 
have made, do make, and will make, mistakes. However, it can then be 
pointed out that such errors are clearly capable of being ironed-out-
presumably, Laudan himself does not believe that caloric or the crystalline 
spheres exist- and that, moreover, their likelihood of occurrence may be 
reduced by the application of careful metaphysical analysis, and the adoption 
of an open-minded attitude. 
It is certainly the case that realist scientists sometimes choose to favour one 
theoretical framework over another when both have the same empirical 
consequences. But it might be claimed that to do so is an error of judgment (if 
and only if the realist is in the process of seeking the truth- there is nothing 
wrong with a realist utilising any theory for pragmatic purposes, without 
making comment on its truth-status), provided that both theoretical frameworks 
278 My claim is that we can identify which infinite set of EPA worlds must contain the actual 
world, in the limit of enquiry. 
279 Specifically, the unthinkable metaphysical possibilities might exclude the possibility of 
unthinkable metaphysical possibilities. Unthinkable, isn't it? 
280 Feynman [1967], p.168 
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are metaphysically possible.2Bl Of course, it might be added that there have been 
several theories, in the past, which had an extremely dubious metaphysical 
character - that were, and should have been seen to be, metaphysically 
impossible. For example, to adopt a bastardised version of Aristotelian 
cosmology according to which the planets lie on substantial concentric 
spheres about the Sun, while simultaneously employing an eccentric point 
displaced from the Sun about which the Earth moves in a circle, is clearly 
inconsistent. Yet this is precisely what Copernicus did in his De 
Revolutionibus.2B2 (Of course, it was recognised more readily that Aristotelian 
spheres were not consistent with the subsequent Tychonic system, for the 
circle describing the motion of the Sun intersects that describing the motion of 
Mars.283) 
Admittedly, I have not stressed the good reasons to commit to belief in Thesis E 
here, although I did cover them earlier; the most obvious is Putnam' s 'No 
Miracles' argument, which was defended in section 1.3.284 My approach has 
been, rather, to present a special understanding of Thesis E which avoids the 
standard criticisms in the literature; this is the area in which the contemporary 
debate lies. 
First Conclusion: How would it be most rational for an individual who committed to 
belief in scientific realism to practice science? 
Stated plainly, my conclusion is, perhaps, somewhat remarkable. For I want 
to suggest that consistent scientific realists who practice science should be 
metaphysical realists, employing analysis of categories known a priori (they 
should claim)- such as property, relation, universal, substance (and, the most 
obvious, natural kind) - in order to delimit that which is possible of the 
world. And this will, of course, be an ongoing process - for sometimes, the 
only conclusions that will be able to be drawn will be of the form "If 
metaphysical possibility a is actual (viz. if the state-of-affairs a obtains), then 
theoretical framework xis false." For example, there may be occasions on 
which the realist might want to say "If it is the case that space is absolute, then 
theoretical framework x cannot be true in the actual world."285 
281 Perhaps abduction could be thought of as a rough-and-ready means by which we can 
sometimes distinguish between the metaphysically possible from the metaphysically 
impossible. 
282 See Kuhn [1957], p.170 
283 Ibid., p.206. (See also Fig. 37, on p.202) 
284 To this, we can now add my conclusion in 3.1 that induction is vital for the scientific 
enterprise in any event. 
285 This is not to say that there will not be other occasions where one might say "If it the case 
that space is absolute or re/atiollal, then theoretical framework x cannot be true." But since 
space could be no other way, this would make theoretical framework x metaphysically 
impossible. 
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Does it not seem obvious, if we cast aside any empiricist bias against 
metaphysics, that it would be ridiculous to believe that science is a process of 
discoven;, rather than invention, while simultaneously maintaining that entities 
such as properties and non-objects do not exist? If the former do not, then 
what could the realist scientist say that mass is? If the latter do not, then what 
could he understand deep-water waves to be? Note that if properties and non-
objects are inventions, then it follows that many of the 'things' which scientific 
realists place in those categories are also inventions; ways in which we see the 
world, rather than ways the world could be (or is). This is certainly the case 
when dealing with theoretical entities such as mass, or light. And note that 
these are theoretical entities, for although we can directly perceive 
'gravitational' forces and colours, we cannot directly perceive that which we 
posit to be causally responsible (at least in part) for such experiences. 
That is not all, however, for we might also question how a realist scientist 
could believe in partial degrees of entailment without adopting something like a 
logical interpretation of probability - that is, without believing that 
probabilities should be understood, at least in certain circumstances, as 
rational degrees of belief rather than mere degrees ofbelief2B6 Under such an 
interpretation, there is a real probability-relation, p, which exists between any 
two sets of propositions, evidence and hypothesis. And such a relation, were 
it to exist, would clearly be an abstract entity- one which the realist might 
want to claim, following Keynes, that we are capable of intuiting. 
To claim otherwise, for example to accept a subjectivist account of Bayesian 
learning, would be to admit that' degree of confirmation' is a purely 
psychological, rather than objective, quantity (or quality, if we allow for non-
numerical probabilities).287 But this is unsatisfactory for a scientific realist, 
since it raises serious doubts about the tenability of any link between the 
degree of confirmation of a theory, and its truth-likeness (relative to past 
theories, which may be accounted for by the correspondence principle). If 
the former is purely subjective, then how can it possibly relate to the latter, 
which is surely objective? There seems to be no plausible answer to this 
286 The realist is also entitled to believe in aleatonJ probabilities, of course. Indeed, one might 
legitimately believe in subjective, logical and frequency (or propensihJ) interpretations, relative to 
context. Carnap writes of: 'probability1, a degree of confirmation' and 'probability2, relative 
frequency'. But he also writes: 'It cannot, of course, be denied that there is also a subjective, 
psychological concept for which the term 'probability' may be used and sometimes is used. 
This is the concept of the degree of actual, as distinguished from rational, belief ... This 
concept is of importance for the theory of human behaviour, hence for psychology, sociology, 
economics, etc.' Carnap [1962], pp.29-37 + p.51 
287 Here, my use of 'objective' should not be understood as suggesting a link to the frequency 
or propensity theories of probability; I refer to these as aleatonJ. For more on this, see 
Rowbottom [2001]. 
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question, as I am sure that Popper would have been most eager to point 
out.2BB 
I should add, however, that my presentation has been skewed towards the 
theoretical, rather than experimental, aspects of science; this is perhaps natural, 
though somewhat regrettable, given that such a bias is prevalent in the 
literature on the philosophy of science over the past century. Given this, it 
should perhaps be added that some realist scientists might never need to 
think metaphysically, if they are only going about the business of data 
collection. This would have been a rare occurrence in the past, for the two 
aspects of science were more closely intertwined -take Brahe' s work in 
Uranisborg as an example -but in the present day, it is certainly possible. 
Some might call such scientists 'hacks', but this seems ill-advised given that 
there would be no science without data. 
3.3 ARGUMENTS FOR OR AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM, FROM 
METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in chapter 2, I want to have it that realists and anti-realists adopt 
different auxilianJ methods, but rely on the same normative methods, when 
practising science; the latter are dominant in normal science, whereas the 
former are dominant in extraordinanJ science. 
Thus, any arguments for scientific realism from methodology present (or past) 
will rely on claims about the relative efficacy of different sets of auxilianJ 
methods, with particular attention being paid to periods of 'crisis', or 
extraordinanJ science.2B9 Specifically, if it could be shown that there were 
certain auxiliary methods which were employed by realists, but not anti-
realists, and were vital in theory-construction, then this might demonstrate 
that science needs realist practitioners. It might then be held to follow that 
realism about science was a superior philosophical position, at least on 
pragmatic grounds.290 
Are there any such arguments for mainstream scientific realism, taken as a 
whole? I think that the answer to this question is difficult to see, insofar as 
some sophisticated anti-realists- such as constructive empiricists- would 
288 This is precisely why Carnap wanted an objective, but not aleatory, account of degree of 
confirmation; else, Popper's criticisms of induction in the Logic of Scientific Discovery do 
seem to hit home. 
289 As I argued earlier, insofar as auxilian; metlzods are applied in normal science, in the means 
by which a puzzle is solved, it is good for science that it has both anti-realist and realist 
practitioners. 
290 Of course, it would not necessarily follow that scientific realism was more h·uth-like than 
anti-realism; as an analogue, even if he agreed that we need to behave as if thesis M is correct, 
the sceptic might still say that it is not. 
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claim to be able to accept literal interpretations of theories as approximately 
true, and work with them as if they were, without needing to believe that they 
were. And it seems a small step for those such as van Fraassen to claim that 
such an anti-realist could, therefore, adopt any set of auxilian; methods that 
involved viewing theories as being approximately true. (If this sort of claim is 
thought to be faulty, then the argument against it must take place on 
epistemological territory - philosophical analysis of science, present or past, 
cannot contribute much, if anything, to such a debate.291) 
However, this said, it is far from clear that there is not such an argument for 
Thesis S. After all, it seems that it is necessary to assign some sort of literal 
interpretation to many mathematical laws, in order to be able to apply them. 
In some cases, when dealing with macroscopic laws such as the Ideal Gas 
Law, only a few 'correspondence rules', clearly related to observables (e.g. 'p' 
corresponds to the observable 'pressure') are necessary. This presents little 
problem for the instrumentalist. However, in other cases, it seems vital to 
understand some mathematical symbols as being referent to unobservable 
entities (i.e. natural kinds, properties of those natural kinds, etc.). Consider 
'refractive index of water', 'half-life of uranium', or 'period of B-DNA helices'. 
Of course, we could always employ Craigian versions of such laws/ theories, 
but unfortunately we do not have an infinite period of time on our hands.292 
As was suggested towards the end of section 2.2, this literal/ realist 
interpretation of mathematical entities is a move that a genuine 
instrumentalist would really have little, if any, reason to want to do. That is, 
aside from his desire to curry the favour and support of his realist 
contemporaries. The realist, on the other hand, will welcome such a 
challenge, and take it very seriously. This is just as well, one might say, since 
it seems that it needs to be done in any event. 
In short, my second conclusion is that, methodologically speaking, it is 
necessary for the scientist (theoretician) to behave as ifthesis S is correct. But 
if it tells against scepticism that the sceptic must behave as if thesis M is right, 
then it is also tells against instrumentalism that the instrumentalist scientist 
must behave as if thesis S is right. Therefore, thesis S is, at the very least, just 
as plausible as thesis M; those who commit to belief in the latter, while 
believing that science is a worthwhile activity and denying the former, seem 
to be acting on a whim. 
291 The line between 'acceptance' and 'belief' is certainly a blurred one, and it remains to be 
seen whether any principled distinction can be made between the two. This is a very difficult 
issue, which I do not feel that I am equipped to h·eat. 
292 Craig' s theorem was discussed in section 1.1, under 'TILe Semantic Thesis'. 
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